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In this dissertation I ask: What accounts for the emergence and electoral performance of 
Eurosceptic political parties in the domestic party systems of Central and East Europe (CEE)? 
Related to this question, I explore how the determinants of electoral Euroscepticism differ from 
those of genuine, value-based Euroscepticism in CEE. In explaining what drives political parties 
to adopt a Eurosceptic agenda, two potential causal factors can be identified. Eurosceptic parties 
can try to capture genuine anti-EU sentiments among voters or they can aim to strategically 
challenge mainstream political elites on a core issue – EU accession - that had grown to define 
mainstream policies. In the second case, opposition to the EU serves only as a signal to voters 
and is instrumental in capturing the segments of the population that have become dissatisfied 
with mainstream governments.  
Yet, a perception of “sameness” of the mainstream political parties does not 
automatically need to result in a protest vote. If citizens felt that the core political parties are 
performing satisfactorily, their convergence on a variety of issues might not have resulted in 
disenchantment with the political process. In Central and East Europe, however, mainstream 
political elites have continuously been charged with engaging in corrupt and dishonest behavior 
with disastrous consequences for the political system. Perceptions of widespread political 
corruption can thus serve as a trigger which, coupled with viewing mainstream parties as “all the 
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same”, intensifies the likelihood that voters would choose a Eurosceptic party as a form of 
electoral protest.  
I test my theory through a combination of statistical analysis and comparative case 
studies. I use an original random representative survey conducted in Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic to test this dissertation‟s individual level hypotheses. At the country level, I use a 
longitudinal analysis of election results from all countries in Central and East Europe. Finally, I 
conduct in-depth case studies of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Results support the 
main propositions of this study and confirm that perceptions of mainstream party similarity and 
political corruption are associated with a Eurosceptic vote.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I ask: What accounts for the emergence and electoral performance of 
Eurosceptic political parties in the domestic party systems of Central and East Europe (CEE)? 
Related to this question, I explore how the determinants of electoral Euroscepticism differ from 
those of genuine, ideology-based Euroscepticism in CEE. In 2002 approximately 21% of parties 
participating in government had a negative position on European integration and in 2006 the 
number was about 25%. For those two time points, about 16% of governing parties held a 
skeptical view of European integration in Western Europe in 2002 and about 18% in 2006.
1
 
While these differences between the new and the old member states are not substantial, 
they become more unusual when one compares the overall attitudes towards the European Union 
displayed by public opinion. In 2002, for example, more than 6 out of 10 people (62%) in the 
candidate countries tended to trust the EU – a number much higher than the average 30% 
satisfaction with domestic institutions across Central and East Europe. Trust in the European 
Union in the West was at an average of 46%.
2
  In the same year, every 6 out of 10 people in the 
EU-15 were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country while satisfaction with the 
way democracy works in the EU averaged approximately 47%. Eurosceptics, therefore, tend to 
                                                 
1
 Liesbet Hooghe, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine de Vries, Erica Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rovny, 
Marco Steenbergen (2008), "Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 
of 2002 and 2006", unpublished ms 
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 Standard Eurobarometer 57 and 58 (Spring and Autumn 2002) and Candidates Eurobarometer 2002.  
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do better and grow at a faster rate in Central and East Europe despite the fact that East Europeans 
on average trust the EU more than their West European counterparts.  
In addition, many Eurosceptic parties, while not in the governing coalition, have gained 
access to national parliaments across CEE and have established themselves as an oppositional 
force. Parties with moderate or high Eurosceptic agenda gained 50% of the vote in Hungary, 
46% in Poland, 31% in the Czech Republic in the last parliamentary election. At the same time, 
there are important regional differences present with Eurosceptic parties gaining only about 20% 
of the vote in Estonia and only 6% of the vote share in Slovenia. Almost all of the Eurosceptic 
parties in Poland, Hungary and Slovenia have a clear populist basis as well, and virtually every 
country in the region has had at least one strong populist party in recent elections, thus adding to 
the spread of protest politics.  
A paradox, however, arises from the fact that the distribution of Eurosceptic parties in a 
country does not always mirror the distribution of public opinion. Instances where public opinion 
polls reveal a population that expresses significant disapproval of European integration or EU 
membership also exhibit few or weak Eurosceptic parties in the political system (e.g. Estonia), 
and vice versa (e.g. Poland). This raises two important questions: first, if it is not the public 
attitudes towards European integration that explain the electoral success (or lack thereof) of these 
political parties, what does? And second, if Eurosceptic parties are gaining support for reasons 
unrelated to their opinions on Europe, then why engage the Eurosceptic dimension?  
In my dissertation I explore these questions through a cross-national and individual-level 
analysis of the determinants of Euroscepticism, and protest politics in general, in the political 
systems of Central and East European countries. My project will contribute to the growing 
literature on political parties and electoral behavior in Central and East Europe and, more 
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specifically, to the study of Euroscepticism and populism in the region. In addition, by looking at 
the effect of the EU on CEE party systems, this study will add to our understanding of the 
international effects on domestic politics. The idea that Europeanization has affected the nature 
of party systems in the candidate states supplements current Europeanization studies by 
exploring an issue area - party politics - which is rarely considered susceptible to international 
effects and thus often excluded from studies of Europeanization. This omission needs to be 
addressed in order to fully grasp the range of EU effects in the societies of candidate states.  
1.1 THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
In this dissertation I argue that Euroscepticism in Central and East Europe is a strategic response 
to various degrees of mainstream party convergence and its electoral success is largely due to the 
disenchantment of the population with domestic elites and political processes rather than the EU 
per se. Political parties in the new member states adopt a Eurosceptic agenda as a means of 
differentiating themselves from the mainstream consensus and offering voters an electoral 
alternative. Citizens who choose these parties do so largely as a form of protest against what they 
see as the hollow mainstream party competition and the lack of choice on substantive issues. 
Many of these Eurosceptic parties lack clearly defined and stable positions on substantive issues 
but their main appeal consists of opposing the mainstream establishment. Picking on the EU 
issue often represents a shortcut to get their message of protest politics across to the voters.  
In explaining what drives political parties to adopt a Eurosceptic agenda, two potential 
causal factors can be identified. Eurosceptic parties can try to capture genuine anti-EU 
sentiments among voters or they can aim to strategically challenge mainstream political elites on 
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the core issue – EU accession - that had grown to define mainstream policies. In the second case, 
opposition to the EU serves only as a signal to voters and is instrumental in capturing the 
segments of the population that have become dissatisfied with mainstream governments. The 
classic way to study Euroscepticism generally assumes the first, while in my project I argue that 
the second scenario would better fit the empirical reality in Central and East Europe and 
reconcile the paradoxes surrounding the success of these anti-EU parties in a largely pro-EU 
population. 
Yet, a perception of “sameness” of the mainstream political parties does not 
automatically need to result in a protest vote. If citizens felt that the core political parties are 
performing satisfactorily, their convergence on a variety of issues might not have resulted in 
disenchantment with the political process. In Central and East Europe, however, mainstream 
political elites have continuously been charged with engaging in corrupt and dishonest behavior 
with disastrous consequences for the political system. Perceptions of widespread political 
corruption can thus serve as a trigger which, coupled with viewing mainstream parties as “all the 
same”, intensifies the likelihood that voters would choose a Eurosceptic party as a form of 
electoral protest.  
For the sake of capturing this larger sense of disenchantment with the mainstream elite, 
Eurosceptic parties in CEE often have heavy populist undertones in their rhetoric and utilize the 
corruption issue to their benefit. Thus, I will analyze Eurosceptic parties as a subset of the larger 
category of protest parties and attempt to disentangle the link between populism and 
Euroscepticism. According to my argument, the domestic electoral success of protest parties that 
mix Euroscepticism with populism is largely due to the populist anti-elite and anti-corruption 
element in them rather than their anti-EU positions.  
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1.2 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of five additional chapters. In the current chapter I have presented the 
research question and briefly outlined my theory.  In Chapter 2 I discuss the existing literature on 
Euroscepticism, populism and Europeanization in more detail and explain how my study 
complements and expands previous research.  
In Chapter 3 I present my theory of the sources and determinants of Euroscepticism in 
Central and East Europe. I begin with a discussion on the many conceptions of Euroscepticism 
and populism and the link between the two. The definitional problem with such broad concepts 
requires a more in-depth explanation of the particular framework utilized in this dissertation. 
Next, I lay out my theory in greater detail and derive testable hypotheses about the 
manifestations of types of Euroscepticism in the region under study.  
Chapter 4 presents the results of a series of statistical tests of the hypotheses formulated 
in Chapter 3. The first part of the chapter consists of an individual-level analysis of attitudes and 
voting behavior of citizens from the region.  I use original surveys conducted in Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic for the purposes of this project. The second part of the chapter consists of a 
country-level analysis of Euroscepticism‟s determinants in the ten countries of Central and East 
Europe that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. I begin by discussing the coding and 
operationalization procedures, followed by a description of the models specification. Finally, I 
present the results of these tests and discuss their implications for the theoretical framework.  
Chapter 5 presents in-depth comparative case studies of the development of 
Euroscepticism in three countries from the sample under consideration. This chapter aims to 
supplement the findings from the statistical tests with more contextual and historical information 
and thus clarify the causal mechanisms linking the EU to CEE political parties and ultimately 
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voters. The cases analyzed include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Estonia. These three 
countries display variation in terms of the relationship between party based and public 
Euroscepticism. While the Czech Republic has traditionally contained strong strands of 
Euroscepticism in its party system, its public is much more favorable to the EU. The opposite is 
the case in Estonia which is often regarded as the most Eurosceptic CEE country in terms of 
popular attitudes, yet Eurosceptic political parties are barely in existence. Finally, Bulgaria 
presents a case where for a long time period both party-based and public-based Euroscepticism 
was relatively low, only to become more prominent in recent elections.  
The last chapter concludes the dissertation with a summary of the theory and empirical 
findings and a discussion of their implications for both academic research and policy makers.  I 
also discuss the limitations of this study and the possible ways in which the project can be 
extended in the future in order to enhance our knowledge and understanding of the phenomena in 
question.  
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2.0  OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This dissertation explores the determinants of Euroscepticism in Central and East Europe and 
attempts to disentangle the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism. The current 
chapter provides the theoretical context within which the current study is situated and outlines 
the gaps in the literature that chapter 3 will subsequently address.  
I begin the chapter with a discussion of the prior work on Euroscepticism and populism 
in the region. The Eurosceptic research agenda has grown substantially in recent years but 
different subsets of it do not always speak to each other. Most studies focus exclusive on either 
party-based or public Euroscepticism without investigating the link between the two. The 
necessity to explore this link in more detail arises from the paradox mentioned earlier where 
levels of party-based and population based Euroscepticism do not overlap in any given country. 
The theory developed in the next chapter attempts to rectify this omission and provide the 
missing link between people, parties and the European issue in the new member states.  
Next, the chapter reviews the existing literature on the Europeanization of party politics 
in the new member states and outlines how this study supplements and extends the research 
agenda. There exists a near universal agreement among Europeanization scholars that Europe has 
had little direct impact on the party systems, party competition and the political parties 
themselves in the new member states.   While previous work acknowledges that indirect effects 
are likely to be present, there has been little research into their electoral implications. The theory 
 8 
presented in this study illustrates how it is the consequences of Europeanization‟s indirect effects 
on party systems that are partially responsible for electoral outcomes in Central and East Europe. 
2.1 THE EUROSCEPTIC AND POPULIST PARADOX IN CENTRAL AND EAST 
EUROPE 
Studies of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe have either focused on accounting for 
the type and electoral strength of party-based Euroscepticism (Marks and Wilson, 2000; 
Kopecky and Mudde, 2002) or on exploring the individual-level determinants of Eurosceptic 
attitudes among ordinary citizens. Most research on party Euroscepticism aims to build 
typologies of Eurosceptic parties and to answer the questions of when and why a political party 
adopts a Eurosceptic agenda. The seminal work of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) laid the 
foundation for this research agenda by proposing a dichotomy between „hard‟ and „soft‟ party 
Euroscepticism. Hard Eurosceptics are distinguished by an “outright rejection of the entire 
project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one‟s country joining 
or remaining a member of the EU” (p.3) while the soft variation of the sentiment involves only 
“contingent or qualified opposition to European integration” (p.4).  
This typology has been widely used in further studies, but it has not remained without its 
critics. Kopecky and Mudde (2002) propose an alternative to the hard-soft Euroscepticism 
divide. They apply Easton‟s (1964) concept of diffuse and specific system support to the 
European Union and arrive at four types of Eurosceptics – the Euroenthusiasts who support both 
the idea and practice of European integration, the Eurorejects who do not support either of the 
two; the Eurosceptics who support the general idea of European integration but disagree with the 
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general practice of integration and the Euro pragmatists who are against the idea of European 
integration but support the practice of it. Vasilopoulou (2009) takes the categorization one step 
further by distinguishing between parties on the basis of three criteria – the principle, practice 
and future of European integration. She arrives at three main categories – rejecting 
Euroscepticism is practiced by parties “that are wholeheartedly against all aspects of European 
integration” (p.7); conditional Euroscepticism refers to parties that accept the principle of 
European integration, but are skeptical of the current practice of integration and any future 
extensions of EU level policy-making; compromising Euroscepticism is practiced by parties who 
accept the principle and current practice of European integration but oppose any future political 
integration.  
Approaching the definitional issue from a different angle, another set of studies examines 
which general party families are more likely to subsume the Eurosceptic brand. In this case 
Euroscepticism is seen as one manifestation of a general political ideology. Most studies locate 
party Euroscepticism at the extremes of political life. Ray (2007) concludes that Euroscepticism, 
with a few exceptions, is “still a distinctly marginal phenomenon, rarely encountered in the 
political mainstream” (p. 170). Similarly, De Vries and Edwards (2009) provide evidence that 
“Eurosceptic cues are found at both extremes of the political spectrum but for different reasons” 
(p. 22). Other scholars agree that Euroscepticism is a fringe phenomenon but tend to locate 
Eurosceptic parties predominantly on the right of the political system (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 
2001; Henderson, 2002). Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2006) look at the nature of the entire 
party system instead and propose that party systems where competition is structured at 
programmatic rather than clientelistic competition “are more likely to be polarized on integration 
and enlargement” since programmatic parties are generally based upon values.  
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Markowski and Tucker (2010), on the other hand, investigate party Euroscepticism in 
Poland and argue that Eurosceptic parties emerge naturally whenever a portion of the electorate 
is underrepresented. This conception of party-based Euroscepticism as a response to pre-existing 
Eurosceptic sentiments in the population, however, fails to explain the disjuncture between 
party-level and public Euroscepticism. A parallel debate within the Euroscepticism literature 
focuses around the question of whether party Euroscepticism is the result of ideology or strategy. 
Some authors contend that ideology plays a dominant part in determining parties‟ positioning on 
the European issue (Taggart, 1998; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002) while others perceive 
Euroscepticism as largely a strategic tool used by parties for short-term electoral goals (Mikkel 
and Kasekamp, 2008; Vermeersch, 2008; Sitter, 2001; Neumayer, 2008). Taggart and Szczerbiak 
(2008) sum up and clarify the conceptual underpinnings of this debate by theorizing that parties 
are likely to have broad underlying positions on European integration but whether they choose to 
use the issue “as an element of inter-party competition and how much prominence they give to it 
is, on the other hand, determined by a combination of electoral (strategic) and (coalition) tactical 
factors” (p. 257). This approach allows for greater conceptual clarity, although, of course it is 
often difficult to empirically distinguish a party‟s underlying (ideological) position from the 
short-term electoral uses of Euroscepticism.  
The strategy vs. ideology debate also fails to take into account the disconnect mentioned 
earlier between party-level and public Euroscepticism. If strategy is indeed the driving force of 
Euroscepticism, for reasons of electoral appeal, then we would expect to see more parties using 
the Eurosceptic label in countries with documented large portions of Eurosceptic electorate, such 
as Estonia. If, on the other hand, the underlying ideology of a party was the key determinant, 
then we would observe relative consistency over time. Moreover, the type of political parties that 
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have gained ground in a lot of CEE countries in recent years are largely devoid of value-based, 
programmatic content and rely on populist messages and charismatic leaders. The theory 
developed in the next chapter will explain how Euroscepticism is indeed primarily used as a 
domestic electoral strategy but for rather different reasons than capturing an underrepresented 
Eurosceptic segment of the population.  
2.1.1 The Determinants of Mass Level Euroscepticism 
As the popular consensus on accession was partially weakened with approaching EU 
membership of the Central and East European countries, more attention began to also be devoted 
to exploring the nature and determinants of population-based Euroscepticism and attitudes 
towards EU membership. Much like the original literature on Euroscepticism developed from 
Western Europe, studies in the then candidate member states revolved around exploring the 
significance of three sets of factors: utilitarian, cultural and political. Utilitarian considerations 
are often found to drive some of the variation in support for the EU among citizens (de Vries and 
van Kersbergen, 2007; McLaren, 2006). Much attention has also been devoted to explanations 
stemming from cultural predispositions and identification with either Europe or the nation-state 
(Bruter, 2008; Wessels, 2007; Vetik et. al, 2006). Recent studies have shown that both utilitarian 
and identity-based considerations are major determinants of support for the EU (Hooghe, Huo 
and Marks, 2007; Luedke, 2005; De Vries, Steenbergen and Edwards, 2007). A third strand of 
research which is of particular interest to this project focuses on political factors – such as the 
assessment of the domestic political system and/or EU level institutions.  
Recent studies of CEE voting behavior have begun to empirically explore the link 
between views of the domestic political system and Eurosceptic voting preferences. Jasiewicz 
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(2004) finds that an anti-EU vote in the Polish accession referendum was associated much more 
with a perception that “things are going in the wrong direction” domestically rather than with 
structural socio-economic factors or cultural predispositions. In a later piece in 2008, he looks at 
the nature of Polish populism and argues that the major contributing factors to the surge of 
populism in the country are the failed government policies, the sense of economic and social 
crisis and the corruption scandals plaguing politicians. Putting the conclusions from these two 
studies together, it seems that both the anti-EU vote and the populist vote a few years later were 
caused by similar factors having to do with perceptions about domestic problems. This helps 
illustrate the close overlap between Euroscepticism and populism in the region and the tendency 
of the populist Eurosceptics to gain votes by capitalizing on disenchantment with the domestic 
political system.   
Of course, it is fully possible that the majority of people who voted against EU 
membership in the Polish referendum perceive membership as part of the reasons why “thing are 
going in the wrong direction” domestically. Alternatively, they may be voters who either don‟t 
care much about membership one way or the other, or they realize from preliminary polls that 
the referendum is about to pass in any case,  so they vote “no” in order to „punish‟ domestic 
governments for their perceived inadequacies in handling the country‟s problems. It is the 
relative importance of each of these seemingly similar sentiments that this study will attempt to 
disentangle in order to be able to evaluate whether the anti-EU votes are mostly due to 
underlying Eurosceptic attitudes among the population or to domestic considerations.    
Moreover, if the failure of specific government policies is one of the primary sources of 
popular discontent, why aren‟t mainstream oppositional parties succeeding electorally rather than 
the protest-based parties? The perception that mainstream parties, whether governing or 
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oppositional, are too similar can provide the missing link in the causal process. When coupled 
with widespread corruption perceptions, it leaves citizens with “a feeling of having been 
betrayed by the politicians” and leads them into the domain of protest politics as a “quest for a 
new purity” (Tismaneanu, 2007). 
Perceptions of domestic governments and political actors have been found to matter in 
the Baltic states as well. Mikkel and Pridham (2004) argue that “public opinion on the European 
issue tended to be related to the role and popularity of the government” during the Latvian and 
Estonian accession referendums. Vetik (2003) finds through an examination of Estonian public 
opinion that a decreased trust in national institutions leads to a greater degree of Euroscepticism. 
McLaren (2007) finds the same relationship EU-wide. However, the idea that trust in domestic 
institutions affects levels of support for the EU has not remained uncontested. Lust (2006) argues 
that such relatively fixed characteristics as income and ethnicity predict the anti-EU vote better 
than trust in government. Ilonszki (2009), on the other hand, contends that “the more critical 
respondents are about their national polity, the more positive they seem to be about strengthening 
the unification process, at least in the CEE context”. 
Moreover, studies of public opinion sometimes produce conflicting findings due to the 
two distinctive ways they measure “public” Euroscepticism. While the majority of studies use 
responses to survey questions about EU support as a dependent variable, others look at the vote 
gains of Eurosceptic political parties. Underlying attitudes, however, do not automatically 
translate into voting preferences as factors like salience and strategic use of the EU issue by 
voters can create a disjuncture. Voters, for whom the EU issue is not that salient, for example, 
may use a seemingly anti-EU vote as a punishment strategy for mainstream elites with which 
they are dissatisfied. This disjuncture is best exemplified by the paradoxes reported continuously 
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across the region regarding the number and strength of Eurosceptic parties and the distribution of 
public opinion on the issue of integration.  
Linking the two levels of analysis is a difficult empirical task since the area of overlap 
between them does not seem large enough, but initial attempts have been made to uncover some 
patterns and provide explanations for the discrepancies found between population-based levels of 
Euroscepticism and the number and strength of Eurosceptic political parties (Linden and 
Pohlman, 2003; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004; Bielasiak, 2004). Findings, however, have so far 
been inconclusive and have focused more on the question of why parties adopt an Eurosceptic 
agenda. Most authors agree that the Eurosceptic brand is used strategically by parties but a causal 
mechanism that accounts for both the motivation of voters to choose these parties and the 
electoral disjuncture between strength of Euroscepticism at the party and mass levels remains 
missing.  
2.1.2 The Manifestations of Populism in Central and East Europe 
Populism, much like Euroscepticism, is a contested concept. Definitions of populism have often 
been criticized as being so broad they can include anything or so specific that you need a 
separate category for each case. Taggart (2000, 2002) offers a set of core characteristics that can 
help us distinguish populist movements. First, populists are inherently hostile to representative 
politics since they portray it as corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of the common people. 
Second, populist movements are characterized by an idealized conception of the country‟s 
„heartland‟ – a notion intentionally ambiguous and romanticized so that to capture a larger 
constituency. Third, populism has an ideological “empty heart” – that is, it can adopt views and 
ideas from the entire range of the political spectrum depending on contextual and strategic 
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necessities since it lacks its own value system.  Fourth, populism emerges as a reaction to a sense 
of crisis in society and builds its platform around the notion that mainstream politics cannot 
adequately handle the pressing problems of the time. Using this analytical framework makes it 
possible to identify populist movements based upon a set of generic criteria while also examining 
the contextual manifestations of each of these criteria and a possible link to Euroscepticism. 
Cas Mudde (2004) when writing on populism in Europe arrives at very similar core 
characteristics of populism: lack of well-defined ideological underpinnings, personalistic 
leadership, anti-elite rhetoric and the juxtaposition of “the pure people” versus the “corrupt 
elite”. Populist supporters are most often those segments of the population who feel “excluded or 
marginalized from national political life” (Weyland, 2001). This disadvantaged segment of the 
population is assumed to harbor intense disenchantment and distrust of traditional political elites 
and the populists appeal to this sentiment through their markedly anti-elite discourse (De la 
Torre, 2000).  Thus, it often seems clearer who and what populists are against than what they are 
for. They are against established elites and mainstream politics, and/or against groups in society 
targeted as the “others” – the ones who do not fit in the carefully constructed ideal of the 
heartland.  
Studies of populism in Central and East Europe have proliferated recently following the 
region-wide rise to power of populist political parties. Authors have asserted that the populist 
resurgence is not merely a symptom of transition, nor is it a pre- or post-accession phenomenon, 
but a lasting political development that is not confined to the fringes of party systems anymore 
(Rajacic, 2007; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007; Krastev and Smilov, 2008). Most studies also 
acknowledge that populism has varying manifestations and comes in degrees. Krastev and 
Smilov (2008) distinguish between “soft” and “hard” populism depending on whether it 
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challenges mainly the existing party system or the entire principles of liberal democracy. 
Meseznikov et. al (2008) come up with as many as 6 categories of populism observed in CEE – 
far-right nationalistic; agrarian; anti-capitalist; moderate social; nationalist-conservative, and 
centrist.  Shafir (2008) analyzes the different degrees of populism found within political parties 
in the party system of Romania. Smilov (2008) finds that populism has incorporated a 
nationalistic discourse into mainstream politics, at least in the case of Bulgaria, while Ucen 
(2007) argues that CEE has become the playground of a new “centrist” type of populism  which 
is “largely free from nationalist mobilization”.  
The causes of populism have also garnered the attention of scholars in the field. Most 
analyses agree that there seem to be some common pre-conditions for the emergence of populism 
such as the spread of corruption among political elites in the region, the constrained 
mainstreamed party competition before accession and economic dissatisfaction. Others go as far 
as to suggest leftover authoritarian values from the communist time period are behind the 
populist surge (Mungiu-Pippidi and Mindruta, 2002) or to link populist rhetoric to an attempt to 
discredit the post-communist political mainstream (Ucen, 2007). While all these studies make 
important analytical contributions to conceptualizing and approaching the study of populism in 
the region, very few of them have conducted a rigorous empirical analysis of voting preferences 
and populism. Linking underlying attitudes to voting preferences will remedy this gap and 
provide insight into the political systems of Centrals and East Europe.  
2.1.3 Linking Euroscepticism and Populism 
With the parallel increase in the electoral salience of both Euroscepticism and populism in 
Central and East Europe, it is surprising that few studies have explicitly addressed the link 
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between the two. Most of the works referred to in the previous sections of this chapter focus on 
one or the other as the major target of analysis. Some of this omission is due to a sometimes 
explicit, but more often implicit, assumption that Euroscepticism and populism are the two sides 
of the same coin, or, in other words, Euroscepticism is merely a subset of populism. While that 
is, indeed, the case for a number of political parties, the Western European experience has 
demonstrated that Euroscepticism can and does occasionally exist in mainstream political 
discourse and is not necessarily the domain of anti-establishment and/or populist parties. In 
addition, whenever the varying degree of opposition to the EU does in fact go hand in hand with 
populism, it remains unclear whether it is the populist anti-elite element of a party that drives 
voters to support it or whether the Eurosceptic strand plays a more significant role.  
Hooghe et.al (2007) present one of the few studies that explore the above-mentioned link. 
The authors find that populist parties on the right use Euroscepticism as a tool to activate anti-
immigrant attitudes on the part of the population. If one focuses exclusively on Central and East 
Europe, however, the immigrant issue is still barely in existence. Nonetheless, what the authors 
find to be due to anti-immigrant sentiment may well be translated into the CEE context when one 
uses attitudes towards traditional minorities instead. Krouwel and Abts (2007), on the other hand, 
argue that populists are able to influence political attitudes and transform “mild Euroscepticism” 
into a more stringent negative orientation dubbed Eurocynicism. While this is an analytically 
appealing proposition, empirical evidence from Central and East Europe does not seem to 
confirm their propositions. Populist parties grew in numbers and increased their electoral 
successes at a much higher rate than any recorded increase in cynical attitudes towards Europe. 
Cynical attitudes have, instead, been directed predominantly towards the national political elites 
of the post-communist mainstream.   
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As the above sections have illustrated, there is a growing compilation of scholarly work 
on populism and Euroscepticism in the region. The initial research contributions, however, have 
largely focused on conceptual issues and party-level developments; and – in the case of 
Euroscepticism – have treated attitudinal and electoral Euroscepticism at the mass level as 
inherently the same. The next chapter of this dissertation puts forth a comprehensive theory 
addressing these gaps in the theoretical and empirical work on Euroscepticism, populism and the 
link between the two in the societies of Central and East Europe.  
2.2 EUROPEANIZATION AND THE PARTY SYSTEMS OF CENTRAL AND EAST 
EUROPE 
The theory developed in this dissertation contends that the indirect effects of the Europeanization 
process have important electoral consequences. The EU accession process in Central and East 
Europe presented governments in the region with a set of extensive requirements under close 
monitoring by the European Commission. Mainstream political parties competed as to who can 
faster implement the needed reforms and gradually moved closer in the political issue-space 
since the only legitimate political direction was becoming an EU member. When increasing 
corruption scandals and a disillusioned electorate, however, created the pre-conditions for the 
emergence of anti-mainstream protest parties, the EU issue became an easy target for these new 
parties to distinguish themselves from the established elite and signal to voters that “politics can 
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be different”3. Europeanization of the mainstream political parties, therefore, indirectly 
facilitated the ability of protest politics to gain grounds in varying degrees across the region.   
While there have been two distinct strands of theoretical work focusing on either the “top 
down” or “bottom up” Europeanization processes, this study is concerned exclusively with the 
former. Radaelli (2000) defines Europeanization as a set of processes through which EU policies, 
rules, norms and procedures become “incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, 
political structures and public policies”. Similarly, Ladrech (2002) defines it as the responses by 
actors to the impact of European integration. Theoretical approaches designed to explain 
Europeanization were initially developed in Western Europe to account for the political systems 
of the EU 15 but they seem to be well suited to account for Europeanization patterns in the East 
as well. Due to the extensive conditionality imposed upon candidate states, Europeanization 
studies on CEE have contended that the institutional and policy effects of the EU have been even 
more immediate and comprehensive than in the old member states (Grabbe, 2001). 
While Europeanization processes and outcomes have been more extensively studied in 
the context of the West European member states, expanding the research agenda to include CEE 
has opened up opportunities for additional insights into the empirical manifestation of the 
Europeanization phenomenon. The seminal work of Shimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) 
charts several possible directions for studying Europeanization in the CEE – from explaining 
variation in the success of EU conditionality to comparing Europeanization responses in the 
“new” and “old” EU member-states. By means of a comparative analysis of selected EU 
candidate states in the issue-area of minority protection, they are able to conclude that the 
                                                 
3
 Politics Can Be Different is the name of a newly formed Hungarian political party with a strong anti-corruption 
element.  
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combination of high EU credibility and low governmental costs is the key to successful EU 
conditionality.  
Consistent with these propositions and suggestions for directions of future research, 
studies of Europeanization in the CEE countries can be categorized as focusing on one of two 
major lines of analysis – explaining different degrees of rule adoption in the candidate countries, 
or in other words the variation in Europeanization outcomes, and testing the causal mechanisms 
that lead to these outcomes. Adoption of EU conditionality has been hypothesized to be a 
function of either external or internal incentives, often a combination of both. These models have 
been applied to a variety of issue areas in CEE – minority rights (Schwellnus, 2005), 
administrative reform (Goetz, 2001; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004; Dimitrova & 
Steunenberg, 2005), regional governance (O‟dwyer, 2006), legislatures (Agh, 1998).  
While Europeanization is, therefore, a broad concept that encompasses a wide variety of 
social, political and economic phenomena, its impact on policy has been much stronger than on 
polities or politics (Borzel, 2006). Mair‟s (2000) assessment of Europeanization‟s effects on the 
format and mechanics of national party system similarly leads him to conclude that “there is very 
little evidence of any direct impact on these features of party systems.” However, it is the 
indirect effects of Europe on national political systems that may be the most causally significant 
ones. In his analysis Mair acknowledges that “European integration increasingly operates to 
constrain the freedom of movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing 
out of competitions among these parties with governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a degree 
of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of policy 
alternatives available to voters”.  
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Mair‟s study is concerned with West European party systems but subsequent works on 
pre- and post-accession states in CEE largely confirm these propositions. Ladrech‟s (2002) 
seminal work on the Europeanization of parties and party systems charted out a useful research 
agenda for Europeanization scholars. Employing Ladrech‟s framework, studies of the CEE 
region or individual countries have generally found that there is little, if any, evidence of direct 
impact of Europeanization on parties and party systems (Szczerbiak and Bil, 2009; Lewis, 2008; 
Hlousek and Pseja, 2009; Sikk, 2009; Fink-Hafner and Krasovec, 2006, Ikstens, 2006; Duvold 
and Jurkynas, 2006; Grecu, 2006). We have not witnessed significant organizational or 
programmatic changes in political parties whose effect can be ascribed to Europe, nor have we 
seen the emergence of new parties built exclusively around the EU issue.  
Studies have, however, largely acknowledged the presence of the previously mentioned 
indirect effects of the Europeanization process. Haughton and Rybar (2009) find that the only 
discernible roles of the EU in the party systems of CEE have been to serve as a source of 
agreement, a reference point and a measure of competence. In other words, the goal of EU 
membership and its wide resonance across society meant a consensus at the elite level as well – a 
consensus that no mainstream political party aspiring for a place in government would dare 
break. For a long period of time Europe functioned as “an all embracing concept, which united 
the political elites and the masses in their burning desire to join the European Union” (Kopecky 
and Mudde, 2002). Given the approaching membership deadlines and the competitive pressures 
to be among the front-runners, national legislation implementing the EU acquis communautaire 
was subject to little modification or debate in CEE parliaments. Moreover, there is evidence to 
suggest that decision-making within parties has also become more centralized due to 
Europeanization effects since party leaders participating in negotiations with Brussels have an 
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informational and agenda-setting advantage (Raunio, 2002). Thus, the avenues for meaningful 
political debate on the EU-promoted reforms were heavily constrained for mainstream political 
parties participating or hoping to participate in government.  
The asymmetric power relationship between the applicant countries and the EU, 
moreover, provided little opportunity for disputing the substance of the reforms, only their pace 
(Grabbe, 2003). While some of the candidate countries were able to secure more concessions 
than others through the use of bargaining strategies, one could hardly call into the question the 
dominant position that the EU held in the negotiations process. The CEE states were confined to 
being the “consumers” of Europeanization rather than also its “producers” (Papadimitriou, 
2002). Parties would thus rarely question or open to public debate the substance of the EU-
desired reforms. This reduced the range of ideological and policy alternatives available to 
mainstream political actors and resulted in parties competing mainly on the basis of their ability 
to achieve the membership goal the fastest (Grzymala-Busse and Innes, 2003). Elections would 
change the governing party but most key policies would remain the same.  
Similarly, Rupnik (2007) draws attention to the tendency towards “emptying party 
competition and politics more generally of their substance” throughout Europe. Krastev (2007) 
examines Central and East Europe in particular and concludes that the post-communist 
mainstream consensus on EU accession left publics with no acceptable means to express 
dissatisfaction. “Elections no longer offer a grand choice between competing worldviews; 
instead they more and more take the form of referenda on the elites – the “ritual killing” of the 
governments in power” (p.63). Mike (2007) develops a formal model of party collusion in 
Hungary and lends additional support to the idea of constrained party competition due to the 
overarching membership consensus and the “strong norm of euroenthusiasm” established in the 
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region. Other scholars have nonetheless argued that party transformation in post-communist CEE 
remains a function of domestic forces. Ishiyama (2006) concludes that “although in the future 
one might observe a direct relationship between Europeanization and the transformation of the 
successors to the communist parties, at this point, such an empirical relationship does not appear 
to exist”. His study, however, looks at only one type of mainstream political parties.  
The literature on Europeanization of parties and party systems has begun to include the 
new candidate states from the Western Balkans in recent years. Preliminary evidence from the 
region shows that the processes witnessed in Central and East Europe seem to be occurring in the 
next round of prospective EU members as well, since a consensus around the goal of EU 
membership is rapidly becoming the norm at both public and party level (Orlovic, 2007; Vujovic 
and Komar, 2008; Lajh and Krasovec, 2007). Expanding the knowledge of political and electoral 
consequences of the Europeanization process in Central and East Europe, therefore, will provide 
further insight into the oncoming phases of the accession process in the current candidate states.  
Studies of party system Europeanization have overall made significant progress in 
exploring the impact of the EU in the ten new member states from Central and East Europe. 
Relative consensus has emerged among scholars in the field that, while direct impact has been 
limited, indirect effects are indeed observed across the region. The narrowing down of party 
competition has resulted in varying degrees of mainstream party convergence and constrained 
the position-taking capabilities of these parties. However, it is the consequences of these 
developments for electoral outcomes and voting behavior that have not been the subject of a 
systematic analysis and this is what this project seeks to remedy.  
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
As noted previously, the purpose of this project is to develop a generalizable theory of the 
determinants of Euroscepticism and, by extension, populism in Central and East Europe. This 
chapter reviewed the relevant literature and laid out the shortcomings that need to be addressed. 
In the following chapter, I will present a theory of what drives citizens to choose Eurosceptic 
parties and in what ways is electoral Euroscepticism a different phenomenon than genuine, 
attitudinal one.  I will also put forth a set of hypotheses derived from that theory and tested in 
Chapter 4 of the dissertation.  
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3.0  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, I lay out a theory to answer the following question: what accounts for the 
emergence and electoral performance of Eurosceptic political parties in the domestic party 
systems of Central and East Europe? In Chapter 2, I discussed the previous literature that 
informs my theory and provides a starting point for analysis. I argue for a move away from 
treating electoral and value-based Euroscepticism as a manifestation of the same underlying 
sentiment as citizens who have genuine anti-EU feelings and citizens who vote for Eurosceptic 
parties do not form a simple, cohesive category. By treating these two groups separately, this 
study also attempts to account for the Eurosceptic puzzle in Central and East Europe. Across 
countries, this puzzle is best displayed in the discrepancy between the number and strength of 
Eurosceptic political parties and the aggregate support for the EU found at the mass level by 
public opinion polls. Within countries, the paradox relates to the sometimes high electoral results 
for a Eurosceptic party in a largely pro-EU population and vice versa.  
In addition, the review of existing literature identified a gap in terms of our knowledge of 
the link between Euroscepticism and populism, two seemingly similar phenomena that may, 
however, have different underlying causes. Since the majority of studies treat Euroscepticism as 
a subset of populism, the possibility of such different causal mechanism at the level of the voter 
is not adequately addressed. This study remedies this omission by elucidating the mechanisms 
that connect Euroscepticism to populism and, ultimately, to vote choice.  
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With respect to the literature on Europeanization, the analysis presented here addresses 
the consequences of a long-noted but rarely examined in a rigorous empirical manner process – 
namely the narrowing down of party competition and the shrinking policy options of mainstream 
political parties as a result of the societal consensus over EU membership. Essentially, I argue 
that the gradual move of mainstream political actors closer to one another has had electoral 
consequences by instilling in voters the perception that mainstream political parties are all the 
same. Coupled with the notorious increase in corruption perceptions in the last decade, this 
sentiment has become the key culprit for the Eurosceptic and populist wave that has spread 
across the region.  
A theory of the determinants of Euroscepticism must necessarily begin by defining the 
main concepts discussed in the rest of the chapter. In the first section, therefore, I explain how 
Euroscepticism, and its close competitor, populism are to be understood, and I lay out the 
theorized link between the two. After establishing what the concepts mean for this study and how 
they relate to each other, I discuss the process of mainstream party convergence at the elite level 
and the opportunities it created for the emergence of Eurosceptic and populist parties. Next, I 
discuss the theory of voting behavior in terms of why citizens vote for these types of parties and 
why we need to distinguish between electoral and value-based Euroscepticism. I explain the link 
between Europeanization and the electoral manifestations of Euroscepticism and populism. This 
section also puts forth a set of testable hypotheses deduced from the theory. 
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3.1 EUROSCEPTICS, POPULISTS OR BOTH? EXPLAINING THE LINK 
BETWEEN TWO INTERRELATED PHENOMENA 
While the literal definition of Euroscepticism refers to opposition to and suspicion of Europe or 
European integration, political parties that subscribe to Eurosceptic beliefs may have additional 
agendas that do not place the highest priority on anti-Europe sentiments. Taggart (1998) 
categorizes three types of Eurosceptic parties. Single issue Eurosceptic parties can be viewed to 
represent the purest anti-EU sentiment since their entire platform is based upon opposition to 
European integration. Occasionally, mainstream parties can adopt a Eurosceptic agenda for 
strategic reasons – thus forming the second category of Established parties with a Eurosceptic 
position. Finally, the third category of Protest-based Eurosceptic parties is the one that has the 
most relevance to Central in East Europe. Euroscepticism in the region, as I will argue in more 
detail in the further section, is largely a form of protest against developments in the domestic 
political system. 
The predominant type of populism, on the other hand, that has gained electoral ground in 
Central and East Europe is embedded in a rhetoric of anti-corruption and unworthiness of the 
mainstream political parties. It is “a political style that builds upon a rigid dichotomy of “the 
pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” (Cas Mudde, 2004) and it is on its way to becoming a 
powerful political phenomenon in post-communist Europe. This contrasts with the outsider status 
granted to populist parties in most of Western Europe (Kopecky and Mudde, 2002).   
Vermeersch (2008) similarly draws our attention to the fact that nationalist and moderately 
Eurosceptic rhetoric have been observed in the otherwise centrist parties.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Populism and protest-based Euroscepticism share the same principle at their core: protest 
against mainstream parties and aspects of the domestic political system. The overlap of these 
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political strategies in Central and East Europe raises the question: Is party based Euroscepticism 
largely a subset of populism and are voters, therefore, casting their vote for these type of mixed 
parties based on their anti-Europe or their populist dimension? Breaking down the broader 
category of protest parties into “purely populist”, “purely Eurosceptic” and “mixed” as shown in 
Table 3.1 sets up the framework for analysis and establishes some expectations. Populist parties 
are clearly a subtype of protest parties whose discontent is directed at the domestic political 
system namely corrupt and incompetent elites, and/or targeted minority groups. Purely 
Eurosceptic parties, on the other hand, engage exclusively the anti-Europe dimension and do not 
fit the populist criteria. 
 
Table 3.1 Dimensions of Protest 
Type of Party  Type of Protest  
Purely Populist Against Domestic Political System  
Purely Eurosceptic  Against the EU and European integration  
Mixed  Against Domestic Political System              
  
 
The final (and largest in CEE) category of protest parties, the “mixed” group, poses a 
puzzle that I am exploring in this dissertation: Is it the domestic or European protest dimension 
that is dominant? Mixed parties are an embodiment of the “chameleonic” (Taggart, 2002) nature 
of populism since they mix the traditional populist rhetoric with an attack on European 
integration or at least certain aspects of it. They tend to become the “anti-establishment 
something-for-everyone party in a milieu where most of the other parties have crowded into the 
pro-Western, pro-market center” (Ghodsee, 2008). My proposed answer is that, despite the 
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Eurosceptic streak in them, mixed parties succeed electorally largely by appealing to the 
dissatisfaction of citizens with domestic political developments rather than capitalizing on direct 
anti-EU sentiments.  
While the mixed category of protest parties is of greatest interest to my study, the 
distinction between the three different types is a useful analytical tool. One might assume that all 
protest parties in Europe would fall under the “Eurosceptic populists” umbrella of mixed parties. 
However, empirical evidence indicates that this is not necessarily the case. First, Eastern Europe 
in particular can provide examples of populist parties that fit Taggart‟s four criteria discussed 
above without expressing an opposition to the European Union. The National Movement of 
Simeon the Second (NMSS) in Bulgaria, for example, was created no more than 6 months before 
it won the elections on a platform promising a change from the corrupt governing style of the 
other parties. Counting on a charismatic leader, devoid of coherent ideology, appealing to 
national salvation and emerging during a time of perceived crisis, the NMSS “was modeled 
loosely on Berlusconi‟s Forza Italia” (Jones, 2007). Yet, the party was strongly supportive of 
European integration and it was during its term that Bulgaria joined the EU.  
The presence of populist non-Eurosceptics in CEE is one manifestation of the wide 
variety of populism found in the political systems in the region. Heinisch (2008) draws attention 
to some core similarities and differences between West European and East European populists. 
While the Austrian Freedom Party, for example, runs on a chameleonic agenda than covers all 
ranges of the political spectrum, “the greater number of populist movements in the transition 
countries yields a greater variety of populist choices”. Populists in CEE need to not only compete 
with the mainstream parties, but also to distinguish themselves from fellow protest parties.  
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Similarly, the category of pure Eurosceptic parties is not only a hypothetical dimension of 
protest. Pure Euroscepticism, as a party platform, does not conform to all of the characteristics of 
populist movements. The UK is often considered the birthplace of modern Euroscepticism and in 
its inception it was an ideology directed specifically against European integration, rather than 
domestic corruption or targeted minority groups. Euroscepticism, in its non-populist form, thus 
does not have an ideological “empty heart” and is not at odds with the notion of representative 
politics. The Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic is a prominent example of a CEE 
Eurosceptic party that defies categorization as populist. Its prominent leader Vaclav Klaus has 
progressively subscribed to an increasingly vocal Eurosceptic agenda by contesting certain 
aspects of European integration and doubting the benefits of further integration. Yet, the Civic 
Democratic Party has been a part of the mainstream political space and, as far as forms of 
protests are concerned, it lacks a domestic anti-establishment element (Hanley, 2002).    
Of course, the “pure” categories of populism and Euroscepticism are, as mentioned 
above, much less widespread than the mixed one. They can, however, provide a useful means of 
comparison both in terms of institutional characteristics and popular appeal. Merely lumping 
together these various types of political actors as Eurosceptic can obscure the relationships 
between Europe, domestic political systems and citizens. Moreover, one loses important 
contextual information by collapsing all types under the same concepts of either populism or 
Euroscepticism. As part of my empirical work for this study, I will be able to test the usefulness 
of these categories through the statistical analysis and the comparative case studies.  
 31 
3.2 EUROPEANIZATION’S INDIRECT EFFECTS ON CEE PARTY SYSTEMS 
As noted in the previous chapter, there is a fairly wide consensus among scholars that 
Europeanization has had little direct effect on the parties and party systems across Europe. 
However, it is the indirect effects of Europeanization that are of interest to this study. As 
mainstream political parties built a consensus around the issue of European integration and 
proceeded to implement the accession criteria, the number of viable policy positions diminished 
and so did the ability of parties to differentiate themselves. It should be noted that this 
dissertation does not assert that these developments have been observed only in the new member 
states. The arguments made here are likely extendable to Western Europe as well. De Wilde 
(2009), for example, finds that mainstream political parties in the Netherlands “are restricted in 
offering voters substantially different policies, creating the image that they are all similar and 
that it doesn‟t make a difference which of the traditional parties is in power”. Keman and 
Krouwel (2006) also consider the possibility that it has become easier for new parties to enter the 
political space in Western Europe because mainstream parties have moved closer to one another 
since the 1990s.  
These studies suggest that the phenomenon of mainstream party convergence and the 
consequences it carries are a Europe-wide occurrence. Nonetheless, it is the countries from 
Central and East Europe that are the subject of this study because there are ample reasons to 
expect these processes to be even stronger and more consequential in the region. The accession 
criteria that had to be fulfilled by all EU candidate states restrained the policy options of 
mainstream parties. In addition, the environment of overarching consensus on the necessity and 
desirability of membership among elites and publics alike, made it fairly difficult for mainstream 
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political actors to formulate issue positions that diverged from what the accession criteria called 
for.  
After the end of the Cold War, the Central and East European countries embarked on a 
long process of democratization and liberalization. Applying for EU membership in the very 
beginning of the 1990s was viewed as a symbolic act expressing a final break with the past and a 
statement of the ultimate goal of the post-communist transition. A “return to Europe” meant for 
CEE societies getting closer to the economic and social security their West European neighbors 
enjoyed but it also symbolized the struggle for re-defining their national identity and embracing 
the European values of freedom and democracy that had been denied to them under the socialist 
regime. Membership in the European Union thus had both far-reaching practical and symbolic 
importance for CEE countries. It was the ultimate form of legitimizing their belonging to the 
European family and the final reward for the difficulties suffered during the democratic 
transition. As established in the previous section, mainstream political parties in Central and East 
Europe thus had little competitive leeway except to question each other‟s competence in 
implementing the accession criteria within the requested deadline (Grzymala-Busse and Innes, 
2003). Membership became a valence issue (Riishoj, 2007) where real disagreement only 
“encompassed different ways to reach the common goal”. 
The broader rationalist institutionalist framework aimed at explaining domestic change 
suggests that the more new opportunities and constraints Europeanization provides, the more 
likely it is that the domestic distribution of power may be altered and new domestic actors 
empowered in the process (Borzel and Risse, 2000). These new actors could take advantage of 
the opportunity unintentionally created by the Europeanization process and the path they often 
chose was the path of a protest party as this was the electoral strategy that could simultaneously 
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differentiate their message from the mainstream consensus and capture the citizens disenchanted 
with the established political elite. As predicted by Evans and Whitefield (1993) early in the 
post-communist transition, countries dominated by valence issues in CEE became likely to 
produce candidates competing “along lines of competence and charismatic appeal”. Evans and 
Whitefield, however, expected these types of political processes to be more pronounced in only a 
subgroup of the post-communist states while the past decade has witnessed a region-wide trend 
in this direction.   
The opportunities provided by Europeanization for the emergence of these new actors can 
be expected to vary over time. Early in their post-communist transitions, CEE countries 
witnessed few parties of the Eurosceptic or populist kind, and the major electoral cleavage was 
still centered around whether the party is a formerly communist one or not. Moreover, EU 
accession, while accepted as a long-term policy goal, was still too distant and EU conditionality 
was still in its nascent stage. The mainstream consensus on EU accession can be hypothesized as 
becoming consequential for the political system in the late 90s as by that time EU conditionality 
had become much more coherent and detailed, and monitoring mechanisms were in place. The 
Central and East European countries were given regular appraisals and target accession dates 
which created competitive pressures within the region to comply with EU conditionality and gain 
entrance to the EU faster. This is when initial Euroscepticism and later populism started to creep 
into the political systems of CEE states on a regular basis.   
As accession approached, mainstream political parties grew ideologically closer and thus 
opened up more space for the new Eurosceptics and populists. Adopting a Eurosceptic position 
was a more viable option for newly formed parties, but re-defining their positions along those 
lines was not a strategy so readily available to mainstream parties who had been or were 
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currently part of the governing coalition. As more directly involved in negotiations with 
Brussels, mainstream parties were de facto responsible for carrying out and popularizing the 
integration project. This imposed heavier policy constraints on these parties and prevented them 
from taking advantage of the emerging electoral trend. The competition among those parties 
continued to revolve around who can do it better rather than what each one of them can offer that 
is a better alternative.  
After accession some observers hoped that, as EU constraints are lifted, political life 
would return “back to normal”. However, this has certainly not been the case with new populist 
and/or Eurosceptic parties still coming and going, and fairing well in elections. Krastev and 
Smilov (2008) suggest that the new populism has “almost made the concept „party program‟ 
devoid of meaning” as many of the established mainstream political parties have been severely 
weakened. Shafir (2008) explores the progression of Romanian president Traian Basescu who 
was elected in 2004 under a mainstream platform but grew progressively more populist by 2008.  
Romania‟s case illustrates an important point about where the main difference post-
accession possibly lies – mainstream parties need no longer be severely constrained by EU 
conditionality but instead of rebuilding their ideological platforms in opposing ends of the 
political spectrum, they often choose to resort to the language and tactics once reserved for 
populists and Eurosceptics. Thus, the effects of mainstream party convergence on political life in 
the region are not only consequential for the period of pre-accession but are likely to be long 
lasting once the electorate has become accustomed to the populist political style. 
In addition to variation over time, mainstream party convergence can be expected to vary 
across countries. While there has been a general trend of mainstream party convergence within 
the region, different institutional and cultural circumstances can influence the degree to which 
 35 
mainstream political actors are able to differentiate themselves electorally. For example, if an 
otherwise mainstream political party such as the ODS in the Czech Republic incorporates a 
moderately Eurosceptic rhetoric without endangering membership prospects, this could diminish 
the policy space available for new parties of the protest type to successfully mobilize voters. 
Additionally, early front-runners in the process of European integration may behave more freely 
in the domestic arena as they come to believe they have already secured membership while the 
enhanced monitoring and scrutiny directed at the slackers can bring political parties even closer 
in the policy space in the final rush to implement EU-desired policies in a timely manner. 
Finally, the arguments developed above notwithstanding, this study does not wish to 
claim that the accession process has been the only factor affecting the distance between political 
parties. Country-specific developments – such as institutional or cultural pre-conditions 
encouraging polarization and mitigating the effect of EU constraints – can and probably do affect 
the degree to which political parties become similar or stay apart. Due to any of the hereby 
discussed factors, I expect that mainstream party convergence will be a region-wide systematic 
trend but it will not necessarily be of the same intensity across countries.  
3.3 RESPONSE OF THE VOTERS: EXPLAINING THE ELECTORAL PARADOX 
Linking Europeanization to individual-level attitudes about Europe or national systems may not 
at first seem to be a natural fit. Europeanization and individual voting behavior operate at two 
different levels of explanation – Europeanization is a process that affects institutions and policies 
much more directly than individuals. However, since individuals‟ political behavior is, in part, a 
response to the institutional and contextual setting, it is also indirectly a response to Europe‟s 
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influence. Is the narrowing down of the political issue space among mainstream parties related in 
any notable way to citizens‟ vote choices? Can it help explain why many people in these 
countries favor Eurosceptic parties while the aggregate public opinion consensus is largely in 
favor of EU membership? The theory developed here argues that electoral support for 
Eurosceptic parties is in part a function of the narrowed party competition and not merely an 
outgrowth of citizens‟ attitudes towards Europe.  
The study contributes to debates about the determinants of Euroscepticism by asking 
whether it is the populist (domestic) agenda of these mixed parties that drives citizens to support 
them or whether the direct anti-EU sentiments are dominant. An assumption that votes cast for 
parties labeled Eurosceptic are a reflection of anti-EU sentiments ignores the possibility that by 
voting for these parties, individuals may be actually voting based on the populist agenda rather 
than the anti-EU rhetoric. In this sense, votes casts for these parties are “protest” votes – voters 
who fail to see any noteworthy distinctions between mainstream political parties, can cast their 
vote for a Eurosceptic party either based on a limited set of issues these parties have managed to 
capitalize on or as a form of protest against the rest of the political parties being “all the same”.   
While the narrowing down of the political space in CEE has been noted by other authors 
as well (Grzymala-Busse and Innes, 2003; Rupnik, 2007; Krastev and Smilov, 2008), there are 
no systematic investigations of its consequences, nor clear conclusions on these matters. This 
study offers a theoretical model linking Europeanization to mainstream party convergence on 
one hand, and mainstream party convergence to electoral outcomes on the other. In addition, by 
empirically testing these propositions with country level and individual level data from the 
region, it is possible to parse out the relative importance of these factors compared to rival 
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explanations for the electoral success of Eurosceptic and populist parties in Central and East 
Europe.  
Attitudes towards the EU may indeed have an effect in determining vote choice, but it is 
of only secondary importance compared to the impact of domestic perceptions. If we were to 
eliminate the sources of domestic discontent (e.g. corruption, mistrust of domestic politicians, 
“sameness” of mainstream parties), Eurosceptics will still be in existence but in much smaller 
numbers and of different type - the genuine opponents of European integration or aspects of their 
country‟s membership in the EU whose ideological values would most closely match the 
platforms of purely Eurosceptic political parties. Electoral Euroscepticism thus needs to be 
analytically distinguished from value-based Euroscepticism where values concerning the 
European Union directly shape citizens‟ political behavior. It should be noted that the concept of 
“value-based” Euroscepticism as used throughout this dissertation differs from the 
conceptualization used by Leconte (2008). In her study, she conceptualizes “value-based” 
Euroscepticism as the possible relationship between the EU and the “moral corruption” 
corroding societies of EU members. In the current study, value-based Euroscepticism simply 
refers to “Euroscepticism as an attitude” as compared to “Euroscepticism as a vote choice”.  
Electoral Euroscepticism, defined by the electoral performance of Eurosceptic political 
parties, can be the product of a different set of factors such as the ones proposed in this study. 
Thus, even individuals who have a favorable opinion of the EU might be casting votes for the 
type of populist/Eurosceptic political parties prevalent in Central and East Europe if their 
dissatisfaction with the domestic political elite is sufficiently high. This study is attempting to 
disentangle the determinants of electoral Euroscepticism and demonstrate that the electoral 
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performance of Eurosceptic parties in CEE tells us more about voters‟ assessment of the 
domestic political process rather than the European Union.  
While the theory developed here concerns the most recent member states of the EU, it 
should be re-iterated that evidence has shown mainstream political parties in the established 
member states in Western Europe have also moved closer to each other in the political space – a 
development usually explored as a potential contributing factor to the popularity of extreme right 
parties (Kitschelt, 1995; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). There are two key factors, however, that 
make this development much more consequential for political life in Central and East Europe. 
First, the EU-generated reform requirements in CEE were much “broader and deeper in scope” 
(Grabbe, 2003). Countries had little more than a decade to approximate the level of European 
integration achieved over the course of 40 years in Western Europe.  
In addition, a pervasive cultural norm that permeated the societies of CEE countries was 
a desire to move away from the communist legacy and EU membership represented the ultimate 
achievement of that ideal. Even though surveys showed mass publics had little factual 
knowledge of the European Union and its policies, support for membership was 
disproportionately high across the region. Since political elites shared this sentiment, European 
Union membership quickly became the single most prominent unifying goal for elites and mass 
publics. The combination of extensive accession requirements, a short time span to fulfill those 
and a region-wide consensus on the necessity of membership was thus likely to cause a stronger 
and more visible convergence of mainstream political parties in the East.  
It should be noted that mainstream party convergence does not always equal compliance 
with EU requirements. For the most part, convergence is indeed the result of following strict EU 
conditionality in order to gain access to membership. As parties adopt the EU-desired policy 
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positions, they automatically move closer to each other. However, convergence is possible when 
compliance with conditionality is uniformly low rather than uniformly high. The Estonian case 
developed in chapter 5 illustrates this. The European Commission has always promoted a policy 
line of expanding minority rights in the candidate states. Estonian political parties, however, 
were uniformly slow and reluctant in implementing reforms to accommodate the large Russian 
minority. Party convergence in this case occurred around an anti-EU norm, at least on one of the 
salient domestic issues. The manifestations of conditionality-induced party similarity in CEE are 
thus not equivalent across country contexts and the interplay between party convergence and 
other domestic factors influencing vote choice needs to be considered.  
According to the spatial model of electoral choice, individuals choose the party whose 
position on an issue or issues of interest is the closest to their own (Downs, 1967; Enelow and 
Hinich, 1984). This model is likely to fit well in Eastern Europe since partisan attachments are 
still weakly developed and issue positioning is more likely to capture electoral shares. Moreover, 
the unstable party systems, the proliferation of new parties and the demise of old ones suggests a 
much greater volatility on the supply side of the electoral process which is reflected among the 
electorate in unstable party attachments and dissatisfaction with partisanship as a whole (Birch 
2001, 2003; Lewis, 2001; Mair, 1997).  
As parties are more likely to be evaluated on issues, rather than ideology, a major 
electoral strategy becomes unavailable to mainstream political parties if they are constrained to 
express similar, if not overlapping, issue positions on the variety of economic, political and 
social reform areas covered by EU conditionality. Citizens who support EU membership and 
European integration, but are largely dissatisfied with mainstream political parties, can thus cast 
a protest vote if perceptions about the performance of domestic politicians are more salient to 
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them than their beliefs about the EU. The saliency of the EU issue in both party platforms and 
voters‟ minds has, moreover, been found to vary in different elections (Haughton, 2009; 
Szczerbiak and Bil, 2009; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008).  
The dynamic concerning saliency can also be visually represented through elliptical 
indifference curves. Indifference curves illustrate graphically the distance between a voter‟s ideal 
point and the different policy alternatives. Circular indifference curves imply that voters would 
choose the alternative that is closer to their ideal point. Elliptical indifference curves, however, 
are often considered to be the more realistic and prevalent way of modeling voters‟ choices (e.g. 
Stewart, 2001). In this type of preference representation, the importance that voters place on 
different sets of considerations plays a larger role in determining the final outcome. Even if the 
distance between a person‟s ideal point and two indifference curves is the same, the policy 
dimension that has the greater salience falls closer to the ideal point.  
In the figure below, the vertical axis represents one‟s level of support for the EU while 
the horizontal axis is the level of domestic dissatisfaction which I have argued manifests itself 
though the perception that mainstream parties are too similar and too corrupt. If a voter has 
relatively high support for the EU and relatively high level of domestic dissatisfaction, the 
salience of preferences becomes crucial. Party A and B are equally spaced from the voter‟s ideal 
point. All else being equal, this individual should be indifferent between voting for either one of 
those. However, since a higher salience is placed on the beliefs about the domestic system, party 
B is preferred because it falls within the indifference curve while party A falls outside of the 
curve. This demonstrates how a seemingly pro-EU individual may become lumped together with 
the Eurosceptic group on the basis of their vote for a party that mixes populism with 
Euroscepticism. 
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Figure 3.1 Dynamics of Issue Salience 
 
 
In addition to the relatively low salience of the EU issue, the theory developed here posits 
a higher than average salience of domestic issues – corruption perceptions in particular. The 
overall trust in political parties has progressively reached low levels in Central and East Europe, 
with problems of corruption being high on the public agenda. Over the past decade, corruption 
has become an issue dominating political discourse in Central and East Europe. Corruption 
scandals ranging from public servants to highest level government officials have permeated the 
media space. Some notorious examples include Stanislav Gross (Czech prime minister 2004-
2005), Ludovit Kanik (Slovakia employment minister 2002-2006), Peter Medgyessy (Hungarian 
prime minister 2002-2004), Miron Mitrea (Romanian minister of transport 2000-2004) who have 
all faced serious corruption charges. These individuals, moreover, represent only a small subset 
of the corruption-related resignations, cabinet re-shuffles and media scandals that have taken 
place in Central and East Europe in the past decade. Politicians as well as representatives of 
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intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly blaming corruption for 
many of the economic and social problems faced by CEE.  
Grigorescu (2006) develops a measure of the salience of corruption in the media by 
calculating the proportion of news reports or articles mentioning the word „corruption‟ over a 
period of 9 years (1996-2004). The results reveal a substantial increase (approximately seven 
times) in the media coverage of corruption in CEE countries. The trend is, moreover, not a result 
of developments in one or two particularly problematic countries. “Even though there are cases 
such as Romania where the coverage of the issue increased “only” approximately four times and 
others such as the Czech Republic where the topic is approximately ten times more present in the 
news”(Grigoresku, 2009), the corruption issue has become more salient over the past decade in 
all of Central and East Europe. Grigoresku‟s findings cover the period up to 2004 but any close 
inspection of the region‟s news media and scholarly articles reveals that the trend has not 
subsided since then.  
Survey data also strongly suggests that corruption perceptions matter for CEE politics. 
Trends in the 2005 New Democracies Barometer indicate that nearly two-thirds of the voters 
complain of corruption and weak rule of law in their respective countries. Miller, Grodeland and 
Koshechkina (2001) analyze the existence of a habitual “culture of corruption” in the new 
democracies of Central and East Europe and its cross-country variation in scope.  According to 
some of their findings, 84 % of Slovakians, 80% of Czechs and 68% of Bulgarians believe that 
politicians are mostly interested in “gaining special privileges”. Moreover, 50% or more or the 
citizens of Slovakia and the Czech republic believed that politicians now behave worse than 
before and a majority in each surveyed country is convinced that the media actually underreports 
incidents of corruption. In addition, the authors found that corruption at “top government 
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officials” was what angered the public the most despite perceptions that low level public servants 
may also be corrupt.  
The above study was done about 10 years ago, but survey data collected for this 
dissertation indicates that corruption perceptions are just as salient. Nearly half of the sample 
surveyed here (44%) believed that “most public officials” are corrupt while another 15 % stated 
that “almost all” of them are corrupt. These findings nearly a decade apart but nonetheless so 
alike indicate that the saliency of the corruption issue was not a fleeting phenomenon. At the 
same time, there is variation at the country level over time. Bulgarians in the 2001 study 
expressed less dissatisfaction with their politicians than Czechs and Slovaks as mentioned 
previously. In the survey I conducted in 2009, however, the Bulgarian part of the sample 
exhibited higher corruption perceptions and higher institutional distrust than their counterparts in 
the Czech Republic. These findings demonstrate than, while corruption remains salient, there is 
over time and cross country variation that also merits exploration. This is what the second part of 
this project does by examining country level factors influencing Euroscepticism and populism.  
The increase in frequency and media coverage of corruption in the region since the late 
90s coincides with the initial rise of Eurosceptic and populist parties in the region. The 
progressive increase in corruption perceptions and the decreased trust in domestic politicians and 
political parties can serve as a trigger for making citizens susceptible to the appeal of protest 
parties. It is in this political environment that mainstream party convergence becomes more 
strongly linked to electoral behavior. Political corruption can act as an intervening variable 
which, once unleashed in a setting where mainstream party convergence has been on the way, 
can lead to changes in the dynamics of inter-party competition and electoral behavior. Moreover, 
empirical evidence indicates that even in cases where corruption has actually declined in 
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absolute terms, news reports and citizens‟ perceptions paint a picture of corruption either 
remaining “intolerably high” or having worsened over time (Andreev, 2008; Holmes, 2003; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; Grigoresku, 2009). Karklins (2002) offers a good summary of this trend: 
“Strike up a conversation with anyone in the post-communist region and the topic 
of governmental corruption will invariably come up. People are convinced that corruption 
is widespread, and they all have stories to tell, either from their own experience or heard 
from others, including the media. They are frustrated because so little is being done about 
the situation and because they feel helpless and see themselves as being played for fools. 
Many cynically believe that in order to get along they have to “play the game” – that “the 
System” compels them to do so.”  
 
One of the most troubling effects of this development for the quality of democracy in 
CEE is the increasing popular distrust of public institutions and their representatives. It is 
important to point out that this effect is, in fact, one of perceptions of corruption, rather than its 
actual levels. Public trust in politicians or, more broadly, in the political elite, is the result of the 
perceived degree of corruption in a country. Recent studies have acknowledged this analytical 
distinction and argued that “it is the corruption we know about, and not the actual level of 
corruption that governs public sentiments” (Krastev, 2002; Wallace and Latcheva, 2006; 
Littway, 2007). In addition to trust in government institutions, corruption seems to reduce 
interpersonal trust as well (Seligson, 2002; Rothstein and Eek, 2006), thus contributing to a 
general sentiment of cynicism and suspicion of leaders and fellow-citizens alike.  
For the purposes of investigating the factors that drive disenchanted citizens to vote for a 
range of protest parties, therefore, corruption perceptions need to be thoroughly examined as a 
key contributing factor to a populist or Eurosceptic vote. For purely populist parties the 
corruption issue is at the very core of their platforms but perceptions of corruption should play a 
key role in explaining support for the mixed category of populist/Eurosceptic parties as well. 
This effect should be the strongest when coupled with perceptions of increasing mainstream 
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party similarity. In addition, as outlined above, it is possible that the effect of mainstream party 
similarity is conditional on corruption perceptions and has the strongest effect on voting behavior 
when an individual perceives a high degree of political corruption in the country. The possibility 
of a relationship with the pure Eurosceptic parties, also needs to be taken into consideration. 
Citizens from candidate countries may tend to attribute blame for unfavorable domestic 
conditions to their national governments and view the European Union as a potential alternative 
that is likely to succeed where domestic politicians have failed. The EU in this sense is seen as a 
preferred alternative to an incompetent or corrupt domestic elite.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the expectations for relationships discussed in this section. The 
rows represent citizens‟ perception about the nature of party competition, the extent of political 
corruption, and European integration respectively. The columns represent the types of protest 
parties. The types are based upon the party positions on the relevant issues rather than voter 
perceptions. A „yes‟ cell indicates that beliefs about the issue in question are directly related to 
the likelihood of voting for the respective type of protest party. The mixed types, as mentioned 
before, have the highest frequency across the region and are the main subject of the subsequent 
analysis as the motivations of their supporters can tell us more about whether Euroscepticism or 
domestic populism is the dominant determinant of vote choice. The pure categories, while rarer, 
provide a useful point of comparison.  
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      Table 3.2 Expected Effect of Citizens‟ Attitudes on Likelihood of Voting for Party Types. 
 
Citizens’ Views 
Likelihood of Voting for Party Types 
 Purely Populist  Purely 
Eurosceptic 
Mixed 
Views that all 
mainstream parties 
are too similar. 
 
High/conditional on 
perceptions of 
corruption 
 
? 
 
High 
Views that political 
corruption is high. 
High ? 
 
High 
Negative views of the 
EU and European 
integration.  
Low High Low 
 
 
 
To summarize the relationships presented in the above table, beliefs about domestic 
issues (corruption and mainstream party similarity) are expected to affect the likelihood of voting 
for populist or mixed political parties. Beliefs about the European Union and European 
integration are expected to affect the likelihood of voting for purely Eurosceptic political parties. 
Mixed parties, of course, consist of a Eurosceptic element as well by nature of their 
categorization. However, as the saliency of the EU issue is expected to be lower, I argue that 
voters will be likely to base their vote choice on domestic considerations rather than attitudes 
towards the EU. It is precisely because of the “mixed” nature of these parties that the presence of 
electoral Euroscepticism may be overestimated by previous studies. While proclaiming an anti-
EU stance or behaving contrary to basic EU principles may be part of a party‟s repertoire, voters 
who are frustrated with their domestic politicians may vote for this party despite of its anti-EU 
stance not because of it.  
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 In accordance with the theory about individual voting behavior developed above, the 
following propositions can be deduced:  
H1: Citizens who perceive a higher degree of similarity between mainstream political parties 
will be more likely to vote for populist and mixed political parties.    
 
H2: Citizens who perceive a higher degree of political corruption in the country will be more 
likely to vote for populist and mixed political parties. 
 
H3: Citizens who have a less favorable view of EU membership and European integration will 
be more likely to vote for purely Eurosceptic political parties.  
 
While proposition H1 predicts an independent effect of mainstream party convergence, it 
is also possible that low levels of mainstream party convergence would not be that consequential 
yet as to color citizens‟ vote choice. Therefore, an alternative proposition considers the 
conditional effect of this process – namely, mainstream party convergence can become an 
important determinant of vote choice when an individual‟s corruption perceptions have reached a 
certain higher than average level. In other words, the idea that “parties are all the same” begins to 
matter only when “sameness” implies a negative evaluation such as corruption.  
 
H4: Citizens who perceive a higher degree of similarity between mainstream political parties 
and perceive a higher level of corruption in the country will be more likely to vote for populist 
and mixed political parties.  
 
As explained in this and the previous chapter, I expect that the determinants of electoral 
Euroscepticism and those of value-based Euroscepticism to differ substantially. What is meant 
here by “value-based” Euroscepticism is simply the genuine feelings of suspicions of and 
opposition to the EU or European integration as measured by direct polls. Some electoral 
Eurosceptics may, in fact, be potentially more likely to support the EU as an alternative to 
corrupt and disliked political elite domestically. However, as there is no justification to expect 
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this to happen on a systematic basis, this study expects that perceptions of corruption and 
mainstream party similarity will not be related to individuals‟ genuine attitudes towards the 
European Union.   
H5: There is no systematic relationship between perceptions of mainstream party similarity and 
attitudes towards the European Union.      
 
H6: There is no systematic relationship between perceptions of political corruption and attitudes 
towards the European Union.  
   
The hypotheses deduced so far concern the level of the individual. In order to account for 
cross-national variation, however, the study will also test some of these propositions at the 
country level. I argue that mainstream political parties have come closer to each other in the 
policy space as a result of pressures from the EU. This conceptualization differs from Bielasiak‟s 
(2004) idea of the relationship between effective number of parties and Eurosceptic electoral 
success. He finds that, despite theoretical propositions, data from CEE does not seem to confirm 
the existence of a relationship between a crowded political space and the success of Eurosceptic 
parties.  
Rather than looking at the number of effective competitors, however, I am proposing we 
need to look at the distance between them. The political space may consist of only 2 parties, yet 
if they are sufficiently polarized, the electoral results should be less favorable to protest parties. 
A crowded political space, if also characterized by increasing party similarity, can nevertheless 
provide structural predispositions for the emergence and success of protest-based political 
parties. Euroscepticism as an electoral strategy succeeds precisely by presenting an alternative to 
the established consensus. As theorized in this chapter, mainstream party convergence is 
expected to also vary in scope in different countries. Levels of corruption also exhibit overtime 
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and across case variation. The following country-level hypotheses will, therefore, be tested in the 
next chapter:  
H7: The higher the similarity of mainstream political parties, the greater the electoral success of 
populist and mixed (populist/Eurosceptic) parties. 
H8: The higher the level of corruption, the greater the electoral success of populist and mixed 
political parties. 
 
Again, it is possible that it is the interaction of these two factors, or the conditional effect 
of one on the other, that ultimately generates a protest vote. The following proposition accounts 
for this possibility: 
H9: Mainstream party similarity results in a greater electoral success for populist and mixed 
political parties when corruption levels are high. 
 
As far as vote share for the third category of protest parties is concerned, the country-
level hypothesis is also expected to mirror the individual level one:  
H10: The smaller the aggregate approval of the European Union and European integration, the 
greater the electoral success of purely Eurosceptic political parties. 
 
In the following chapter I will discuss and conduct a set of empirical analyses to test the 
above hypotheses.  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have put forth a theory of the determinants of electoral Euroscepticism. I argue 
that when using the term Euroscepticism and when studying the phenomenon analytically, we 
are sometimes conflating two different political processes. The first one relates to vote choice 
while the second is a function of the genuine attitudes of a person towards the EU.  I refer to the 
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second type of Euroscepticism as “value-based” and contend that most of it is the result of 
entirely different underlying motivations.  
The chapter outlined what I regard as the key causes of electoral Euroscepticism. The 
perceptions that all mainstream are “the same” or too similar and the associated belief that 
corruption is widespread act as a catalyst for the Eurosceptic vote. By choosing these parties, 
voters are casting a protest vote against their domestic governments rather than the EU. 
Moreover, by virtue of lower saliency of the EU issue, it is likely that a large portion of the 
Eurosceptic voters are, in fact, otherwise supportive of the EU and European integration. Thus, 
electoral results claimed by Eurosceptic parties in CEE are largely a reflection of domestic 
developments such as the mainstream party convergence and perceptions of ubiquitous 
corruption.  
The manner in which the EU comes to play in the causal process leading to a Eurosceptic 
vote choice is by means of the indirect influence of the Europeanization process. During the pre-
accession period, CEE candidate-states were faced with a wide-range of criteria to fulfill and 
legislation to adopt. The near-complete consensus on membership resulted in mainstream 
political parties having few distinctive policy options to offer to voters. Thus, they moved closer 
in the policy space and competition began to revolve over lines of competence and charisma.  
The theory presented here also aims to disentangle the relationship between Eurosceptic 
and populist political parties. As one category is often, but not always, a subset of the other it has 
remained unclear whether it is the populist, anti-corruption, anti-elite aspect or the anti-EU one 
that has the greatest appeal to these parties‟ supporters. By classifying protest parties as either 
Eurosceptic, populist or mixed it becomes analytically and empirically feasible to answer this 
question.  
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It should be noted that while the theory in this chapter has argued that domestic 
considerations are the key determinants of electoral Euroscepticism, I do not wish to claim that 
there are no truly Eurosceptic citizens who would vote for parties of this type. If the issue has 
indeed a high saliency for them, a Eurosceptic party would be the logical option. What this 
dissertation argues is that this would be a comparatively smaller portion of the party supporters 
and that there will be no systematic relationship between attitudes to the European Union and 
vote choice in the general population.  
The rest of the dissertation is devoted to testing the theory presented here. In the 
following chapter I will describe and perform a series of empirical tests of the hypotheses 
outlined above. The first part of Chapter 4 will present the individual-level analysis while the 
second will focus on the country-level evidence.  In Chapter 5, I will trace contextual 
developments more thoroughly by conducting three case studies of selected countries in the 
region.  
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4.0  TESTING THE THEORY 
In Chapter 3 I developed a theory about the determinants of Euroscepticism and populism in the 
countries of Central and East Europe. I argued that electoral Euroscepticism is often caused by 
dissatisfaction with domestic governments rather than the EU and that a seemingly Eurosceptic 
vote can be related to negative feelings towards mainstream parties – especially since these 
parties are often perceived to have become too similar and too corrupt. Drawing from this 
general framework, I outlined a number of key hypotheses that summarize the main relationships 
proposed in the theory. In this chapter I will present a series of statistical models, their results 
and implications for the study. The first half of the chapter focuses on the individual level 
manifestations of Euroscepticism and its related attitudes. Through survey data from 
representative countries, I try to gauge the underlying citizens‟ motivations when it comes to 
their vote choice. The second half of the chapter extends the study to the country level and offers 
some supplementary evidence that the relationships found at the individual level in the surveyed 
counties do in fact hold across the region.  
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Table 4.1 List of Main Hypotheses 
Label Hypothesis (Individual Level) 
H1 Citizens who perceive a higher degree of similarity between mainstream 
political parties will be more likely to vote for populist and mixed political 
parties.   
H2 Citizens who perceive a higher degree of political corruption in the 
country will be more likely to vote for populist and mixed political parties. 
H3 Citizens who have a less favorable view of EU membership and 
European integration will be more likely to vote for purely Eurosceptic political 
parties. 
H4 Citizens who perceive a higher degree of similarity between mainstream 
political parties and perceive a higher level of corruption in the country will be 
more likely to vote for populist and mixed political parties. 
H5 There is no systematic relationship between perceptions of mainstream 
party similarity and attitudes towards the European Union.     
H6  There is no systematic relationship between perceptions of political 
corruption and attitudes towards the European Union.    
Label Hypothesis (Country Level) 
H7 The higher the similarity of mainstream political parties, the greater the 
electoral success of populist and mixed (populist/Eurosceptic) parties. 
H8 The higher the level of corruption, the greater the electoral success of 
populist and mixed political parties. 
H9 Mainstream party similarity results in a greater electoral success for 
populist and mixed political parties when corruption levels are high. 
H10 The smaller the aggregate approval of the European Union and European 
integration, the greater the electoral success of purely Eurosceptic political 
parties. 
 
 
 54 
4.1 INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF EUROSCEPTICISM AND 
POPULISM 
For the purposes of testing the theory developed in this study I conducted a survey of public 
opinion in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. These two countries were chosen for a variety of 
reasons. One of them entered the European Union in 2004 as one of the front-runners, the other 
one was delayed until 2007 due to deficiencies in terms of curbing corruption and organized 
crime and reforming the judicial system. Thus, the survey ensures that results will not be biased 
on the basis of the timing of EU accession and, by extension, the degree of progress in fulfilling 
the accession criteria. Secondly, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic provide the necessary range of 
types of protest parties. Bulgaria has experienced the rise of populist parties in the last few 
elections and a lower degree of Euroscepticism. The Check Republic, on the other hand, has 
encountered less populism but one of its two major parties has an explicit Eurosceptic bent in its 
ideology. Therefore, by combining the surveys from these two countries, one can acquire a 
comprehensive range of Euroscepticism and populism. 
The surveys consisted of a random sample of 700 individuals of voting age per country 
for a total of 1400 respondents.  Of the respondents who agreed to complete the survey, 53% are 
female and 47% are male, the mean age of the sample is 37 years old. 64% of respondents have a 
post-secondary education and 91% of the whole sample identify with the majority ethnic group 
(e.g. Bulgarian, Czech). 4% of the Bulgarian sample identified as Turkish and less than 1% 
identified as Armenian, Roma or other. 3% of the Czech sample identified as Moravian, Slovak, 
Roma or other.  46% of the sample identified as Orthodox Christians, 26% as Catholics, 23% as 
non-believers and 7% identified as Muslim, Jewish, Protestant or other. Most of these 
distributions are representative of Bulgarian and Czech society. Both societies have a high rate of 
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post-secondary education. Orthodox Christianity is the religious norm in Bulgaria and 
Catholicism in the Czech Republic but the Czech Republic is also known to have one of the least 
religious populations in Europe. The survey oversamples respondents from the dominant ethnic 
group but it is not within the purposes of this study to examine differences in Eurosceptic views 
on the basis of ethnicity.  
Comparing self-reported votes or vote preferences with actual results from elections in 
the two countries indicates that the sample is indeed representative of the actual voting behavior. 
Percentage totals from the surveyed individuals differ by no more than 6% from actual election 
results in the country. An exception in the Bulgarian case concerns the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms party which gained 14.4% of the vote in the actual election while only 4.5% of the 
Bulgarian sample indicated an MRF vote. As the MRF is closely associated with the ethnic 
Turkish population within the country, the discrepancy is probably due to the low frequency of 
respondents of Turkish ethnicity mentioned above. Alternatively, it is possible that some 
supporters of this party did not accurately report their vote as the electoral campaign of all 
remaining parties for this particular election included a vocal anti-MRF element and accusations 
directed at Turkey for allegedly attempting to influence the election results by questionable 
means. Even if some MRF supporters did not accurately report their votes, though, the close 
overlap between actual and self-reported votes for the rest of the political groups indicates that 
there is not a consistent bias towards falsely overestimating the vote share of a particular party. 
Prior to having the actual surveys carried out, I conducted a dozen cognitive interviews in 
each country. Cognitive interviews are becoming a widespread pre-survey tactic for improving 
the validity of the proposed questions. Beatty and Willis (2007) define them as “the 
administration of draft survey questions while collecting additional verbal information about the 
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survey responses, which is used to evaluate the quality of the response or to help determine 
whether the question is generating the information that its author intends”. Respondents are, in 
essence, asked to share their thoughts at each step of the cognitive process from reading the 
assigned question to selecting an answer. Also known as the “think aloud  method” , these one-
on-one interviews become particularly necessary in the context of translating survey questions 
into a different language as there always exists the possibility of translated concepts being 
understood differently in the local political culture. Cognitive interviews can eliminate or reduce 
this potential bias, as well as help correct for general survey threats to validity – such as too 
complex or misleading questions and social desirability bias. Information collected from all pre-
survey respondents is then carefully examined for common trends and the final survey questions
4
 
are modified to take into account potential confounding factors. 
4.1.1 Models and Variable Description 
In order to test citizens‟ motivations for picking Eurosceptic and populist parties, I will conduct a 
series of statistical tests on the likelihood of voting for a type of protest party. The main 
dependent variable, therefore, will be a standard vote choice measure about whether the 
respondent voted for a Eurosceptic party or not; and whether he/she voted for a populist/mixed 
party in the other set of hypotheses. Given the dichotomous nature of these variables, I will use 
logistical regressions to estimate the models.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 The list of final survey questions is available in the Appendix.  
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Key Independent Variables:  
Perceived Similarity of Mainstream Parties. This will be a measure aimed to capture 
the degree to which citizens perceive mainstream parties to be all the same. It is measured by the 
following survey question:   
Here are some commonly cited distinctions between political parties in this country. 
Please place each of the following political parties on a scale from 1 to 10.   
1. Views on the Communist regime  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pro-communist   Moderate    Anti-communist 
2. Market versus Government-managed economy  
Politicians from some parties argue that leaving the market alone is best for the economy 
while others claim that government intervention to guide the economy is necessary in our 
society.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pro-market    Moderate   Government-managed 
3. Urban versus Rural  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Catering to the urban electorate    Catering to the rural electorate 
 
4. Pro versus Against European integration  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
In favor of integration   Moderate   Opposed to integration 
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5. Ethnic lines  
Some parties call for defending our country from the growing influence of ethnic 
minorities while others ask for encouraging diversity and improving the integration of ethnic 
minorities in society.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Defending the interests of the  Neutral/Moderate  Defending the interests of  
ethnic majority       ethnic minorities 
 
6. Other distinction lines (please name) 
The largest distance between a respondent‟s placements is then taken on each issue and 
then averaged across the issue to arrive at the final estimator of perceived party similarity. The 
final scale ranges from 1 to 10 where 10 equals the highest similarity. This survey question was 
asked fairly early in the survey due to its somewhat more complex nature to ensure that 
respondents are more likely to pay attention to their choices.  
In addition to this measure, the survey also utilizes a split-sample technique to gauge 
citizens‟ perceptions of how similar parties are to one another.  At the beginning of the interview, 
respondents in half of the sample were asked a more direct question aimed to capture the notion 
of mainstream party similarity: 
Consider the following political parties (list mainstream parties). To what extent do you 
agree with the following statement: Political parties like this are all the same. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
The second half of the sample was asked an identical question, with the exception that 
this time the list of parties included all non-mainstream parties as well. The goal of this 
technique is to compare the means from the two samples. If the respondents who were given 
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mainstream parties only tend to perceive a higher level of similarity than the respondents who 
were given a full list of the parties, we can infer that the difference is due to the effect of 
different perceptions towards non-mainstream parties. This experimental tactic is often referred 
to as the list experiment (Sniderman, Tetlock and Piazza, 1992; Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens, 
1997) and is recommended by social psychologists for unobtrusively obtaining valid results from 
respondents by comparing the properties of the two sub-samples. If all respondents were asked 
both of these very similar question, there is a chance they would have automatically given the 
same answer or would have realized what the questions are designed to measure and possibly 
given the desired answer.  
Perceptions of Political Corruption. A standard straightforward way of measuring 
perceptions of political corruption in the comparative context involves the answers to the 
following question:  
How widespread do you think bribe-taking and corruption is in this country? 
1. Almost no public officials are engaged in it.  
2. A few public officials are engaged in it.  
3. Most public officials are engaged in it.  
4. Almost all public officials are engaged in it. 
This question does not differentiate between the political parties that are involved in 
corruption and thus aims to capture the general beliefs of the respondents about the state of 
political life in their country. The expectation is that people who believe that most or almost all 
public officials are involved in corruption would tend to vote for protest parties since protest 
parties, particularly of the mixed and populist type, are often formed not long before the election 
and thus have not been “tarnished” by corruption scandals yet.  
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A subsequent question will directly relate corruption perceptions to specific political 
parties:  
In thinking about political corruption in this country, please place each of the following 
political parties on a scale of 1 to 7 where 1 equals the least corrupt and 10 equals the most 
corrupt. (list all country-specific parties) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
This question is designed to provide more in-depth information on the possible 
distinctions between political parties as to the extent to which they are perceived as corrupt by 
the general public.  
Attitudes towards Europe. This variable aims to capture the European dimension of a 
protest vote. As Abts, Heerwegh and Swyngedouw (2009) have pointed out, attitude-based 
Euroscepticism is frequently theorized about as a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
while at the same time measured by a single indicator. This disjuncture creates the potential for 
measurement error through the simplistic measurement of support/opposition to the EU. In order 
to avoid this pitfall, the current study constructs a multi-dimensional index of attitudes towards 
the EU based upon four dimensions: membership, image, trust and identity. The following four 
survey questions were used to construct the index:  
1. On a scale of 1-10, would you say that your country‟s membership in the EU is a:  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bad thing         Good thing 
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2. On a scale of 1-10, does the EU invoke for you a positive or negative image?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very negative    Moderate    Very positive 
 3. With which of the following do you most closely identify yourself?  And which do 
you identify with secondly?   
a. My ethnic group 
b. Local community or city in which I live  
c. Region  
d. Country:  
e. Europe  
f. Other 
 
4. To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions to look after your 
interests? Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 for no trust at all and 10 great trust.  
 
1. Courts 2. Political Parties 3. Army 4. Parliament 4. Police 5. President 6. Trade Unions 7. 
Church 8. Media 9. Most people in this country 10. Most people you know. 11. European 
Union  
The first two of these questions have both been used by previous Eurobarometer surveys 
and are commonly used for studying attitudes towards the EU.  I used both of them in the survey 
because support for membership has been criticized to underestimate degree of Euroscepticism 
as individuals can generally support their country‟s membership but nonetheless feel strongly 
dissatisfied with the direction of European integration or specific policies of the EU. Therefore, 
asking about the general “image” of the EU can provide a more nuanced picture. The results 
from these questions, however, indicated that at least in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic EU‟s 
image is generally highly related to support for membership (the two variables were correlated at 
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0.7) which is why I have grouped them together for most of the analyses as a combined measure 
of attitudes towards European integration.  
The third question is a more conservative measure of identification with Europe as polls 
have consistently shown that national identity is, for the time being, still more important for the 
majority of Europeans. Only 12% of the current sample identified with Europe as their first 
choice. However, identification with Europe does often come as a close second, even more so in 
the new member states, some of whose citizens have been eager to join the European Union for 
practical and symbolic reasons for nearly a decade. To make sure the measure reflects this, 
people who select Europe as their first identification will have this factor more heavily weighted 
in the index than people who select Europe as their second identification and, in turn, the latter 
will have the identity factor weighted more heavily in their index that people who did not list 
Europe among their top two choices. Including the identity measure in the index without the 
weightings reduces the reliability of the index as it is not sufficiently correlated with the other 
indicators of attitudes towards the European Union. By reducing the relative importance of the 
identity variable in combining their scores, therefore, a more trustworthy scale of attitudes 
towards the EU can be achieved. For example, many respondents who scored above average on 
positive attitudes towards the EU on all other indicators nonetheless selected their nationality as 
the foremost identification. Giving the identity factor equal importance in the final scale thus 
risks biasing the results towards overestimating the level of Euroscepticism in the sample.  
Finally, the fourth question looks at an additional dimension – the extent to which the 
respondent trusts the European Union. Again, while trust is highly correlated with having a 
positive image of the EU and supporting EU membership, employing these four dimensions of 
attitudes towards the European Union enriches the construct and is likely to provide a more 
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reliable measure of attitudes towards the EU than any of these four measures separately. The 
final index ranges from 1 to 10 where 1 indicates the least support and 10 indicates that highest.  
EU Saliency. In addition to general attitudes towards the EU, I have also included an 
estimator of the saliency of the EU issue as compared to other national problems. The saliency 
factor can have a conditioning effect on general attitudes towards the EU. The analysis will, 
therefore, interact saliency of the EU issue with the appropriate independent variables to check 
for conditional effects. The following survey question was used for constructing the measure:  
In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the country at present? And 
what is the second most important problem facing the country at present?  
1. The poor economic situation. 
2. The spread of corruption in society. 
3. The spread of crime in society. 
4. The loss of decision-making power and erosion of national identity after entry into the 
EU. 
5. Increasing influence of minority groups.  
6. Rise of radical religious movements.  
7. The poor condition of the environment.  
8. Decay of moral values in society.  
9. Other (please name).  
 
Only 2% of the respondents chose the last option and named a different problem which is 
reason to believe that the list was indeed representative of the key societal problems perceived by 
citizens. The “other” problems named were also quite varied and there was no systematic issue 
that arose in that category. One respondent, for example, lamented about the demise of 
communism while another claimed that “the biggest problem is that communists are still in 
power” referring to the Socialist party in Bulgaria.  
Knowledge of the EU. Finally, the study also uses a measure of self-reported level of 
knowledge of the EU to capture the possibility that a Eurosceptic vote is a function of the distant 
and complex nature of the EU and the difficulty for common citizens to understand its 
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institutions and policies. Studies have theorized that “since the EU‟s institutions and agendas are 
neither easily understood nor easily embraced by the media, national leaders and communities in 
the new EU member states, the people face serious problems if they want to identify themselves 
with the European project”(Butora, 2007). Respondents‟ perceptions of how well they know the 
EU will thus be used in the analysis to control for these effects.  
On a scale of 1 to 10 how much do you feel you know about the European Union? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Nothing at all         A great deal 
Control Variables:  
Attitudes towards Minorities. Policies with respect to minority rights have been a point 
of contention between the EU and many candidate states in CEE since the strict EU requirements 
often clash with more or less widespread negative attitudes towards minority groups in the 
region. Instituting stricter minority rights protection laws has been a key aspect of EU 
conditionality. Studies have shown that European institutions “have been significant, active 
participants in shaping domestic policy on ethnic issues” (Kelley, 2004). While the incentive of 
EU membership has been linked to inducing compliance from candidate states‟ governments in 
the minority rights issue area, the resurgent nationalist sentiment among CEE publics after the 
collapse of communism (Greenfeld, 1995; Minkenberg, 2002; Lowell, 2002) is at odds with the 
highly EU-compliant behavior of governments. Consequently, many of the mixed Eurosceptic-
populist movements subscribe to a nationalist anti-minority agenda. The analysis presented here 
needs to, therefore, control for the possibility that a protest vote is the result of perceptions that 
the EU and the governing mainstream parties are conceding too much to minorities. As 
government compliance with minority rights criteria has been a visible and politically 
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contentious issue, voters are likely to conceive the extension of extra benefits to allegedly 
undeserving minorities as an EU-imposed reform.  
The following three survey questions are used to measure citizens‟ attitudes towards 
minorities:  
1. Do you think any of these pose a real threat to peace and security in this society? 
1. National minorities in our society 
2. Immigrants from other societies.  
3. Neighboring countries.  
4. Other countries (ask “which one(s)” if respondent picks this option) 
4. Terrorist groups.  
 
2. On a scale of 1 to 10, please indicate your position on the following issues: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ethnic diversity      Ethnic diversity enriches life 
erodes a country‟s unity 
 
3. In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the country at present? 
And what is the second most important problem facing the country at present?  
10. The poor economic situation. 
11. The spread of corruption in society. 
12. The spread of crime in society. 
13. The loss of decision-making power and erosion of national identity after entry into the  
EU. 
14. Increasing influence of minority groups.  
15. Rise of radical religious movements.  
16. The poor condition of the environment.  
17. Decay of moral values in society.  
18. Other (please name).  
 
As far as the first question is concerned, respondents are coded 1 if they selected national 
minorities as a source of threat for the country and 0 otherwise. The second question is a 
straightforward scale ranging from 1 to 10 as to respondents‟ general sentiments on ethnic 
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diversity. In the case of the third question, respondents are coded 1 if they picked “increasing 
influence of minority groups” as either their first or second choice of the biggest problem facing 
the country. Since these 3 questions all provide ways to get at individuals‟ perceptions of and 
attitudes towards minorities, the variables are aggregated into an additive scale of minority 
attitudes for the rest of the analysis.  
Democratic Values. Another possible explanation for voting for a Eurosceptic party can 
be based upon values such as authoritarianism. People who posses these values would be much 
more likely to oppose the European Union on principled grounds. Thus, opposition to democratic 
norms may be the driving force of explaining the outcome of interest.  Respondents were 
presented with two questions related to authoritarian values. These are: “Some people say that 
we would be better off if we get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader who can 
decide everything. What do you think” and “With which of the following statements do you 
agree the most? 1. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government 2. Under some 
circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one 3. For people 
like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime”.  
Following previous studies (Ehin, 2001) an index was created to capture the effect of 
authoritarian values.  
Political Ideology. The question presents respondents with 7 choices: pro-market, social 
democratic, communist, national traditions, environmentalist, other, or none. People who 
subscribe to either communist or “national traditions” type of self-described ideology could be 
more likely to vote Eurosceptic since EU values are in complete contradiction with the former 
ideology and somewhat incompatible with the latter. Moreover, Eurosceptic parties frequently 
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have a nationalist dimension as well and call for stronger representation of the national interest in 
negotiations with Brussels.  
Media exposure. This measure aims to capture the possible influence that the news 
media has on political views of citizens. As previously discussed, the salience of the corruption 
problem in the media has increased over the last decade at a faster rate than the actual corruption 
levels as measured by official statistic. The mass media‟s preoccupation with corruption issues is 
likely to induce a “priming” effect upon individuals receiving the message. The concept of 
priming describes the mechanism through which the media has often been found to have an 
effect on attitudes. As an individual is more recently or more frequently exposed to a certain 
issue, information about that issue becomes more easily accessible in that individual‟s memory 
(Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Valentino, 1999; Mendelberg, 2001).  
At the same time, however, it is unlikely that priming effects will be observable for those 
individuals who do not trust the media. Recent evidence has shown that priming seems to be 
moderated primarily by trust in the media rather than exposure (Miller and Krosnick, 2000). In 
addition, in Central and East Europe in particular, the media enjoys higher levels of trust among 
citizens than a lot of other institutions, including organizations like trade unions, political parties 
and police forces (Mair et al, 2004; New Europe Barometer, 2001). This relatively high trust can 
explain the tendency of citizens to perceive higher levels of corruption than their actual 
experience may suggest. In order to control for media effects, therefore, the study will use a 
measure of both trust in the media and exposure to media sources. Respondents were asked about 
the frequency with which they watch news and/or political programs on TV, read a major 
newspaper and visit news websites on the internet. Overall trust in the media was also recorded.    
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Religion. While there are no immediate reasons to assume religion may be associated 
with higher or lower support for populist parties, a few studies have explored the connection 
between religious denomination and Euroscepticism. Boomgaarden and Freire (2009)‟s 
comprehensive analysis concludes that religion matters for explaining Euroscepticism at the 
macro-level but has little, if any, impact at the individual level. In addition to simply subscribing 
to a given denomination, it is possible that the level of one‟s involvement with religious activities 
has a greater influence on their views towards the EU. In these cases, higher religiosity may be 
related to anti-immigrant or anti-minority views which could indirectly affect views on the 
European Union. In order to control for these effects, a measure of religious denomination and 
religiosity is included in the analysis. For the sake of parsimony, the results reported in the tables 
further below will only include the religiosity control variable. However, all the models have 
additionally been estimated substituting religiosity with religious denomination. Whether one is 
an Orthodox Christina, Catholic or non-believer did not have a significant impact on any of the 
outcomes analyzed in this study.  
Institutional and social trust. The institutional trust measure averages the levels of trust 
indicated by respondents in the key institutions of the political system – courts, political parties, 
army, parliament and president. These are the main political bodies comprising the political 
system of a modern democracy and an indication of low overall trust in those could imply a 
greater disillusionment with the political process. The social trust variable has a similar function 
when it comes to people instead of institutions. Respondents were asked the extent to which they 
trust “most people in this country” and “most people you know”. There does not seem to be a 
straightforward reasons why social trust should be related to either Euroscepticism or populism 
but it is possible that people who extend their trust to strangers in their own country would be 
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more likely to extend this trust to strangers outside of their country and thus be more open to the 
idea of European integration. Alternatively, however, a strong trust in one‟s fellow citizens may 
indicate the opposite trend – that the respondent identifies with, and is attached to, his or her 
nationality and is more likely to be suspicious of anyone falling outside of the national in-group.  
 Socioeconomic factors (Age, Gender, Income, Education). Previous studies have 
hypothesized that younger people, as well as more educated ones are more likely to express 
support for their country‟s membership in the EU since they possess more pronounced post-
materialist values (De Graaf, 1996; McLaren, 2002). Therefore, if support for the EU is a 
predictor of both purely Eurosceptic and mixed vote, we should see age and education being 
positively related to these categories. Other work has highlighted the existence of a "gender gap" 
in support for the EU (Nelsen and Guth 2000), and a dummy variable for gender will be 
included.  
Controlling for level of income, on the other hand, is designed to capture a more 
utilitarian aspect of attitudes towards EU membership. Theories explaining individual-level 
variation in attitudes towards the EU have argued that people who are worse off under the 
current political conditions are more likely to be doubtful about EU membership. Most existing 
studies have used standard socio-economic characteristics, such as income and education, as 
proxies for individual competitiveness (Anderson and Reichert 1996, Gabel 1998). This effect 
should manifest itself through a significant relationship between individual economic situation 
and voting Eurosceptic. While the study does include a self-reported measure of how the 
respondents perceive their personal economic situation and the state of the national economy, 
controlling for income accounts for objective effects of class differences.   
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4.1.2 Findings 
Before describing the results from testing the aforementioned hypotheses, I will present some of 
the more interesting descriptive information gained from the survey. This will help illustrate 
some general political and social trends and provide the first glimpse into citizens‟ attitudes.  
Who Are the Protest Voters? 
The typical protest voter is dissatisfied with domestic political and economic 
performance; does not trust the institutions of the state; worries about crime, corruption and the 
economy; watches a lot of news programs; is not a proponent of ethnic diversity in principle but 
does not disproportionately blame minorities and/or immigrants for society‟s problems. He/she is 
supportive of EU membership and sees the EU in a positive light, but does not claim to know a 
lot about the European Union. He/she tends to place a lot of importance on the personality of a 
party leader. He or she tends to be fairly interested in politics but does not believe that he/she can 
have much influence on government policies. This is a simple snapshot of the average protest 
voter but more nuanced information will be provided below.  
Cross-tabs of key variables from the survey indicate protest voters tend to be more 
dissatisfied with both political and economic developments in their country. 68% of protest 
voters find the economic situation in their country to be unsatisfactory
5
, as compared to 46% of 
mainstream voters. Interestingly, however, there is no major difference between the number of 
mainstream and protest voters unhappy with their personal economic situation – 67% of protest 
voters and 64% of mainstream one gave their household economic situation a score of 5 or 
lower. Protest voters are more pessimistic about the future, with only 34% of them predicting an 
                                                 
5
 For the purposes of the cross-tabs, the economic satisfaction scales have been dichotomized where satisfactory = a 
score of 6 or higher and unsatisfactory equal a score of 5 or lower.  
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improvement in their personal economic situation in 5 years, while 49% of mainstream voters 
predicted a slight improvement.  
There was no difference in terms of age, education, income or gender for the basic cross-
tabs. Protest-voters are both male and female, 56% of them have post-secondary education 
(similarly, 59% of mainstream voters have one), their self-reported income distribution does not 
exhibit any major differences from the general sample. These demographic characteristics 
coupled with the economic indicators discussed above suggest that while protest and mainstream 
voters have similar economic and educational backgrounds, protest voters are more likely to be 
pessimistic about the future and about the state of the national economy.  
This pessimism manifests itself when it comes to the political arena as well. While level 
of trust in the major institutions of the regime (courts, parties, parliament, president, police, 
army) was low throughout the sample (mean of 3.4 on a scale of 1 to 10), it was twice lower for 
the protest voters than for the mainstream ones. In addition, 76% of protest voters claimed that 
“almost all public officials” engage in corruption compared to 46% of mainstream voters. 
Respondents were also asked to rate each political party in terms of perceived corruption which 
yielded interesting results. The mean for both groups of parties is similar – 6.5 for mainstream 
ones, 7 for non-mainstream ones. However, 57% of protest voters tend to give mainstream 
parties a corruption score of 6 or higher, while only 37% of mainstream voters do so. Similarly, 
52% of mainstream voters tend to give protest parties an average corruption score of 6 or higher 
as compared to 32% of protest voters. Corruption perceptions, therefore, may be an influencing 
factor for mainstream voters as well.  
Protest voters are also slightly more prone to engage in corruption-related activities since 
they have less faith in their ability to influence government policies. 67% of protest voters gave a 
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score of 4 or lower to the question “Under our present system, how much influence do you think 
people like yourself can have on government”. 51% of mainstream voters expressed similar 
levels of low personal efficacy. Respondents were also asked “What should a person who needs 
a government permit do if an official says: just be patient, wait”. 22% of protest voters claimed 
they would “use connections”, 15% said they would “offer a tip to the official” to get a prompt 
reply and 8% said they would “do what you want without a permit”. A staggering 34% said that 
they would “give up the project as the permit will never come”. 11% said they would write a 
letter to the head office and only 10% agreed that they should just “wait; it will come”. 
Moreover, this question is likely to be subject to some bias as respondents may feel unwilling to 
divulge to the interviewer that they would offer a “tip” to the official or do what they want 
without the permit. The percentages could, if anything, be underestimating the nature of the 
phenomenon. In terms of mainstream voters, 22% said they would write a letter, 12% expressed 
confidence that the permit will come, 21% said they would give up the project, 11% decided to 
offer a tip and 9% claimed they would do what they want without the permit. Interestingly, 25% 
of mainstream voters claimed they would use connections if possible which is slightly larger than 
the equivalent group of protest voters.  
A more positive picture emerges from the items measuring general support for 
democracy. According to cross-tabs, the dissatisfaction and sense of inefficacy that seems 
widespread among protest voters does not translate into opposition for democracy. 79% of 
protest voters and 66% of mainstream ones have scores of 4 or lower on the authoritarianism 
scale. This slightly higher frequency of more authoritarian predispositions among mainstream 
voters could be due to remnants of communist nostalgia as socialist parties (which are the 
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successors of former communist ones) are nowadays part of the political mainstream. Some of 
their long-term supporters though have been found to still express support for the old regime.  
The salience of corruption perceptions is also manifested by the responses to the “biggest 
problem facing the country” question. 72% of respondents named corruption as either their first 
or second choice of biggest problem. The economic situation was most frequently cited as 
problem number 1, while the spread of corruption in society was most frequently cited as 
problem 2, followed closely by the spread of crime. This question was also one of the few places 
in the survey where more notable differences emerged between the two country samples. 23% of 
Bulgarians named the “increasing influence of minority groups” as one of the two biggest 
problems, while only about 3% of Czechs did. As the survey was conducted during the summer 
of a very ethnically polarized election in Bulgaria, these results should not be surprising. 12% of 
the Bulgarian sample also cited “national minorities in our society” as posing a threat to peace 
and security in the country while 8% cited neighboring countries, usually referring to Turkey.  
Protest voters are also more likely to cite minorities as one of the key problems in the country 
when it comes to the Bulgarian sample.  
Protest voters are, on average, more interested in politics. 63% of them scored 6 or higher 
on the “interest in politics” scale as compared to 43% of mainstream voters. The majority of both 
protest and mainstream voters seem to get their information on politics from television programs 
rather than newspapers or the internet. More than half of each sub-group watches news or 
political programs on TV daily, while the majority in each case reads the newspaper “a couple of 
times a week “and visits news websites on the internet “once in a while”. There seems to be a 
connection between the news media and corruption perceptions as well. 54% of the people who 
either watch the news or read a newspaper daily tend to respond that “almost all government 
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officials are corrupt” while only 37% of the more infrequent “once in a while” readers and 
viewers have similar views.  
When it comes to party similarity, there is evidence to suggest that there are differences 
in terms of the two groups of parties and voters. Protest voters have higher averages on the party 
similarity index. 57% of these respondents had a mainstream party similarity score of 6 or 
higher, while only 23% of them scored that high on the similarity of non-mainstream parties. Of 
all respondents in the sample who scored 6 or higher on the mainstream similarity measure, 65% 
also had above average corruption perceptions. People who had scored high on the mainstream 
party similarity scale also have lower institutional trust than people who perceive parties as more 
distinct. However, low scorers on the mainstream similarity scale exhibit higher social trust on 
one of the indicators. 67% of their group tends to trust “most people you know” but only 36% 
tend to trust “most people in this country”. Respondents who scored lower than average on the 
mainstream party similarity measure also have low institutional trust (mean of 3.8).  
Results from the split-sample experiment are supportive of the theory presented in this 
study. Respondents who were presented with a list of mainstream political parties only and asked 
about the extent to which they agree with the statement “these political parties are all the same” 
averaged 7.5 on a 10 point scale. Their counterparts in the other half of the sample were 
presented with a list of mainstream and protest parties and asked the same question. The average 
score in their case was 4.5. A simple intuitive responsive to a non-invasive question thus shows 
that when thinking about protest-based parties, voters tend to automatically see greater 
differences than when thinking about the political mainstream only. This finding confirms the 
existence of the party similarity phenomenon when it comes to citizens‟ perceptions.  
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In addition to aggregate measures of party similarity, more information on citizens‟ 
perceptions of political parties can be derived from the question on major distinction lines around 
which parties compete. As described previously, citizens were asked to place parties on a scale 
of 1-10 on five dimensions. Table 4.2 presents the perceptions of protest voters when it comes to 
the two groups of parties. The average score of mainstream and non-mainstream parties on each 
issue dimension is given, as well the perceived similarity of each group broken down by issue 
dimension.  
 
Table 4.2 Protest Voters‟ Views of Parties‟ Positions 
 
 Pro/Anti- 
Communist 
Market/ 
Gvmt-
managed 
Economy 
Urban/Rural Ethnic 
Lines 
 
Pro/Anti-EU 
Av. 
Score 
Party 
Sim 
Av Party Sim Av Party 
Sim 
Av Party 
Sim 
Av Party 
Sim 
Mainstr. 
Parties 
6.8 5.1 4.5 7.8 2.5 7.5 5.5 7.3 2.6 8.4 
Non-
Mainstr. 
Parties 
5.3 3.5 6.2 3.7 3.8 6.3 2.4 7.1 6.4 6.5 
 
 
People who vote for Eurosceptic and populist parties overall tend to perceive mainstream 
parties as more similar to one another than non-mainstream ones. This is particularly evident 
when it comes to views on the economy and communist regime, both of which are among the 
more salient dimensions of competition in East European societies. Substantively, the average 
locations of the parties on the 1-10 issue scale are not too far from each other, but their 
distribution is different for the mainstream versus non-mainstream subgroup. Respondents are 
much more likely to place mainstream parties within the moderate 4-6 category on economic 
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views, while non-mainstream parties fall across the scale. For the same protest party, for 
example, 23% of respondents gave it a placement of 3 or lower (thus indicating it is strongly 
market-oriented) while a comparable 31% thought it deserves a score of 7 or higher (in favor of 
more government intervention).
6
 For the mainstream sub-group, less than 10% of respondents 
would place parties at the extreme ends of the economic views scale.  
This type of distribution is observed when it comes to views on the communist regime as 
well, and is even more pronounced for the urban/rural divide where respondents placed non-
mainstream party all over the spectrum. The very nature of Eurosceptic and populist parties can 
help explain this phenomenon. Their undefined or vague positions on many substantive issues 
likely result in voters either not knowing or not caring about these parties‟ issue positions.  When 
we compare self-reported ideology to the placement of non-mainstream parties, we see that there 
is no noteworthy overlap. For example, 62% of the subsample that voted for a protest party and 
identified with pro-market ideology also placed protest parties in the pro-government 
intervention end of the economic scale. An even greater percentage of 74% of the sub-sample 
that identified as social democrat and reported a vote for a non-mainstream party placed these 
types of parties in the pro-market end of the scale (4 or lower).  
The lack of overlap between self-reported ideology and placement of parties on issue 
positions persists as far as views on the communist regime, European integration and the 
urban/rural divide are concerned. The only category that exhibits overlap is the perception of the 
extent to which parties defend the interests of the ethnic majority versus minority. In that case, 
non-mainstream voters who reported feeling most closely identified with an ideology that favors 
“national traditions” also tended to place protest parties as representing primarily the ethnic 
                                                 
6
 These percentages are calculated for the Ataka political party in Bulgaria.  
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majority. Non-mainstream parties have, in this case, a very high score of similarity as well, but it 
means substantively the opposite than mainstream parties. Since attitudes towards minorities are 
a consequential factor, they have of course been incorporated in the rest of the analysis.  
Thus, except for the category discussed above, non-mainstream voters do not seem to be 
picking protest parties for the sake of their substantive positions, either because these positions 
are too vaguely defined and constantly shifting for the voters to clearly see them, or because 
despite being able to discern them, voters do not care about those as much as about the way these 
parties present themselves as a last resort alternative to incompetent and corrupt political elites. It 
should also be noted that 29 respondents did write in something in the open-ended option of the 
question where they could name their own additional category according to which parties differ. 
While this is a very small and statistically inconsequential part of the sample, 26 of those 29 
additional categories had to do with corruption and to what extent parties or their leaders can be 
trusted.  
Finally, in terms of their attitudes towards the European Union, protest voters do not 
differ substantially from mainstream ones. 65% of protest voters have a higher than average view 
of EU‟s image and 68% of mainstream voters feel the same way. Mainstream voters have 
slightly higher scores on identification with Europe – 12% mention it as their first choice and 
53% as their second; for protest voters the respective percentages are 7% and 46%. Less than 
10% in each subgroup see unwanted consequences of EU membership as the biggest or second 
biggest problem facing the country at present. From the group of people who do not support EU 
membership or have a negative image of the EU, 67% say they know little about the EU (score 
of 5 or lower). Respondents opposing membership also tend to evaluate their economic situation 
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in more negative terms than supporters, they support ethnic diversity to a smaller extent and, in 
the Bulgarian sub-sample, they tend to have more negative views of national minorities.  
Testing H1-H4 
In this section I will present the findings from directly testing the first four hypotheses. 
These have been grouped together, as they all attempt to measure the determinants of electoral 
Euroscepticism, while the last 3 individual-level hypotheses are concerned with value-based 
Euroscepticism.  
Table 4.3 presents the results from the first two models designed to test hypotheses 1, 2 
and 4. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent voted 
for populist or mixed party and estimations have been conducted using a logistical regression. As 
indicated by Model 1, there is strong support for hypotheses 1 and 2. The coefficients for 
mainstream party similarity and perceived corruption are statistically significant and in the 
expected direction.  Citizens who perceive a higher degree of similarity between mainstream 
political parties are more likely to cast a vote for populist or mixed political parties. Similarly, 
the likelihood of voting for these types of parties increases as people perceive a higher degree of 
corruption among public officials in their country. Attitudes towards the EU, as measured by the 
composite scale, are not significantly correlated with the dependent variable, thus lending 
support to the theoretical proposition that voting for parties that have both populist and 
Eurosceptic strands in them is equivalent to voting for purely populist parties and caused largely 
by dissatisfaction with the domestic political system rather than a particular sentiment towards 
the European Union.  
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Table 4.3 Determinants of Voting for Populist and Mixed Parties 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Mainstream Party Similarity 0.799 * 
(0.347) 
0.078 * 
(0. 082) 
Corruption Perceptions 0.832*** 
(0.206) 
0.748 * 
(0.439) 
EU Attitudes 0.281 
(0.185) 
0.251 
(0.164) 
Democratic Values 0.133 
(0.176) 
0.139 
(0.173) 
Minority Attitudes - 0.028 
(0.042) 
- 0.009 
(0.047) 
Ideology -0.113 
(0.235) 
-0.121 
(0.243) 
Media Exposure 0.385 ** 
(0.132) 
0.385** 
(0.134) 
Religiosity 0.162 
(0.358) 
0.162 
(0.358) 
Institutional Trust -0.262 * 
(0.108) 
-0.258 * 
(0.103) 
Social Trust -0.682 * 
(0.259) 
-0.683 * 
(0.259) 
Age 0.183 
(0.191) 
0.183 
(0.191) 
Gender -0.046 
(0.043) 
-0.047 
(0.046) 
Education 0.056 
(0.082) 
0.054 
(0.082) 
Income 0.533 
(0.488) 
0.534 
(0.488) 
Party Similarity x Corruption Perceptions  0.028 *** 
(0.009) 
Constant  6.454 
(3.858) 
5.985 
(1.558) 
N 1208 1208 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1873 0. 1546 
Log Likelihood -132.24 -140.64 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence 
**indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence 
***indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence  
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A few of the control variables also achieve statistical significance in Model 1. 
Institutional trust is negatively correlated with the dependent variable. As individuals tend to 
trust their domestic political institutions less, they are also more likely to vote for protest parties 
of the populist and mixed type. This finding is largely consistent with the theoretical 
expectations outlined in this study. Interestingly, social trust – measured by the degree to which a 
respondent trusts their friends and other people in the country – is also statistically significant 
suggesting that people who trust their fellow citizens are less likely to cast a protest vote. This 
result indicates that, while factors directly related to the political system, are a determinant of 
protest voting, so seem to be social psychological factors as well. Trust in other people may be a 
product of cultural factors based on one‟s background or it could also be a product of personality 
traits. The specific causes of this attitude are not the subject of this study, but they point to the 
need of acknowledging the complex nature of vote choice and the inability of one set of 
determinants only – whether political, economic or cultural to tell the whole story.  
Finally, media effects seem also to be influencing the protest vote. The media exposure 
variable is a scale achieved by multiplying exposure to the media by trust in the media in order to 
capture a more comprehensive media effect. Results indicate that as media exposure increases, 
so does the likelihood of voting for a populist or mixed party. A possible way to account for this 
relationship is that the news media often tends to have sensationalist overtones and thus stresses 
the flaws of the system. Corruption stories abound in both print and television outlets. Therefore, 
it is possible that being exposed to a lot of this information increases one‟s belief that the 
political class is corrupt and incompetent .  
Since logit models do not allow for substantive interpretation of the size of the 
coefficients, I have also estimated predicted probabilities for key variables. The probabilities for 
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Model 1 are presented in Table 4.4 below. As we can see, both mainstream party similarity and 
corruption perceptions have a strong effect on the odds of voting for populist or mixed party, all 
else being held constant. An individual who claims that “almost all public officials” are corrupt 
would, for example, have a nearly twice higher likelihood of choosing a protest party than an 
individual who chooses the previous category - “a few public officials” engage in corruption. 
Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the perception of mainstream party similarly raises 
the likelihood of voting for populist or mixed parties by 41%. When mainstream party similarity 
and corruption perceptions are held at their minimum values, the likelihood of a protest vote falls 
to 3 and 5% respectively.  
 
 
Table 4.4 Predicted Probabilities for Key Variables in Model 1 
 
Situation
a
 % Probability of Voting for Populist or 
Mixed Parties 
Min Value Mean Value Max Value 
Mainstream Party Similarity      3%                            41%                        52% 
Corruption Perceptions      5%                            49%                        63% 
Media Exposure    12%                           35%                        44%   
Institutional Trust     9%                            23%                        37% 
Social Trust     12%                           16%                        21% 
Media Exposure
b
    2%                            12%                         16% 
Social Trust
c
    19%                          43%                         49% 
a- All the variables are held at their means except the variables listed.  
b- Corruption perceptions held at 1 or2, institutional trust held at 6 or higher.  
c- Corruption perceptions held at 1 or 2, institutional trust held at 6 or higher, mainstream party similarity held 
at 4 or lower.  
 
 
From the control variables which achieve significance, it should be noted that media 
exposure does seem to be a stronger than expected predictor of voting for a protest party. A one 
point increase in level of media exposure raises the likelihood of voting for a protest party by 
35%. In order to better understand this effect, I estimated the predicted probability of media 
exposure when holding corruption perceptions at Low (variable = 1 or 2) and institutional trust at 
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High (variable = 6 or higher). The predicted probability of voting for a protest party as a result of 
media exposure drops to 16% at the maximum which lends some support to the idea that the 
media‟s focus on the negative “news-making” items has some priming effect on individuals‟ 
perceptions of the political system.  
Also, in order to explore the nature of the social trust factor in a bit more detail, I 
estimated its predicted probability when holding corruption perceptions at Low, institutional trust 
at High and mainstream party similarity at Low (variable = 4 or lower). In this case, raising one‟s 
social trust seems to reduce the likelihood of voting for a protest party by 43%. This suggests 
that if one was to eliminate or substantially reduce systemic problems such as corruption and low 
institutional trust, the baseline support for non-mainstream parties will be largely determined by 
these more personality-based or culturally-specific traits.  
The second model in Table 4.3 creates an interaction term between mainstream party 
similarity and corruption perceptions. For a more straightforward interpretation of the findings, I 
have collapsed these variables into fewer categories. Both Corruption Perceptions and 
Mainstream Party Similarity are divided into High and Low. Results from the model are, in 
general, similar to the ones from Model 1. However, the magnitude of the substantive effects 
differs. Mainstream party similarity and corruption perceptions have an effect on the dependent 
variable both independently and as a joint factor. The predicted probabilities presented in Table 
4.5 show a slightly more nuanced picture. We see than when corruption perceptions are low, 
mainstream party similarity has a much smaller substantive effect. It increases the likelihood of 
voting for a populist or mixed party by 11%, or at its high levels to 17%.  When mainstream 
party similarity is held at low levels, however, corruption perceptions still raise the odds of 
choosing a protest party by 39%. This suggests that the effect of mainstream party similarity is 
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somewhat dependent on how citizens perceive these parties‟ behavior.  If corruption perceptions 
and lack of trust were reduced to a lower level, the narrowing down of the political issue space as 
a result of mainstream party convergence would likely not be nearly as influential on vote 
choice. In terms of control variables, there are no notable differences between Model 1 and 
Model 2.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Predicted Probabilities for Key Variables in Model 2 
 
Situation
a
 % Probability of Voting for Populist or 
Mixed Parties 
Min Value Mean Value Max Value 
Mainstream Party Similarity 
b
       4%                         11%                         17% 
Corruption Perceptions 
c
       28%                       39%                         48% 
Corruption Perceptions when Mainstream 
Party Similarity set at High 
      33%                       58%                         71%            
Mainstream Party Similarity when Corruption 
Perceptions set at High 
       36%                      53%                         62% 
Media Exposure        16%                      32%                         39% 
Institutional Trust        9%                        25%                         31%          
Social Trust         6%                        14%                         19% 
a- All the variables are held at their means except the variables listed.  
b- Corruption perceptions held at Low (1 or 2)  
c- Party Similarity held at Low (4 or smaller) 
 
 
Given the evidence that corruption perceptions play a strong role in shaping voting 
behavior, another factor needs to be considered. Incumbents have been shown to be more likely 
to suffer from allegations of corruption (Welch and Hibing 1997; Chang and Golden, 2004). 
Incumbents have more governing responsibility, are under greater media scrutiny and are often 
subjected to justified or rhetorical accusations of corruption by opposition parties. The saliency 
of the corruption issue in Central and East Europe makes such tactics on the part of the 
opposition particularly appealing.  
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Data from the survey indicates that there are some country differences as far as this factor 
is concerned. Incumbents were indeed more likely to be perceived as corrupt than non-
incumbents in the Czech Republic, though not by much. Incumbents had an average corruption 
score of 5.44 (out of 10) while non-incumbents scored an average of 4.25. In Bulgaria, however, 
the results are less straightforward. Parties in government there averaged a corruption perception 
score of 3.14 while non-incumbents had a much higher average of 7.34.  
These results, while seemingly surprising at first glance, become clearer when one takes 
the election cycle into consideration. The Bulgarian election had just occurred and the favorable 
corruption rating of the winning party (GERB) is thus not unexpected. GERB had, moreover, 
campaigned on the standard populist messages of cleaning up corruption and organized crime. If 
we were to instead look at the corruption scores of the previous incumbent (a mainstream 
socialist party), they fare much worse at 6.74. In the Czech Republic the incumbents had been in 
power for 3 years, thus acquiring a higher corruption score. In the subsequent election in 2010, 
the incumbents from the Civic Democratic Party lost but only by 2 percentage points margin to 
the major opposition party. A recently formed populist party (of a predictably stellar corruption 
rating) came in as a close third.  
Incumbency thus does matter for corruption perceptions, and hence for electoral 
outcomes. Protest parties set themselves somewhat of a trap by often campaigning heavily on the 
issue of corruption and later on being perceived as not having done enough to fulfill their 
promises. By their very nature, these political formations flourish in opposition, but face 
difficulties governing. The relationship between corruption perceptions and protest voting, 
however, persists as the niche left by a failed protest party is often quickly replaced by a 
seemingly more capable equivalent.  
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Testing H3 
 
The next set of tests aims to test the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party. The 
dependent variable is again a dichotomous estimator of whether an individual voted for this type 
of party or not. The exact same set of explanatory factors is used to model the determinants of a 
Eurosceptic vote. Model 1 indicates that there is support for this hypothesis as attitudes towards 
the EU are this time statistically significant and negatively correlated with the dependent 
variable. The higher an individual‟s support for the EU and European integration, the lower the 
probability that they would cast a vote for a purely Eurosceptic party.  
The other key independent variables – Mainstream Party Similarity and Corruption 
Perceptions also achieve statistical significance and, much like in the previous set of models, are 
positively correlated with a protest vote. Attitudes towards the European Union are thus not 
exclusively determinative of vote choice even when it comes to genuinely Eurosceptic parties. 
Domestic considerations seem to be systematically related to voting behavior for all three types 
of protest parties discussed in the theoretical chapter.  
 From the predicted probabilities reported in Table 4.7, however, we can see that their 
effect is much smaller than before. A one point increase in corruption perceptions decreases the 
likelihood of voting Eurosceptic by 17% while the same increase in mainstream party similarity 
raises the odds by 13%. A person whose support for the EU goes up by 1 point, on the other 
hand, becomes 38% less likely to pick a purely Eurosceptic party. This effect is further boosted 
when one holds corruption perceptions and mainstream party similarity at their low levels. In this 
case, a one unit increase in negative evaluations of the EU raises the likelihood of voting 
Eurosceptic by 59%. This suggests that the underlying motivations of voting for a purely 
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Eurosceptic party are indeed based upon views of the EU, but their effect is often muted by 
domestic considerations.  
 
 
Table 4.6 Determinants of Voting for a Eurosceptic Party 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Mainstream Party Similarity 0.308 * 
(0.154) 
0.589 
(0.491) 
0.580 
(0.467) 
Corruption Perceptions -0.723 * 
(0.349) 
-0. 456 
(0.392) 
-0.436 
(0.390) 
EU Attitudes -0.540 * 
(0.234) 
-0.543 * 
(0.232) 
-0.430 
(0.442) 
Democratic Values 0.348 
(0.312) 
0.347 
(0.312) 
0.329 
(0.330) 
Minority Attitudes -0.289 
(0.392) 
-0.287 
(0.392) 
-0.289 
(0.392) 
Ideology 0.219 
(0.199) 
0.223 
(0.205) 
0.210 
(0.193) 
Media Exposure -0.448 * 
(0.212) 
-0.442 * 
(0.210) 
-0.489 * 
(0.233) 
Religiosity -0.674 
(0.529) 
-0.675 
(0.532) 
-0.498 
(0.490) 
Institutional Trust 0.763 
(0.734) 
0.763 
(0.734) 
0.634 
(0.539) 
Social Trust -0.873 * 
(0.432) 
-0.846 * 
(0.421) 
-0.847 * 
(0.412) 
Age 0.092 
(0.073) 
0.101 
(0.094) 
0.124 
(0.110) 
Gender 0.274 
(0.166) 
0.274 
(0.167) 
-023 
(0.233) 
Education 0.983 
(0.901) 
0.992 
(0.902) 
0.993 
(0.902) 
Income 0.737 
(0.623) 
0.736 
(0.640) 
0.712 
(0.723) 
Party Similarity x Corruption 
Perceptions 
 0.757* 
(0.320) 
0.764 * 
(0.314) 
Salience of EU Issue   0.892*** 
(0.023) 
EU Attitudes x Salience    0.034 
(0.029) 
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
Constant  12.345 
(3.448) 
13.231 
(5.693) 
9.847 
(2.447) 
N 1208 1208 1208 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0048 0.0048 
Pseudo R
2
 0.1006 0.2226 0.2241 
Log Likelihood -765.243 -734.355 -645.453 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence 
**indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence 
***indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence  
 
 
Table 4.7 Predicted Probabilities for Key Variables in Model 1 
 
Situation
a
 % Probability of Voting for Eurosceptic 
Parties 
Min Value Mean Value Max Value 
Mainstream Party Similarity  4%                              13%                          22% 
Corruption Perceptions  5%                              17%                          21% 
EU Attitudes  47%                            38%                          23% 
Media Exposure 7%                              29%                          36% 
EU Attitudes
b 
 69%                            59%                          23% 
Social Trust
c
 36%                            24%                          11% 
a- All the variables are held at their means except the variables listed.  
b- Corruption perceptions held at Low, Mainstream Party Similarity held at Low  
 
 
 
The control variables in this model also produce some interesting results. Similar to 
before, social trust reduces the likelihood of a protest vote. Institutional trust, however, loses 
statistical significance – an expected result given that institutional trust is a variable measuring 
attitudes towards national institutions. Media effects again seem to have an influence on vote 
choice, but in the opposite direction. Increasing one‟s media exposure by 1 point reduces the 
likelihood of voting Eurosceptic by 29% for average media viewers and by 36% for those who 
have the highest exposure to the media. While I do not have a detailed explanation of this effect, 
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one possibility is that the European Union is, on the whole, much more positively portrayed in 
the media than domestic institutions. The negative effect that the media has on how you view 
your domestic government may automatically translate into support for the EU as citizens need 
an alternative to what they may perceive as inadequate national political class.   
Model 2 in the Table 4.6 adds some additional clarity to the picture. Here I have included 
the interaction variable between mainstream party similarity and corruption perceptions. 
Through this model specification, we see that the independent effects of each of these two factors 
disappear. In other words, when corruption levels are held at Low, mainstream party similarity 
does not systematically affect a Eurosceptic vote. When mainstream party similarity is held at 
Low, corruption perceptions are not a significant determinant of a Eurosceptic vote either. 
However, from this model and its associated predicted probabilities in Table 4.8, we see that 
each of these variables preserves its effect when the other is set at high levels. Thus, when 
mainstream party similarity is seen as high, corruption perceptions increase the likelihood of a 
Eurosceptic vote by 23%. When corruption perceptions are high, mainstream party similarity 
raises the odds of voting Eurosceptic by 17%. The effect of EU attitudes remains almost the 
same as in the previously discussed model.  
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Table 4.8 Predicted Probabilities for Key Variables in Model 2 
 
Situation
a
 % Probability of Voting for Eurosceptic 
Parties 
Min Value Mean Value Max Value 
EU Attitudes  53%                           40%                           12%                 
Media Exposure 9%                             30%                           38% 
Corruption Perceptions when Mainstream 
Party Similarity set  at High 
4%                             23%                           31%                         
Mainstream Party Similarity when Corruption 
Perceptions set at High 
6%                             17%                           23% 
EU Attitudes
b 
 71%                           59%                            9% 
Social Trust 38%                           25%                           11% 
a- All the variables are held at their means except the variables listed.  
b- Corruption perceptions held at Low, Mainstream Party Similarity held at Low  
 
 
 
Finally, in order to explore the issue of salience, I ran a third model which includes an 
interaction term between EU attitudes and the salience of the EU issue. The salience variable was 
created based on the question asking about the biggest problem facing the country at present. 
Individuals who named the consequences of EU membership as either their first or second choice 
were coded as High Salience (salience =1) and those who did not were coded as Low Salience 
(salience = 0). The findings listed in Table 4.6 reveal that for Low Salience individuals, EU 
attitudes are indeed not a significant factor in determining their vote, even in  the case of a purely 
Eurosceptic party. On the other hand, when one has a low level of support for the EU, the effect 
of the salience variable is statistically significant and High Salience individuals are more likely 
to vote for a Eurosceptic party. As evident by the predicted probabilities in Table 4.9, the effect 
of EU attitudes for High Salience individuals consists of a 57% increase in the likelihood of a 
Eurosceptic vote. For the most Eurosceptic individuals, this effect increases to 75% and for the 
most pro-EU ones the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic party drops to 14%.  
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Table 4.9 Predicted Probabilities for Key Variables in Model 3 
 
Situation
a
 % Probability of Voting for Eurosceptic 
Parties 
Min Value Mean Value Max Value 
EU Attitudes
 
when Salience set at High 75%                          57%                            14% 
Media Exposure 19%                          33%                            44% 
Corruption Perceptions when Mainstream 
Party Similarity Set at High 
10%                          21%                            29% 
Mainstream Party Similarity when Corruption 
Perceptions Set at High 
6%                            13%                            22% 
Social Trust 30%                           23%                           15% 
a- All the variables are held at their means except the variables listed.  
 
 
 
What these results suggest is that when it comes to electoral Euroscepticism and 
populism, domestic considerations are indeed a key explanatory factory. Both of the key 
independent variables were found influential, to various degrees, on vote choice for protest 
parties. Nonetheless, the findings also demonstrate that this effect is sometimes conditional – 
mainstream party similarity, in particular, seems to increase the odds of a protest vote to a much 
greater extent when combined with high corruption perceptions. Results also point to the 
existence of underlying views on the EU whose effect becomes much stronger when domestic 
dissatisfaction is reduced to a lower level. Finally, social and institutional trust, as well as 
exposure to the media, were all found to be among the determinants of a protest vote.  
Testing H5 and H6 
While the previous models were concerned with electoral Euroscepticism, the final part 
of the individual-level section looks at value-based Euroscepticism. The theory developed here 
argues that these two will not operate in the same way and will have different determinants. The 
dependent variable in this case is support for the EU, ranging from 1 to 10. Given the nature of 
this variable, a standard OLS model can be used. Findings are presented in Table 4.10.  
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Table 4.10 Determinants of Attitudes towards the European Union 
 
Independent Variable OLS Estimates 
Mainstream Party Similarity 0.033 
(0.027) 
Corruption Perceptions 0.243 * 
(0.111) 
Knowledge of the EU 0.523 * 
(0.234) 
Democratic Values -0.052 
(0.157) 
Minority Attitudes -0.250 
(0.204) 
Ideology 0.049 
(0.107) 
Media Exposure 0.102* 
(0.049) 
Religiosity -0.003 
(0.007) 
Institutional Trust 0.214 
(0.165) 
Social Trust 0.094 * 
(0.043) 
Age -0.036 * 
(0.012) 
Gender 0.354 
(0.344) 
Education 0.202 * 
(0.099) 
Income 0.119 
(0.121) 
Economic Satisfaction 0.156 * 
(0.073) 
Nationalist  -0.289 ** 
(0.103) 
Constant  12.934 ** 
(2.213) 
 
N 1208 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0000 
F 17.06 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence 
**indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence 
***indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence  
Breusch-Pagan test = 6.03 (critical value for 95% = 10.14) 
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Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted that citizens‟ perceptions of mainstream party similarity 
and political corruption will not be systematically related to the existence (or absence) or 
Eurosceptic views. Mainstream party similarity is indeed not significantly related to the 
explanatory variable. This result suggests that value-based Euroscepticism and electoral 
Euroscepticism are largely a product of different underlying causes and that voters do not tend to 
attribute to the EU the faults that they find in domestic political parties. In the case of H6, 
however, we see that corruption perceptions actually reduce one‟s Eurosceptic views. As 
individuals tend to perceive domestic politicians as more dishonest and blame-worthy, they 
evaluate the EU alternative more positively. A one unit increase in perceived corruption 
domestically increases one‟s support for the EU by 0.23 points.  
Given the newcomer status of the CEE member states, they are still closely monitored to 
one extent or another by the European Commission, but this effect is likely to subside overtime 
as domestic and European elites become more inter-wined. Moreover, it should be noted that for 
this relationship splitting the sample revealed that the substantive effect of corruption perceptions 
on EU attitudes is much smaller in the Czech Republic which joined in 2004 than in Bulgaria 
which joined in 2007 and is still regularly monitored. The more vocal the EU is as a corruption 
“watch-dog”, the more citizens tend to see it as an alternative to the inefficiencies of domestic 
governments.  
A number of the other potential explanatory variables achieve statistical significance. 
Unlike the electoral models, socioeconomic factors seem to matter for one‟s level of support for 
the EU. Each additional year of education raises one‟s evaluation of the EU by 0.2. Age is 
negatively correlated with support suggesting that older citizens may tend to be more 
Eurosceptic. Economic satisfaction plays a major role in determining views on the EU. With 
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each additional unit of being economically satisfied, one‟s support for the EU increases by 0.16 
points. While it is unclear to what extent citizens attribute their financial situation to domestic or 
EU-related developments, it is likely that as one‟s satisfaction with their financial situation 
increases, they are more likely to want to preserve the status quo – which in this case includes 
integration in the European Union.  
Nationalist sentiments are another key predictor of EU attitudes. This variable was 
created by using the question on self-reported ideology and coding the people who picked the 
“national traditions” as 1, while the rest as 0. As expected, subscribing to this mindset tends to 
reduce support for a supranational structure like the European Union. Self-reported knowledge of 
the EU also has a strong effect on the dependent variable. A person who claims to know the EU 
at one unit higher than another will tend to support the EU by 0.52 additional points. It should be 
noted that it is possible that this variable exaggerates to some extent the effect of self-reported 
knowledge as people who otherwise support the EU may be embarrassed to admit they don‟t 
actually know a lot about it.   
The only two control variables that achieve statistical significance in both sets of models 
(electoral and value-based Euroscepticism) are Media Exposure and Social Trust. Media 
exposure is positively correlated with the dependent variable. This means that as one absorbs 
more media information, they are actually going to support the EU to a greater extent. This result 
mirrors some of the findings above as it seems that media exposure has the opposite effect on 
one‟s perceptions of domestic governments and European institutions. The effect of social trust 
is also similar to the previous models. As a person trusts their fellow-citizens more, they are 
going to exhibit greater support for the EU suggesting either an underlying “trusting” trait or 
maybe a degree of cosmopolitanism.  
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These findings clearly paint a picture where value-based Euroscepticism is a different 
phenomenon that electoral one. Socioeconomics, cost-benefit analysis, attachment to the nation-
state are all factors found to be unrelated to electoral Euroscepticism but as the above tests 
demonstrate, they are all predictors of value-based Euroscepticism. On the other hand, factors 
related to the domestic political system such as corruption perceptions, mainstream party 
similarity, institutional trust all have much stronger and more systematic effects on vote choice 
but not necessarily on support for the EU.  
4.1.3 European Parliament Elections 
While this dissertation focuses on domestic elections, a brief overview of the European 
Parliament elections can provide some additional insights. These elections took place in June 
2009 and the survey I conducted was able to, therefore, record the self-reported votes of the 
respondents shortly after the actual election. First, comparing the aggregate vote percentages 
reported by respondents to those recorded in the actual elections helps confirm the validity of the 
survey data. In the case of the Czech Republic, for example, 35% of respondents indicated a vote 
for the CDP, 19% for the SDP, 11% for the Communist Party, 9% for the People‟s Party and 6% 
for Sovereignty. The actual vote percentages from the election were 31%, 22%, 14%, 8% and 
4% respectively, indicating that the sample was representative of the voting population. The 
Bulgarian percentages from the survey sample are similarly close to the actual election results, 
with the exception again of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms whose supporters are 
underrepresented in the survey.  
In the Bulgarian case the European and domestic elections happened within a month of 
each other so it is possible to compare underlying trends. The European election preceded the 
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domestic one and there was already a strong showing for protest parties such as the newly-
formed populist GERB and the mixed Ataka. Ranking parties by the vote share captured yields 
the same order for both EP and domestic elections.  Nonetheless, while GERB won the most 
votes for the EP election, they fared even better in the domestic arena gaining an additional 15%. 
The now smaller NMSS, on the other hand, managed to pass the entry threshold in the EP 
elections but failed to do so in the domestic ones.  These results are largely consistent with the 
second-order model of European Parliament elections which holds that turnout would be lower 
than in national elections, smaller parties would do better and so would oppositional parties (Reif 
and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh and Franklin, 1996).  
The proximity of the elections, however, may also be credited with a notably higher 
reported turnout in the survey sample when it comes to EP elections. About 55% of Bulgarians 
surveyed indicated that they have voted in the European election while the actual turnout was 
37%. Reported and actual survey rates were much similar for the domestic election – 64% versus 
60% respectively. This discrepancy when it comes to the European Parliament elections possibly 
results from cases where respondents only voted in the domestic election but nonetheless 
reported having cast a vote in both. Only about 11% of the sample reported voting for a different 
party in the two elections and, of those who did, a vast majority switched from a smaller to a 
larger party during the month between the European and the subsequent domestic election. In the 
Czech case, where there was no domestic election in summer 2009, no notable discrepancy 
between actual turnout in the EP election (28%) and the one estimated in the survey (33%) 
exists.  Therefore, the proximity of the two elections in the Bulgarian case has probably resulted 
in some respondents being reluctant to admit they voted domestically but not in the EP election. 
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4.2 COUNTRY-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF EUROSCEPTICISM AND 
POPULISM 
The second half of this chapter extends the study from individuals to countries and asks the 
question of whether the main relationships found among individuals hold at the country level. 
This approach also allows for more temporal flexibility as both Euroscepticism and corruption 
perceptions have fluctuated over the years. According to regional trends, for example, 
Euroscepticism was much less pronounced in the political systems of CEE countries in the early 
and mid nineties when EU accession was still a distant goal. Eurosceptic parties or Eurosceptic 
strands within existing parties became much more common in the late nineties and the past 
decade. Similarly, corruption levels, while generally high in the post-communist economies of 
the CEE countries, did not produce nearly as much outrage among the public in the initial years 
of transition. The country-level analysis allows for exploring some of these trends in more detail.  
In addition, while Bulgaria and the Czech Republic were selected for the surveys based 
on their representativeness of the region, country-specific factors almost invariably have an 
effect on general political developments. Extending the study to include the entire group of new 
member states bolsters the generalizability of the findings and also helps control for the country-
specific variation that is likely to be present. The Baltic states, for example, despite having many 
similar features to other post-communist societies, also have a distinctive set of political 
characteristics due to their troubled relationship with Russia and the large Russian minorities 
within their borders. The country-level analysis is better equipped to control for this variation 
and will allow for the creation of a more complete picture of regional trends and causal 
relationships.  
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4.2.1 Models and Variable Description 
For this part of the statistical analysis, I am going to use a fixed effects model as it accounts for 
the country-specific variation that is likely to be present. The unit of analysis is election-year and 
the time period covered ranges from 1990 to 2008 and covers the ten recently joined member 
states of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.  All parliamentary, presidential, and local 
elections were included in the dataset for a total of 154 observations. It should be noted, 
however, that data for all election-years is not available on all variables which is why some 
models contain a lower number of observations.  
Dependent Variable  
The dependent variables are constructed by using the percentage of vote share won by 
Eurosceptic, populist and mixed parties in each of the countries under consideration. Depending 
on the particular hypothesis, these percentages are combined to produce the dependent variable 
of interest.  
While both populism and Euroscepticism tend to fall under the “you know it when you 
see” category, a coding scheme has been created to ensure consistency across countries. A party 
was coded as populist if it has not existed for more than two election cycles.  A party was coded 
as Eurosceptic if it proclaims its opposition to major aspects of European integration or behaves 
in ways that are incompatible with European integration. Scholars have noted that some of the 
complexities in measuring Euroscepticism arise from parties which do not directly express anti-
EU views but are “non-EU compatible” (Lewis, 2007). An example of this is the Greater 
Romania Party which has often been characterized as far-right, xenophobic, anti-Semitic, 
irredentist fringe party while at the same time refraining from direct criticism of the EU.    
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Key Independent Variables 
Mainstream party similarity. Operationalizing the proximity of the mainstream 
political parties was conducted by using two types of measures. First of all, I use the 
Comparative Manifestos project which contains information on the positioning of political 
parties over a couple of dimensions. The different categories in Comparative Manifestos project 
are grouped into 7 major policy domains – External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, 
Political System, Fabric and Society and Social Groups. The broad range of issues covered by 
this coding scheme ensures a valid estimation of relative proximity of political parties in a 
country. Secondly, I use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) which 
provides scores on the perceived positioning of all political parties on the standard ideological 
left-right dimension. While the Comparative Manifesto project provides a more information-rich 
measure of party positioning, it is not consistently available so I will the CSES scores whenever 
necessary. I will use the scores of solely the mainstream (non protest-based) political parties to 
arrive at a measure of mainstream polarization. 
Using information on party positioning provided from these two sources, I have 
constructed a scale (ranging from 1-10) of mainstream party similarity by averaging the distance 
between parties on each dimension and across dimensions.  In addition to calculating values for 
mainstream parties, I have constructed a second scale which measures party similarity when all 
parties are taken into consideration – mainstream and protest-based ones. This could provide a 
helpful descriptive illustration of how the means of the two groups are similar or different from 
each other.  
Corruption Levels. As theorized in the previous section the effect of mainstream party 
similarity may be conditional on, or strengthened by, corruption levels. The measure used is 
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based on Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) which aggregates 
corruption perceptions every year as seen by business circles, risk analysts, investigative 
journalists and the general public. Respondents in the CPI index thus range from experts to 
regular citizens. This is a continuous variable within the range of 2-8.   
Attitudes towards the European Union. The most likely alternative explanation for the 
overall success of Eurosceptic parties in a country centers around opposition to European 
integration. In order to capture this factor, I will use aggregate data on overall support/opposition 
to European integration and EU membership which is available in the Eurobarometers (and the 
Candidate Countries Eurobarometers prior to accession). It should be noted that this variable is 
much less nuanced than the individual-level one as Eurobarometer surveys have not consistently 
asked all four questions on membership, image, trust and identity in the conducted polls.  
Control Variables  
Economic Indicators (GDP, Unemployment, Inflation). The utilitarian framework for 
evaluating the European Union holds that citizens evaluate the integration process in terms of 
costs and benefits. For instance, citizens will support integration to the extent that policy 
outcomes actually result in the welfare gains predicted in the promises of politicians. Several 
studies have looked at whether citizens evaluate the EU based on macroeconomic performance, 
including growth, unemployment, and inflation (Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Anderson and 
Reichert, 1996; Gabel and Palmer, 1995).  Since these macroeconomic indicators have been 
found to affect aggregate support for the EU, it is also possible that they influence the likelihood 
of a Eurosceptic vote. Moreover, populist parties are also likely to do better when citizens are 
dissatisfied with the economic situation as they can capitalize on this sentiment.  
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Proximity to Accession. Another possible predictor of Euroscepticism aims to capture 
the time effects of proximity to accession. It is a linear time trend measuring how many years 
have passed since 1990 – therefore taking values from 0 to 18. The literature has hypothesized 
that as accession approaches the general moods and attitudes on EU-related questions in Central 
and East Europe have shifted and public opinion polls seem to confirm this finding. Support for 
the EU in East Europe has, thus, declined in the immediate years before accession. Yet, time in 
itself is not a sufficient explanatory factor, which is why it would be useful to see how key 
factors – such as corruption perceptions and party similarity – interact with the effect of time and 
cause shifts in aggregate effects.  
4.2.2 Findings 
Given the longitudinal nature of the data, the models in this section are estimated using fixed 
effects. This type of estimation allows to control for country-specific factors which could 
interfere with the desired predictors. It should be noted, therefore, that in all models listed below 
country characteristics that are not explicitly modeled can be deemed accounted for by the fixed 
effects in the model. Table 4.11 presents the results from the two models estimated.  
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Table 4.11 Determinants of Vote Share Won by Populist and Mixed Parties 
 Model 1 Effect of One 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increase 
Model 2 Effect of One 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increase 
Mainstream Party Similarity 0.092 
(0.79) 
0.007 0.007 
(0.032) 
0.003 
Corruption Levels  0.254 * 
(0.109) 
0.134 0.012 * 
(0.004) 
0.013 
Mainstream Party 
Similarity x Corruption 
Perceptions 
  0.382 ** 
(0.102) 
0.165 
Attitudes towards the EU 0.235 
(0.220) 
 
0.009 0.265 
(0.259) 
0.003 
GDP 2.324 
(2.299) 
0.002 2.546 
(2.454) 
0.010 
Inflation 0.178 * 
(0.065) 
0.012 0.167 * 
(0.065) 
0.009 
Unemployment 0.674 
(0.578) 
0.003 0.476 
(0.449) 
0.003 
Proximity to Accession  0.219 * 
(0.107) 
0.112 0.127 * 
(0.054) 
0.011 
Constant 14.69 ** 
(4.19) 
 13.42 * 
(4.15 ) 
 
N  134  134  
F test 14.58**  65.27**  
Prop > F 0.00  0.00  
Rho .34  .49  
Sigma_u .31  .30  
Sigma_e .45  .51  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence 
**indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence 
***indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence  
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The findings demonstrate that hypotheses 8 and 9 are supported while hypothesis 7 is not. 
H7 stated the expectation that the higher the similarity of mainstream parties, the greater the 
electoral share of populist and mixed parties. Results presented in table 4.11, however, show that 
mainstream party similarity does not seem to have an independent effect on the votes won by 
protest parties. Corruption levels, on the other hand, are statistically significant and in the 
expected direction indicating that higher corruption results in a greater share of protest vote. 
Comparing the substantive effects of the coefficients (presented in the third column of Table 
4.11) indicates that corruption perceptions are, in fact, the strongest predictor of a protest vote 
along with the time trend variable Proximity to Accession.  
Attitudes towards the EU do not reach statistical significance, thus adding more 
credibility to the findings from the individual-level analysis. From the macro-economic 
indicators, level of inflation seems to be positively related to the dependent variable indicating 
that there is some sociotropic voting in place in the Central and East European countries. Higher 
levels of inflation result in a greater vote share won by populist and mixed parties, since citizens 
become dissatisfied with the performance of mainstream political parties. The other control 
variable that reaches statistical significance – proximity to accession – confirms observations 
already made in the literature that the populist/Eurosceptic trends have developed over time and 
have paradoxically increased as EU accession came close.  
Model 2 in Table 4.11 presents an interaction term between mainstream party similarity 
and corruption levels. As expected, when corruption levels are held at zero, there is no 
statistically significant effect of mainstream party similarity on the dependent variable. However, 
when mainstream party similarity is held at zero, there is still a small independent effect of 
corruption levels on vote share won by populist and mixed parties. The substantive effect for the 
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coefficient is much smaller in this model, but even a small effect in the absence of any party 
similarity is theoretically meaningful. The interaction effect between corruption levels and party 
similarity is also statistically significant and exhibits a strong substantive effect.  
For a more visually clear interpretation of the conditional effect in the model, Figure 4.1 
presents a graphical version of the underlying dynamics. The coefficients in an interactive model 
represent the effects of an independent variable on the dependent variable at varying levels of the 
conditional variable (Friedrich, 1982). In this case, figure 4.1 reports the conditional effect of 
mainstream party similarity on vote share won by protest parties at varying corruption levels. For 
a more intuitive interpretation, the continuous corruption category has been divided into three 
sub-categories corresponding to different degrees of estimated corruption.  
  
 
 
  
Figure 4.1 Conditional Effect of Mainstream Party Similarity on Vote Share Won by Protest Parties 
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The graph demonstrates that at low levels of corruption, mainstream party similarity has, 
in essence, no impact on the dependent variable. As corruption levels move towards medium-
high, however, there is a slight change in the slope. At high levels of corruption, the effect of 
mainstream party similarity on the dependent variable becomes much more notable. Higher 
values of mainstream party similarity thus result in a greater vote share won by protest parties 
when corruption levels are high. This finding lends strong support to H9 as it is clear from the 
graph that there is what one could call a “tipping point” before the effect of mainstream party 
similarity becomes consequential at the country level.  
For a clearer comparison between the different factors, the relative impact of the each 
explanatory factor on the dependent variable has been calculated. Table 4.12 reveals that 
Corruption Perceptions on their own, and in combination with Mainstream Party Similarity, have 
a high relative impact in both models compared to the rest of the variables. Attitudes towards the 
EU account for about 10-14 percent of the dependent variable and inflation moves within a 
similar range. Of course, despite the fact that their relative impact is similar, it should be noted 
that inflation has been shown to have a statistically significant effect while attitudes towards the 
EU do not seem systematically related to the vote share of protest parties in either one of the 
models.  
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Table 4.12 Relative Impact of Each Factor on the Dependent Variable 
 
Variable 
Percentage  of Total 
Impact 
(Model 1) 
Percentage of Total 
Impact 
(Model 2) 
Mainstream Party Similarity 2.36 3.67 
Corruption Levels 21.5 
 
15.23 
Corruption Level x 
Mainstream Party Similarity 
 37.5 
Attitudes towards the EU  10.25 14.5 
Inflation 19.3 
 
13.5 
Unemployment 9.14 6.4 
GDP 5.78 2.27 
Proximity to Accession  31.67 22.93 
 
 
In order to test hypothesis 10, I conducted a similar analysis using a fixed effects 
estimation technique but utilizing the vote share won by Eurosceptic parties this time. The results 
presented in Table 4.13 complement and expand the findings from the individual level analysis. 
Mainstream party similarity is, once again, not statistically significant, while corruption levels 
have a negative correlation with the dependent variable suggesting that higher domestic 
corruption may reduce the vote share won by Eurosceptic parties. However, the substantive 
effect of this variable is quite small, and so is its relative impact on the dependent variable as 
exhibited by Table 4.14.  
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Table 4.13 Determinants of Vote Share Won by Eurosceptic Parties 
 Model 1 Effect of One 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increase 
Model 2 Effect of One 
Standard 
Deviation 
Increase 
Mainstream Party Similarity 0.356 
(0.349) 
0.002 0.345 
(0.332) 
0.002 
Corruption Levels -0.043 * 
(0.016) 
0.007 -0.052 * 
(0.021) 
0.009 
Mainstream Party 
Similarity x Corruption 
Perceptions 
  -0.068 * 
(0.032) 
0.064 
Attitudes towards the EU -0.268 * 
(0.112) 
 
0.165 -0.269 * 
(0.110) 
0.174 
GDP -3.356 
(3.034) 
0.007 -3.466 
(2.986) 
0.090 
Inflation 0.247 
(0.234) 
0.004 0.235 
(0.365) 
0.003 
Unemployment 0.553 
(0.523) 
0.005 0.089 
(0.076) 
0.002 
Proximity to Accession  0.281 * 
(0.132) 
0.154 0.235 * 
(0.109) 
0.162 
Constant 20.25 ** 
(6.76) 
 18.21 ** 
(4.95 ) 
 
N  134  134  
F test 12.26**  15.44**  
Prop > F 0.00  0.00  
Rho .29  .34  
Sigma_u .37  .35  
Sigma_e .39  .43  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
*indicates statistical significance with 90% or greater confidence 
**indicates statistical significance with 95% or greater confidence 
***indicates statistical significance with 99% or greater confidence  
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Table 4.14 Relative Impact of Each Factor on the Dependent Variable 
 
Variable 
Percentage  of Total 
Impact 
(Model 1) 
Percentage of Total 
Impact 
(Model 2) 
Mainstream Party 
Similarity 
4.26 3.94 
Corruption Levels 12.5 
 
14.10 
Corruption Level x 
Mainstream Party 
Similarity 
 13.38 
Attitudes towards the 
EU  
31.95 32.64 
Inflation 19.25 
 
16.46 
Unemployment 10.17 3.9 
GDP 7.32 1.34 
Proximity to Accession  24.55 15.24 
 
 
When an interaction term is included (Model 2), results do not change much, with the 
interaction term having a modest substantive effect. Attitudes towards the EU, on the other hand, 
do seem to better account for the variation in country-level vote share and their relative impact 
on the dependent variable is also larger. Time, again, remains a key predictor variable as the vote 
share won by Eurosceptic parties tends to increase over time. Macro-economic indicators, 
including inflation, are not systematically related to the dependent variable in this case. 
Differences in levels of Eurosceptic vote share across countries are, therefore, mostly due to 
differing attitudes towards the EU and country-specific factors absorbed by the fixed effects. 
Corruption perceptions do play some, though more minor, role in determining vote share.  
While the individual level analysis was also able to test the determinants of value-based 
Euroscepticism, this kind of undertaking would likely not produce reliable results at the country 
level. Eurobarometer surveys, while consistently including questions on EU attitudes, do not 
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always include the necessary items to create country-level indicators for variables such as 
corruption perceptions, EU knowledge, democratic values, media exposure, social trust, etc. 
However, in the next chapter, more space will be devoted to evaluating general country-level 
trends in terms of EU attitudes and how those relate to the Eurosceptic and populist vote shares.  
4.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter tested a series of hypotheses regarding the individual-level and country-level 
determinants of two varieties of Euroscepticism. The first type of Euroscepticism manifests itself 
electorally in the platforms of either mixed or purely Eurosceptic parties. The second one is 
simply the genuine views and attitudes of citizens towards the EU and European integration. The 
findings at the individual level are largely supportive of the hypothesized relationships. The 
country-level analysis yielded mixed results as to the determinants of country-level 
Euroscepticism and populism. In addition, the findings of this chapter have provided some 
interesting questions for future research.  
The survey analysis revealed a lot about the nature and motivations of protest voters. I 
was able to confirm my key prediction that electoral Euroscepticism is, to a large extent, a factor 
of attitudes towards the domestic political system. These factors include primarily a 
dissatisfaction with widespread corruption, with the convergence of mainstream political parties 
to the point of being too alike, and with the main political institutions. At the same time, the 
findings also demonstrated that attitudes towards the European Union are an explanatory factor 
only when it comes to voting for purely Eurosceptic parties. The analysis also revealed some 
 109 
interesting relationship between social trust and protest voting as well as the presence of media 
effects.   
Value-based Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is primarily determined by a different set 
of factors. When exploring what makes people support or oppose the EU, I found that corruption 
perceptions do matter to some extent, but in the opposite direction as compared to their effect on 
Eurosceptic voting. More perceived corruption seems to lead citizens to negatively evaluate their 
domestic leaders and institutions while positively evaluating the European Union. Socio-
economic characteristics, economic satisfaction, nationalist sentiments, knowledge of the EU, 
social trust and media exposure were also among the factors found to be related to EU attitudes. 
While some of these findings are not surprising, what is surprising is that the things that make a 
person dislike the EU are not necessarily the things that make him/her vote for a partially or fully 
Eurosceptic party.  
The country-level part of the analysis confirmed some of these findings, but provided 
mixed support for others. When it comes to protest voting for populist or mixed parties, findings 
demonstrate that the relationships found at the individual level do, in fact, hold at the country 
level. Mainstream party similarity and corruption levels were both found to be significant 
predictors of the vote share. However, while corruption perceptions had an independent effect, 
the effect of mainstream party similarity was conditional. At low levels of corruption, there was 
no systematic relationship between party similarity and the vote share of protest parties. 
However, once corruption levels reached high levels, greater mainstream party similarly resulted 
in greater vote share for populist and mixed parties.  
In terms of the country-level models looking at purely Eurosceptic vote share, results 
from those were fairly mixed. There was some support for the proposition that corruption 
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perceptions have an effect, though much weaker one, on vote share. Attitudes towards the EU, 
however, were the key predictor along with proximity to accession and occasionally inflation. 
One drawback of the country-level models is that there is not enough reliable information to 
construct a similar set of variables as the individual-level analysis. This is why a fair amount of 
the variation in the model is bound to be accounted for by the country-specific fixed effects. The 
next chapter will try to improve our understanding of the country-level developments by 
developing case studies of three countries and explaining how they compare to the rest of the 
region. 
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5.0  CASE STUDIES 
In this chapter, I analyze the evolution of protest parties in three cases: the Czech Republic 
which has high levels of party Euroscepticism, Estonia which possesses high levels of public 
Euroscepticism and Bulgaria which has high levels of populism in its political system. These 
three countries all share a communist past and similar post-communist trajectories. Nonetheless, 
as will be explained in more detail below, each of these cases provides rich contextual 
differences. One is highly homogenous in terms of its ethnic and linguistic composition (the 
Czech Republic); two have larger minorities (Estonia and Bulgaria). Two were among the first 
wave of EU enlargement and joined in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia) and one had to wait 
until 2007 (Bulgaria). One‟s economy has been deemed stable enough to adopt the common 
European currency (Estonia); two haven‟t qualified yet (Bulgaria and the Czech Republic).  
The three countries‟ pre-communist histories, as well as some aspects of the communist 
period, also point to different historical legacies. It is commonly believed that attitudes and 
values are often partly influenced by childhood experiences, cultural context and historical 
legacies (Zaller, 1992; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Hofstede, 2001; Mungiu-Pippidi and 
Mindruta, 2002). Citizens are part of societies and societies have certain norms, habits and belief 
systems influenced by the particular interplay of history and politics overtime. These countries 
provide a useful range of historical and social differences, while nonetheless having experienced 
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similar overarching political and economic trajectories during the communist and post-
communist period.  
Of course, in addition to the particular mixture of historical, economic and social 
characteristics observed in these countries, the major justification for their selection has to do 
with the distribution of Euroscepticism and populism. Bulgaria, Estonia and the Czech Republic 
provide the desired variation in terms of distribution of electoral and value-based 
Euroscepticism. The average vote share won by Eurosceptic and populist parties over the course 
of the post-communist period comes to 30.6% in the Czech Republic, 53% in Bulgaria and 
15.4% in Estonia. These differences suggest that the case selection is suited for examining the 
effects of the explanatory factors. In terms of value-based Euroscepticism – one‟s attitudes 
towards the European Union as reported by survey evidence – the average EU support for the 
same time period was 65% in Bulgaria, 56% in the Czech Republic and 43% in Estonia
7
. These 
figures, while closer than the electoral averages, provide as much variation as possible given the 
generally sizable support for EU membership in the entire region. Table 5.1 below summarizes 
these statements and the relative position of the countries compared to one another.  
 
Table 5.1 Distribution of Electoral and Value-based Indicators 
 Electoral Euroscepticism and 
Populism 
Value-based Euroscepticism 
Bulgaria  High Low  
The Czech Republic Medium Medium 
Estonia  Low High 
                                                 
7
 The averages are derived from Eurobarometer surveys (or Candidate Countries Barometer when applicable). 
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 The purpose of the chapter is twofold. First of all, as explained in the theory, 
Europeanization‟s indirect effects are held responsible for the constrained inter-party competition 
in the region. Since EU accession was, however, the key long-term goal for all of the CEE 
countries, this chapter attempts to account for the varying levels of mainstream party 
convergence. I trace the process of EU accession by focusing on the degree of pressure exercised 
by the EU on the candidate countries under investigation. The analysis seeks to demonstrate that, 
while membership conditions were the same across the region, the politicization of the 
negotiations and the interplay of domestic-EU factors resulted in varying degrees of pressure to 
comply with EU conditionality. Contextual characteristics of the 3 cases can help clarify these 
differences overtime and across countries.  
Secondly, the chapter provides a closer within-country inspection of the main trends in 
the evolution of Euroscepticism and populism. While these trends were also explored in the 
second half of the previous chapter, the case studies can help illustrate the general trends by 
identifying aspects that fit or do not fit the theory. The analysis of each case focuses on the key 
independent variables – mainstream party convergence and corruption – and explores to what 
extent their levels across time and across cases correspond to increases in electoral gains for 
Eurosceptic and populist parties. For example, the findings so far demonstrate that mainstream 
party convergence is particularly consequential for vote choice whenever corruption perceptions 
are high. By identifying moments in time where particular events increased the saliency of the 
corruption issue in voters‟ minds, however, we could better understand the mechanism that 
activates a dormant protest vote. Corruption levels as measured by objective (to the extent 
possible) international indicators were also high in certain places in the early and mid-nineties 
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but parties formed around an anti-corruption platform were rare. The case studies are useful for 
examining this transformation from low to high saliency of the corruption issue.  
The evidence presented in this chapter is based upon the analysis of primary and 
secondary sources and semi-structured interviews. More than 30 elite interviews were conducted 
in the summer of 2008 in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. I interviewed politicians, analysts 
and some former civil servants involved in the EU accession negotiations. The analysis of each 
case study includes assessing the scope of mainstream party convergence as influenced by 
Europeanization, followed by an examination of the extent of corruption in the country and 
finally a description of the type and evolution of key protest parties.  
The next part of the chapter provides a snapshot of each country by describing key 
indicators such as population, ethnic and linguistic composition, economic development. After 
the country snapshots, a brief historical background of each case is presented. The third part of 
the chapter examines the manifestations of mainstream party convergence, corruption, 
Euroscepticism and populism within the political context.  
5.1 COUNTRY SNAPSHOTS 
5.1.1 The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic is located in Central Europe and borders upon Germany, Poland, Slovakia 
and Austria. Its population, according to the most recent estimates, accounts to 10.2 million 
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people presiding over a territory of 78,867 sq km.
8
 The country is ethnically and linguistically 
largely homogenous with 94% (9.6 million) of the population made up of Czechs. The Roma and 
Slovak minorities represent the largest minority groups at respectively 200,000 and 193,000 
people. Smaller minorities include the Silesian (11,000), Polish (52,000), German (39,000), 
Ukrainian (22,000), and Vietnamese (40,000) ones. The major religious denomination in the 
country is Roman Catholic (26.8%) but the Czech Republic is known for having one of the 
largest non-religious populations in Europe. 40% of Czech citizens describe themselves as 
atheists and another 16% are uncertain. Protestants represent around 2.1% of the population.  
The Czech Republic is a parliamentary republic subdivided into two main regions – 
Bohemia and Moravia. Since 2004, the country is a full member of the European Union. Its GDP 
is approximately $256.6 billion (2009 estimate) which places it at the 43rd place relative to all 
other countries in the world. The majority of the labor force is employed in the services (56.2%) 
and industry (40.2%) sectors while a smaller proportion is employed in agriculture (3.6%). The 
Czech Republic has a high literacy rate of 99% and its urban inhabitants comprise 73% of the 
population.  
5.1.2 Bulgaria 
Bulgaria is situated in Southeastern Europe, bordering on the Black Sea, Turkey, Greece, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Romania. Its land area is 110,879 sq km and its population is 7,148,785 
as of 2010 estimates. The dominant ethnic and linguistic group – Bulgarians – comprises 83.9% 
                                                 
8
 The country facts presented in section 5.1 of the chapter have been obtained from the CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and the US Department of State Background Notes 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/index.htm).  
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of the population. The country has a sizable Turkish minority of 9.4% and a Roma minority of 
4.7%. The remaining ethnic groups (Macedonia, Armenian, Tatar) together account for only 2% 
of the population. Bulgarian is spoken by 84.5% of the population, with Turkish and Roma 
languages coming second and third. The most common religious denomination (82.6%) is 
Bulgarian Orthodox followed by Muslim (12.2%) and Roman Catholic (0.6%).  
Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy subdivided into 28 provinces for administrative 
purposes. It has been a member of the European Union since January 2007. The country‟s GDP 
amounts to $90.51 billion (2009 estimates) which places it at the 72
nd
 place in comparative world 
rankings. A vast majority of the labor force is employed in the services sector (64.9%) while 
27.6% belongs to the industrial sector. Bulgaria has a relatively large agricultural sector 
employing 7.5% of the working population. The average literacy rate is 98.2% and 71% of the 
population resides in urban areas.  
5.1.3 Estonia 
Estonia borders on the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Finland, Latvia and Russia. It is a very small 
country with a population of 1,291,170 people and a land area of 45,228 sq km. Estonians 
represent the largest ethnic and linguistic group comprising 67% of the population, but the 
country also has a significant Russian minority of 25.6%. Other nationalities include Ukrainian 
(2.1%), Belarusian (1.3%) and Finn (0.9%). While Estonian is the official language of the 
country nearly 33% of the population speaks a different language (mostly Russian). Evangelical 
Lutheran and Orthodox are the most widespread religious denominations in Estonia espoused by 
13.6% and 12.8% of the population respectively. Another 1.4% of the population subscribes to a 
different Christian denomination (including Methodist, Seventh-Day Adventist, Roman Catholic, 
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Pentecostal). Estonia has an even greater number of non-religious citizens with 66% describing 
themselves as unaffiliated or unspecified, and another 6.1% claiming no religion (2000 census). 
A 2009 Gallup survey
9
 of 142 countries placed Estonia as the least religious country in the world 
as only 14% of respondents answered positively to the question of whether religion plays an 
important part in their lives.  
In terms of government, Estonia is a parliamentary republic subdivided into 15 counties. 
It is a member of the European Union since January 2004.  Estonia is scheduled to be the third 
CEE country after Slovenia and Slovakia to adopt the Euro as its currency in January 2011. Most 
recent estimates assess its GDP at $24.36 billion thus granting Estonia the 112
th
 place among 
countries in the world. The vast majority of the country‟s labor force is employed in the services 
sector (74.5%), followed by industry (22.7%) and agriculture (2.8%). It has a high literacy rate of 
99.8% and the urban segment of the population represents 69% of the total population.  
5.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
5.2.1 The Czech Republic 
Czech history contains periods of remarkable progress and influence in Europe punctuated by 
times of war and foreign domination. The current Czech Republic consists of three historical 
lands – Bohemia in the West, Moravia in the southeast and small parts of Silesia in the northeast. 
The earliest Slavic settlers reached these territories at the beginning of the 6
th
 century AD in 
                                                 
9
 “Estonians – least religious in the world”, The Baltic Course, 11.09.2009.  
http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/baltic_news/?doc=2559 
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successive migration waves (Harvalik, 2009) and later on, during the 13
th
 century, the Czech 
lands also became the target of substantial German immigration. 
 In the late 9
th
 century Bohemia started developing as an independent state under the 
auspices of the Premyslid dynasty and was an important regional actor during most of the Middle 
Ages. Despite being part of the Holy Roman Empire, Bohemia remained largely autonomous and 
influential within the empire. Charles IV, second king of Bohemia and Holy Roman Emperor, 
even made Prague the seat of the empire and a center of Latin Scholarship. Charles the IV 
additionally asserted the autonomy of the Czech lands by issuing a constitutional charter on the 
creation of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. His reign during the 14
th
 century is considered the 
Golden Age of Czech history and the Bohemian kingdom would then remain in the same 
territorial form until 1635 (Teich, 1998).  
After being severely afflicted by the Black Plague much like the rest of Europe, the 
Bohemian lands experienced a period of religious turmoil in the 15
th
 century. Jan Hus, a Czech 
scholar and preacher started a religious movement aimed at reforming Christianity and was 
eventually burned for heresy. His ideas, however, lived on through his followers known as 
Hussites. Hussite beliefs, combined with mounting Czech resentment of German imperialism, 
resulted in a general rebellion in Bohemia (Halverson, 2007). Despite being defeated in the 
rebellion, the Hussite movement was granted the right to enact their religious ideas without 
interference from the papacy or German bishops, thus transforming the Bohemian lands into an 
area of religious tolerance (Halverson, 2007; Agnew, 2004).  
In 1526 Ferdinand I of Habsburg took up the Bohemian throne thus initiating Habsburg 
rule over the country which was to last until 1918. After a brief period of renewed cultural 
progress, the Bohemian kingdom became embroiled in the Thirty Years War between Protestant 
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leaders and the Habsburg Empire. The victory of the Habsburgs resulted in the end of religious 
freedoms and the banning of all religions except Catholicism. The Czech language, culture and 
national consciousness were suppressed for the next 150 years and Bohemia‟s inhabitants forced 
to adopt German customs in what became known as a “time of darkness” in Czech history 
(Agnew, 2004; Cornej and Pokorny, 2000).  
The subsequent reign of Maria Theresa of Austria and her son Joseph II ended the Dark 
Age and brought new freedoms and national revival to the Czech lands. It was during that time 
that the Czech inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia “became a nation both in their own eyes and 
in the eyes of the outside world” (Auty, 1956). Advances in science, culture and art boosted the 
developing Czech identity and a distinctive Czech political style began to emerge as well – one 
characterized by “practicality and rationality, instead of audacity and romanticism” (Rothschild, 
1974).  
This renewed sense of national identity and social progress spurred a desire among 
Czechs to achieve greater autonomy and self-rule from their foreign rulers. After the fall of the 
Holy Roman Empire, Bohemia had become a part of the Austrian empire, and later of the 
Austria-Hungary one. While Czech discontent did not result in a violent rebellion during the so-
called Springtime of Nations – a period of political and revolutionary upheaval in Europe – it 
spurred persistent attempts by Czech leaders to reform the empire and achieve greater autonomy. 
Negotiations and passive resistance such as political boycotts finally resulted in a compromise 
reached in 1879 when Czech representatives returned to the legislature and supported the Austro-
Hungarian government while also working towards gaining small concessions for Czech 
nationhood (Agnew, 2000).  
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For the remaining time prior to World War I, Czechs remained under the control of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, while preserving their sense of national identity and maintaining 
political representation in the legislature. During the war, exiled and expatriated members of the 
political elite lobbied among Western powers for their right to post-war self-determination. The 
defeat of the Central Alliance and the subsequent breakdown of the Austria-Hungarian Empire 
provided Czechs and Slovaks, among other East European peoples, with the opportunity to 
proclaim their independence. At the post-war Versailles conference, the principle of self-
determination was championed by influential Western politicians, including US President 
Woodrow Wilson. Self-determination was understood as granting nations statehood “along 
historically established lines of allegiance and nationality” (Leff, 1997). The settlement was 
“particularly generous” to Czech and Slovak territorial claims granting them nearly all of the 
claimed territory. The territorial victory was, however, in retrospect often seen as a double-edged 
sword since the new lands of independent Czechoslovakia came with large minority populations 
(Hungarians, Poles, Germans) and potential for future territorial disputes  (Leff, 1997).  
Politically, the newly formed Czechoslovakian state was a democracy governed by a 
unicameral national assembly. The system of proportional representation adopted by the republic 
resulted in an inclusive multi-party system which accommodated ideological and ethnic divisions 
across the country. Presidents were democratically elected and, despite lacking substantial 
powers, were often able to enhance their authority through their moral and intellectual prestige – 
something that contrasted with other Central European leaders of that age who were often 
military leaders and favored centralized rule (Fawn, 2000). Czechoslovakia succeeded in 
avoiding the rise of fascist and generally anti-democratic parties within its territory by effective 
party politics combining repressive strategies towards extremists (party bans) with attempts to 
 121 
integrate them back into the political system (Capoccia, 2001). The country also possessed a 
legacy of relative autonomy and self-rule for a large part of its history, despite formal belonging 
to the Holy Roman and the Habsburg empires. This legacy, coupled with a history of early 
religious reformation and a move towards secularism, is often credited with the stability of its 
postwar democracy (Braghiroli, 2007). Czechoslovakia was the only Central or East European 
country to maintain democracy throughout the entire interwar period and its collapse during 
WWII has been largely attributed to overwhelming external rather than internal pressures.  
Despite its notably strong democratic performance, compared to its counterparts, the 
Czechoslovak state was not without its problems. The economic depression of the 1920 had 
severely affected the country. The regions inhabited by Sudeten Germans and the Slovak portion 
of the republic were particularly afflicted (Fawn, 2000). The Slovak economy had already been 
lagging in competitiveness to the Czech one and the economic disparities exacerbated the project 
of creating a common Czechoslovak identity. Slovaks, moreover, feared that centralized rule 
from Prague was leading towards a much more Czech-oriented national identity (Cohen, 1999). 
The movement towards creating an independent Czechoslovak nation had been led mostly by 
Czech and Slovak émigrés and T.G. Masaryk, a Czech philosopher, and leader of the 
independence movement was not a proponent of Slovak autonomy. He concluded the “Pittsburgh 
Agreement” with the Slovak League of America where he reluctantly promised Slovaks a certain 
degree of autonomy but after the formation of the Czechoslovak republic he distanced himself 
from the agreement (Stolarik, 2003). Combined with the economic disparities that existed 
between the Czech and Slovak regions of the country, this move towards centralization caused a 
certain degree of friction between the two nationalities (Cohen, 1999).  
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Similarly, efforts at integration of the German population in the Sudeten regions were not 
particularly successful despite invitations to participate in government and the provision to 
receive education in the German language. Discontent among the German minority persisted and 
resulted in the pro-Nazi National Front Party winning two thirds of the Sudeten German vote. Its 
leader advocated for a federal solution to the statehood issue in Czechoslovakia. The Sudeten 
German minority during the interwar period is thus often considered the greatest challenge to the 
Czechoslovak state concept (Cornwall and Evans, 2007).  
Thanks to its fairly strong democratic record, Czechoslovakia never experienced a serious 
internal threat but it was nonetheless invaded and occupied by external forces during World War 
II. The issue of the Sudeten Germans played in the hands of German Chancellor Adolf Hitler 
who used it as a pretext to target Czechoslovakia (Cornej and Pokorny, 2000). Hitler demanded 
the cession of the Sudeten region to the Third Reich under the threat of war. Britain and France – 
unwilling to risk a confrontation with Germany and still believing Hitler‟s territorial ambitions 
were not far-reaching - advised the Czechoslovak government to concede. Thus, under pressure 
from both allies and adversaries, Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes exceeded his 
constitutional authority and accepted the ultimatum while circumventing parliament (Cornej and 
Pokorny, 2000).   
However, unsatisfied with possession of only Sudetenland, Hitler invaded and occupied 
the Czech lands in March 1939. The former country became the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia and was annexed to the Third Reich. Humiliated and unable to defend themselves 
against the strong German army, Czechs were left with an entrenched sense of betrayal against 
Western powers (Cornej and Pokorny, 2000). At the same time, the Czech and Slovak 
experiences during WWII diverged and generated some distrust between the two nationalities. 
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While Bohemia and Moravia were annexed as a Protectorate, Hitler used the Slovak bid for 
independence to his advantage by allowing Slovakia to declare independence while assuring that 
it remained a servile state. Czechs interpreted Slovak assistance to Germany as „treason‟ while 
Slovaks viewed the Check pragmatic attitude of leading “frugal and frightened but otherwise 
normal lives” as complacency (Fawn, 2000). 
Despite their different experiences during the Nazi occupation, Czechs and Slovaks 
joined forces again after Hitler‟s defeat and Czechoslovakia was reestablished with its pre-war 
borders largely intact. The heavy legacy of the war included approximately 340,000 
Czechoslovak citizens killed and hundreds of thousands sent into concentration camps or used as 
forced labor. The psychological impact, on the other hand, was more devastating for the Slovaks 
which had assisted the Nazi regime and their war-time leader Josef Tiso was executed for his 
activities in support of Nazism. Czech sense of national pride, on the other hand, was fairly 
unscathed with the exception of a disillusionment with their Western allies.  
It was not long after it had been liberated from Nazi forces, however, that the 
Czechoslovak state became subjugated to another dictatorial regime. In 1947 the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) won more votes than any of the other contenders and soon 
asserted itself as the dominant political force. At that time, the Czechoslovak communist party 
still enjoyed genuine support among a population already suspicious of the West and grateful to 
the Soviet forces for their military aid in the fight against Nazi occupation (Fawn, 2000).  
For the next 45 years Czechoslovakia would remain under communist control functioning 
largely as a Soviet puppet state. The limited sovereignty enjoyed by the Czechoslovak state 
became apparent as early as 1947 when a decision to accept the American offer for economic 
assistance under the Marshall plan was quickly reversed after receiving orders from the Soviet 
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delegation (Renner, 1990). The communist puppet regime then engaged in Soviet-inspired 
practices that were to become common across East Central Europe. The economy was brought 
under state control and a system of central planning was instituted. Following Soviet policy, a 
major push toward developing the heavy industry was undertaken. Massive increases in 
industrial output, however, were paralleled by low labor productivity and poor quality of 
products. Private property was seized and agriculture was collectivized. Opposition of the kulaks 
– the richer and more productive farmers – and general resistance from the peasantry, however, 
resulted in a decline of agricultural production. The Communist leadership embarked on a 
campaign to penetrate and control all aspects of life, including economy, culture, education, 
science and art (Wolchik, 1998).  
The first and greatest challenge to Soviet rule in Czechoslovakia came in 1968 when 
sweeping reforms proposed by party reformers and aimed at implementing “socialism with a 
human face” threatened to undermine the underpinnings of the orthodox communist regime. The 
practical policies of the reform program would increase political and social freedoms, decrease 
censorship and party intervention in private life, and finally decentralize the economy in an 
attempt to foster economic growth. The Czechoslovak economy had severely stagnated in the 
early 1960s and its industrial growth rate was the lowest in East Europe. Despite Alexander 
Dubcek‟s status as a communist party leader and his framing of the reforms as merely 
improvements towards socialism rather than a regime challenge, Warsaw Pact forces led by the 
USSR invaded Czechoslovakia and put an end to the reform program (Agnew, 2004; Wolchik, 
1998). These events became known as the Prague Spring and had a lasting effect on Czech 
attitudes towards communism.  
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The period following the failed Prague Spring was known as „normalization‟ – a 
restoration of the pre-1968 state of the country. This involved renewed political repression, 
purging of the reformists within the party and increased censorship. Arguably, the Czech 
intelligentsia was treated harsher than the Slovak one and pushed harder into dissent while the 
Slovak elites collaborated with Moscow more eagerly (Eyal, 2003). At the level of common 
citizens, the communist regime emphasized obedience and conformity among the population 
and, having witnessed the fate of reform attempts, citizens became largely apathetic and 
distanced themselves to the extent possible from political activity. Some underground dissident 
groups were still formed, but their reach was limited and members were often captured and 
imprisoned (Wolchik, 1998).  
In the mid and late 1980s the reform policies of „glasnost‟ (openness) and „perestroika‟ 
(economic restructuring) initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev brought forth another era 
in Soviet satellite states, including Czechoslovakia. Realizing the Soviet planned economy and 
widespread political repression were unsustainable, Gorbachev embarked on an ambitious 
reform program which ultimately initiated a chain reaction of anti-communist movements in all 
of Central and East Europe. With Polish and Estonian revolutions already on the way, events in 
the Czech Republic unfolded fast to bring an end to 45 years of communist rule.  
A peaceful demonstration in Prague commemorating International Students‟ Day and the 
50
th
 anniversary of the execution of Czech students by the Nazis was suppressed by government 
military forces. The uncalled for intervention ignited widespread protests across the nation and 
Vaclav Havel, a famous playwright and an active opposition leader, established the Civic Forum 
– a political organization to counteract the Communist party (Dowling 2002; Agnew, 2004). In 
December 1989 the communist leadership resigned from power and Vaclav Havel was elected 
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the president of the Czechoslovak Republic. The bloodless regime change conducted through 
largely peaceful means became known as a „velvet revolution‟ and was made possible in part by 
Gorbachev‟s pledge to refrain from using military means to suppress resistance movements.  
The peaceful dissolution of the communist regime through the means of elite negotiations 
is often seen by democratization theorists as a promising sign. Higley and Burton (1998) suggest 
that post-communist countries where regime change happened through a “pact of elites” had 
greater chances of successful democratic consolidation. The Round Table Talks conducted by 
Communist parties and the respective oppositional movements in Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, for example, can be taken as an indicator of a transformation through an “elite 
pact” (Stefan-Scalat, 2000). In addition to pro-Western public sentiment, Czechoslovakia thus 
exhibited favorable conditions for democratization at the elite level as well.  
The first free parliamentary election in Czechoslovakia took place in June 1990 with an 
overwhelmingly high turnout of 95%. The growing unpopularity of the Communist Party ever 
since the suppression of the Prague Spring and the general enthusiasm for the transition to 
democracy created the pre-conditions for the outpouring of voter participation – a phenomenon 
that subsided and brought Czech turnout to the much lower and much more common levels in 
subsequent elections. Unsurprisingly, anti-communist organizations such as the Civic Forum 
won a comfortable majority and formed a government. The Communist Party was left with only 
13% of the votes indicating that ever since the very first free election citizens in Czechoslovakia 
embraced democratic and pro-Western values. In contrast, the first free election in Bulgaria was 
won by the Communist Party, albeit by a slim majority. Czech citizens‟ apparent support for 
moving towards a Western-style democracy was reciprocated in the West by highly favorable 
assessments of foreign analysts, scholars and political leaders. In fact, for a period of time in the 
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early to mid-nineties, “it was almost impossible to read anything negative about the Czech 
Republic” (Shepherd, 2000).  
 However, while effectively bringing down the Communist regime, dissident groups 
proved unable to effectively govern as they are often unfamiliar with many features of everyday 
politics (Lomax, 1995; Rose, 1995). Civic Forum thus dissolved in 1991 and several new parties 
formed in its place, the most prominent of which was the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) led by 
Vaclav Klaus.  The party presided over the so-called „velvet‟ divorce just a year later when the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia peacefully parted ways and became separate states (Cornej and 
Pokorny, 2000). As noted previously, Czechs and Slovaks never fully succeeded in forming a 
joint national identity and followed somewhat different paths during WWII and the communist 
era. These legacies were exacerbated by the political disagreements that arose after the fall of 
communism. Slovak nationalism gained political grounds through the populist Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia which became the dominant party in the Slovak regions. Its leader Vladimir 
Meciar opposed the fast privatization and liberalization policies favored by Czech Prime 
Minister Vaclav Klaus.  
As a result, despite only lukewarm support from the public (Cornej and Pokorny, 2000; 
Shepherd, 2000), Klaus and Meciar reached an agreement on the velvet divorce and 
Czechoslovakia officially ceased to exist on January 1, 1993. The split did not have much effect 
on the Czech trajectory of rapid pro-market and pro-democratic reforms. The institutions of 
governance had already been in place in Prague and the country had a legacy of greater self-rule 
throughout the centuries. The Czechs regions had always been more economically prosperous 
and its citizens had a well-instilled sense of national identity. In Slovakia, by contrast, the 
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“ongoing transition to liberal democracy was compromised and held up as a direct consequence 
of the split” (Shepherd, 2000).  
The Czech transition in the 1990s was consequently viewed as more “on track” and the 
party system, for example, already exhibited by 1996 some characteristics found in consolidated 
democracies. Much like in Western Europe, a one-dimensional left-right axis was able to 
successfully predict the structure of party competition and voter preferences (Kitschelt, 1994; 
Brokl, 1994; Vlachova, 1996). Parties differed largely on their views about socioeconomic 
policy such as the role of the state in the market economy, the optimal pace of privatization, the 
scope of welfare benefits. The only party emphasizing issues of cultural and anti-minority nature 
– the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC) – held a 
fairly marginal spot in the party system. Social cleavages similarly had little effect on the 
structure of Czech party competition. Parties did not seem to have stable constituencies and none 
of them were anchored in the divisions of society (Elster, Offe, Preuss, 1997; Karasimeonov et 
al, 1999). Competition thus revolved largely around an ideological left-right dimension unlike 
neighboring Slovakia where populist and nationalist political discourse dominated part of the 
1990s.  
The Czech political system thus began to resemble the “normal” Western European 
democracies fairly early in the transition process and, despite the inevitable economic and 
political hurdles, is in retrospect considered to have enjoyed a fairly linear and smooth transition. 
Czech society during the early transformational period was fairly aware and acceptant of the 
short term negative consequences of reform such as price shocks. As social and economic 
inequality grew, the consensus in favor of reforms decreased, but comparatively speaking the 
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citizens of the Czech Republic withered the shocks of the initial market reforms in a pragmatic 
and calm manner (Cornej and Pokorny, 2000).  
Overall, the history of the Czech Republic has given Czech citizens much to be proud of, 
such as managing to maintain democratic rule in the interwar years and experiencing long 
periods of relative or full self-governance throughout the ages. The Soviet period was met with 
resistance and resentment by Czechs. The failed Prague Spring resulted in a more complacent 
but alienated relationship with the regime. After the Velvet Revolution, Czechs were quick to 
turn away from communism and embrace Western values and practices. A final attempt at 
building a common identity with Slovaks failed due to political disagreements. Historical 
experiences had left the two nations with different cultural legacies and different socio-economic 
characteristics leading to the final split.  
5.2.2 Bulgaria 
Bulgarian history is marked by highly contrasting periods ranging from imperial prosperity, 
military might and cultural progress to foreign domination, repression and sluggish development. 
Bulgaria‟s geographic location on the ethnically, linguistically and culturally very diverse Balkan 
peninsula and the frequent redrawing of the country‟s boundaries have been influential factors in 
the country‟s experiences throughout the ages.  This section will give a concise description of 
major periods in Bulgarian history and their potential consequences for politics and society.  
The territories which now constitute the state of Bulgaria are known to be among the first 
in Europe to witness the emergence of “organized social life” (Crampton, 2006). These lands 
were subsequently ruled by the Persian and Roman empires until Khan Kubrat united the 
disparate Bulgarian tribes and established the Bulgarian state in 681. The origins of current 
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Bulgarians can be traced to three different tribes inhabiting the Balkan regions – the Indo-
European Thracians, the Slavs and the Central Asian Bulgars. Several years later, the First 
Bulgarian Kingdom under Tsar Simeon I (893-927) emerged. His rule is often known as a golden 
age when art and literature flourished (Forbes et. al, 2004). At the height of its power, the 
Bulgarian Kingdom ranged from Budapest to the Black Sea and from the Dnieper River in 
Ukraine to the Adriatic Sea. During the 9
th
 century, Christianity became the dominant religion in 
Bulgaria and the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced. Bulgarian culture to the present day treats the 
fact that the Cyrillic alphabet was developed in Bulgaria as a source of national pride. The 
successes of the First Bulgarian Kingdom were not enough, however, to forever ward off 
powerful enemies. Bulgarian tsars and the aristocracy arguably fell into the trap of “folie de 
grandeur” and assumed that any enemy can be contained (Crampton, 2006).  
Bulgaria‟s chief adversary in the Balkans was the Byzantine Empire. The two fought 
several wars against each other but also joined forces to fight a united front against outside 
invaders. Byzantine culture and religion had a strong influence on Bulgarian lands and 
occasionally Bulgarian rulers would attempt to curb these influences in an effort to preserve a 
uniquely Bulgarian culture (Crampton, 2006). In 1018 Bulgaria officially fell under the rule of 
the Byzantine Empire, albeit only for a century. Despite the loss of independence, Bulgaria 
experienced fairly little interference in its affairs during this period. Successive rebellions against 
the empire finally succeeded in the re-instatement of the Bulgarian state. Once independent 
again, the Bulgarian Kingdom promptly engaged in military attacks against Serbia and Hungary 
successfully expanding Bulgaria‟s Western borders (Hupchick and Cox, 2001).  
The Second Bulgarian Kingdom existed until the early 15
th
 century and was a dominant 
power in the Balkans. During the rule of Tsars Kaloyan and Ivan Assen II in particular, the 
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country enjoyed significant military and economic strength and its territorial boundaries were the 
largest in its history. Throughout the years, Bulgaria expanded to the south and west at the 
expense of the Latin Empire, undermined Latin influence in the Balkans and won recognition for 
an independent Bulgarian Patriarchate of Turnovo (Hupchik and Cox, 2001). 
Until the 14
th
 century, the Bulgarian lands thus experienced a long period of growth and 
military might. Historical legacies from these times include a sense of Bulgaria‟s past greatness 
and territorial vastness. The Bulgarian kingdoms engaged in frequent conflicts with neighboring 
countries in what was a typical for the Balkans constant redrawal of boundaries. In the 14
th
 
century, however, Bulgarian might started to wane and history took an unfortunate turn for the 
country. A rising Serbia defeated and subordinated Bulgaria in 1330. Serbian domination, 
however, was short-lived since the Ottoman Empire was similarly on the rise at the time and in 
1393 its forces conquered and subjugated the Bulgarian lands.  
From 1393 until 1878 the Bulgarian state did not exist, national progress was paralyzed 
and “what stood in those days for national consciousness was obliterated” through the forced 
assimilation into Ottoman culture (Forbes et. al, 2004). Unlike the Byzantine Empire, the 
Ottomans did not permit much autonomy to the subjugated nations and Bulgarian institutions of 
governance were dismantled. Bulgarian folklore and culture abounds with stories of suffering, 
oppression and injustices experienced by the Bulgarian population at the time. Works of art 
commemorating the heroism and martyrdom of resistance fighters during the Ottoman yoke are 
often among mandatory school reads up until present day.  
The harshest aspects of Ottoman rule involved the many reported cases of forced 
Islamization of the population, the so-called “blood tax” where every 5th newborn boy was taken 
and trained to be a soldier in the Sultan‟s army (Crampton, 1997; Hupchick, 2002). While the 
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cultural and religious aspects of Ottoman rule were fairly oppressive, the impact of the Ottoman 
Empire on Bulgarian lands was not entirely negative. During the 19
th
 century, in particular, some 
Bulgarian towns experienced a period of economic growth and witnessed advances in 
communication, transportation and trade.  
Bulgarian history and culture contain numerous accounts - some historically 
substantiated, others more in the realm of myths and legends - about attempts at liberation from 
the Ottomans. The first uprising happened as early as 1408 and sporadic rebellions occurred 
throughout the ages. The 19
th
 century, however, witnessed an increase in intensity, 
organizational scope and frequency of revolutionary outbreaks. These developments culminated 
in what came to be known as the Bulgarian National Revival. The Ottoman Empire was 
experiencing general decline and was plagued by internal and external problems, resulting in 
weakening of control over the subordinate nations. In 1876 Bulgarians organized - and were 
defeated in - the so-called April Uprising. The cruelty of the Ottoman forces in suppressing the 
revolt, however, resulted in a public outcry among liberal circles in Western Europe. This 
Europe-wide reaction gave Russia the long-awaited opportunity to embark on a military attack 
against the Ottomans (Ertl, 2008). The offensive proved successful and the subsequent Treaty of 
San Stefano re-instated the independent Bulgarian state in a territory roughly coinciding with the 
nation‟s ethnic boundaries.  
The treaty was, however, revised by the Treaty of Berlin later that year in which Western 
powers substantially scaled down the size of the proposed Bulgarian state, largely due to fear of 
rising Russian influence on the Balkans (Forbes et. al, 2004). The Berlin Treaty is often seen in 
Bulgaria as a betrayal by Western nations for the sake of Great Power politics. Not surprisingly, 
it is the date of signing the San Stefano Treaty that is commemorated as Bulgaria‟s national 
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holiday while the anniversary of signing the Berlin Treaty is rarely acknowledged. Ultimately, 
the 5 centuries spent under Ottoman rule did not obliterate the Bulgarian nation and culture. 
However, historical memories of domination and suppression, fueled by legends and folklore, 
and at times by populist politicians, would play into Bulgarian perceptions of Turkey and the 
Turkish minority up to the present.   
The rest of the 19
th
 century saw an independent Bulgaria achieve a surprising rate of 
economic progress. Bulgaria‟s constitution, largely crafted with foreign help, made provisions 
for an “ultra-democratic” system for which Bulgarians were not prepared after centuries of no 
self-rule. The initial governance attempts failed miserably, only to be substituted by a brief de 
facto dictatorship of the President of Parliament Stefan Stambolov (Forbes et.al, 2004). 
Stambolov‟s iron-fisted rule did, however, restore order in the fragile state of Bulgaria and he 
was eventually replaced by a more democratic successor.  
The 20
th
 century was a tumultuous time in Bulgarian history, marred by political and 
social unrest. Bulgaria‟s territorial ambitions and the attempt to incorporate all ethnic Bulgarians 
in the type of vast state that existed prior to the Ottoman rule prompted it to become involved in 
the two Balkans wars of 1912 and 1913. While being on the winning side, Bulgaria suffered the 
highest number of casualties in the first Balkan war and was fully defeated in the second (Hall, 
2000). Territorial expansion thus remained unfulfilled and Balkan boundaries remained disputed 
by Bulgaria, as well as by most of the countries inhabiting the region.   
Bulgaria‟s participation in the First World War on the side of the Central Powers had 
everything to do with the “unrealized ideal of national unification” (Ertl, 2008). Germany 
promised Bulgaria a return to the country‟s San Stefano borders in exchange for assistance in the 
war. The first half of the war was fairly propitious for Bulgarians as they achieved military 
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victories against Serbia and Romania, while also occupying most of Macedonia. Domestic 
turmoil, however, put a halt on the military expansion. The war had become highly unpopular 
among the population as it was seen as the cause of severe economic hardship. Moreover, the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 affected Bulgarian society by instilling a certain dose of anti-
monarchist sentiment. The government was forced to resign under public unrest and 
disobedience in the army. King Ferdinand abdicated in an effort to save the monarchy and was 
succeeded by his eldest son (Gilbert, 2004). With the end of World War I and the signing of the 
Versailles Treaty, Bulgaria was punished by having some of the territories acquired since 1912 
taken away. As a result, resentment against the treaty became widespread in Bulgaria and 
Bulgarians refused to consider it final (Hupchick and Cox, 2001).   
During the interwar years democratic governance was mostly absent, unlike in the Czech 
Republic. Bulgarian politics was in a very volatile and tumultuous state and political repression 
and murders were not uncommon. Initially, a radical agrarian agenda was implemented by 
Alexander Stamboliiski whose political style was ruthless and authoritarian. He was killed in a 
coup staged by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) which promoted 
nationalist agitation and eventually devolved into a racketeering gangster formation resorting to 
violence and empty slogans (Hupchick and Cox, 2001). Progressive intellectuals organized 
another coup, ousted the IMRO and established a one year dictatorship in an attempt to restore 
order. However, the political situation by 1935 had been reduced to near anarchy. Tsar Boris 
responded by instituting a royal dictatorship, but amongst the permeating communist activity, his 
rule also proved unpopular.  
On the eve of World War II Bulgaria was in a less than favorable political and economic 
condition. Much like with WWI, the country‟s decision to ultimately side with Nazi Germany 
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was the result of territorial ambitions. The Entente had repeatedly refused to accept Boris‟s 
requests for revising the post-WWI territorial terms.  
During the war, Bulgarian forces invaded and occupied Macedonia which represented the 
greatest share of their involvement in the war.  King Boris refused to declare war on the Soviets 
unlike Hitler‟s other allies. He also refused to send Bulgarian Jews to the Nazi concentration 
camps despite Germany‟s wishes (Ertl, 2008). When the tide of war turned against the Nazi 
alliance, Soviet forces invaded and occupied Bulgaria installing a puppet government and 
declaring a People‟s Republic. For the next 45 years Bulgaria would be firmly within the Soviet 
sphere of influence.  
The peace treaty following WWII also deprived Bulgaria of most of its wartime territorial 
gains thus once again shattering unwavering Bulgarian hopes for restoring their former 
greatness. Saving Bulgarian Jews from deportation and likely death would remain the only act 
generating uncontested national pride in the future. Bulgaria‟s experiences in the 20th century 
from the Balkan wars to its attempts to play alongside Great Powers in the two world wars also 
solidified the general sense of distrust of the West instilled from the fate of the San Stefano 
treaty.  
The communist regime in Bulgaria is often viewed as having been the most stable and 
Moscow-friendly one in Europe. Its eventual demise was a factor of mostly external 
developments such as the general collapse of the Soviet-sponsored regimes across the region 
(Dimitrov, 2002). The evolution of the communist regime in Bulgaria mirrored to some extent 
developments across East Europe. Regime consolidation in the late 40s was achieved through 
massive purges of dissidents, state takeover of the economy and nearly every aspect of life. 
Stalin‟s death, however, brought a relaxation of terror policies. The reign of Bulgarian 
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communist leader Todor Zhivkov, while strictly following Moscow‟s orders and communist 
dogma, was not exceedingly oppressive (with the exception of the forced assimilation of the 
ethnic Turks, see discussion below). Bulgarians benefited from an economic progress that made 
them one of the more prosperous Soviet satellites and their loyalty to Moscow made them a 
valuable ally (Gruev, 2008).  
Bulgaria never experienced the type of mass public uprisings seen in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. In fact, the Bulgarian public seemed to be one of the most favorably inclined 
towards the Soviet Union and the Zhivkov regime enjoyed relative complacency on the part of 
the population, if not active support. Some of the reasons for these sentiments include the 
contrast between Bulgaria's pre-war times and the communist period, as well as distant historical 
legacies. As described above, Bulgaria post-liberation society had suffered and mostly lost many 
wars and battles, the economy was drained, the prewar political leadership was in disarray and 
the country‟s experience with democracy had been very short. The communist system brought 
industrial growth, economic security and order in a previously tumultuous society. In addition, 
historical experiences had instilled a sense of distrust in Bulgarians towards the Western powers 
while Russians were still regarded with affinity due to their assistance during Bulgaria‟s 
Ottoman liberation.  
A distinctive feature of Zhivkov‟s communist regime was its increasingly nationalist 
rhetoric and policies. Many ethnic Turks and Pomaks (people of Bulgarian origin whose 
ancestors converted to Islam during the Ottoman age) fled the country after being deprived of 
their lands. A major assimilation campaign was launched in the 1970s and 1980s when many 
Pomaks and Turks were forced to take Bulgarian names in the hope of diluting their ethnic 
identity. When Turks organized peaceful resistance in some villages, the army was sent in and 
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rebels were either forced to submit, sent to prison or killed (Zhelyazkova, 2001). Many other 
members of the minority fled the country fearing for their lives or identities.  
Soon after the forced assimilation process, the Bulgarian communist regime began to 
crumble. Zhivkov had not put any real effort into implementing the economic reforms advanced 
by Gorbachev‟s perestroika. The Bulgarian economy was stagnant and near the brink of 
unsustainability. The chain reaction of anti-communist movements in Central and East Europe 
caught up with Bulgaria and mass demonstrations against the regime were organized by an 
ecological organization. Like the majority of other regime changes in the region, the Bulgarian 
transformation was largely peaceful. The Communist party strategically gave up its hold on 
power and the first free elections were held in June 1990. However, those elections were in fact 
won by the Communist party signifying the reluctance of a large part of Bulgarian society to part 
with the familiarity of communism. Forty-five percent of surveyed Bulgarians, for example, 
agreed in 1994 that it is “best to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader who 
can quickly decide things” (Rose and Haepfer, 1994). Bulgaria‟s transformation thus was only 
partial and the communists maintained significant influence until 1997 (Crampton, 2006). 
Society was not fully sold yet on the democratic idea.  
Consequently, the political system in the early and mid-nineties revolved around the 
communist issue cleavage. The major oppositional force – the Union of the Democratic Forces 
(UDF) won a slim majority in the 1992 elections and governed until 1994. But internal divisions 
coupled with the difficulty experienced by the UDF in transitioning from an anti-communist pre-
political movement into a modern party organization, hindered the effectiveness of the 
government (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Market reforms were initiated including a large scale 
privatization program which, however, moved slowly and was plagued by corruption and 
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inefficiencies. The Bulgarian Socialist Party (the re-named Communist Party) was back in power 
in 1994 after a popular election but the economic situation in the country had sharply worsened 
after the disorderly and patchy transformation from communism to market capitalism. 
Unemployment and inequality skyrocketed in the new democracy and an unprecedented 
economic crisis in 1996-1997 brought down the Socialist government after widespread 
demonstrations (Giatzidis, 2002). Since 1997, despite various bumps in the process, Bulgaria‟s 
democratic transition assumed a firmly pro-Western, pro-capitalist road; joining NATO and the 
European Union became key goals.  
Ethnic relations in the new Bulgarian society were also a source of tension for a while. 
Following the attempted assimilation process by Todor Zhivkov, divisive rhetoric and nationalist 
sentiments had intensified. Shortly after the regime change, there existed tangible danger of 
ethnic violence in mixed regions and 69% of ethnic Bulgarians believed that minority groups 
within the country pose a serious threat to the country‟s unity and territorial integrity (Vassilev, 
2001). Nonetheless, both of the two major parties tried to avoid polarizing the issue and  
included some legal protections for minorities in the new constitution. Another mitigating factor 
was the formation of an ethnic-based party representing the Turkish minority (the Movement for 
Rights and Freedoms) which, by means of necessity, became an automatic coalitional partner to 
successive governments from both right and left. While the Bulgarian constitution explicitly 
forbids the creations of parties on an ethnic, religious or racial basis, the constitutionality of the 
MRF survived a court challenge in 1992 and, for all intents and purposes, it preserved its de 
facto status as the party representing the Turkish minority. For the majority of the post-
communist transition onwards, ethnic tensions were kept at bay and despite latent distrust 
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between Bulgarians and Turks, the issue was not politicized until populist actors began to use it 
to their advantage in the mid 2000s.  
In summary, Bulgarian history has gone through periods of military might and territorial 
expansion, but it never fully recovered from the five centuries of Ottoman rule. Bulgaria‟s quest 
to regain some of the territories it regards as its historical property had disastrous consequences 
for the country in both world wars. The interwar period was marked by initial democratic rule 
but the country‟s lack of self-governance experience hindered democratic consolidation and 
eventually resulted in a rather chaotic political system. The communist decades brought order 
and some socio-economic improvements to Bulgarian society which partially explains the slow 
pace of reform and the continued strength of the communist party in the early years of transition.       
Unlike Czechs who were quick to move away from their communist past, Bulgarians had 
much more favorable historical attitudes towards Russia and the Soviet Union. Russian military 
assistance for Bulgaria‟s liberation from the Ottoman Empire held a special place in Bulgarian 
national culture and the sense of affinity to Russia reduced the opposition to the communist 
regime. Thus, Bulgaria embarked on its post-communist period with less pronounced pro-
Western orientation than its fellow CEE states and a stronger nostalgia among the population for 
the safety nets of the communist lifestyle. Bulgaria‟s explicit commitment to reform and parting 
with the communist past came as late as 1997 after severe socio-economic shocks that would 
scar the population and create the pre-conditions for a populist wave.  
5.2.3 Estonia 
Estonia‟s strategic geographic location in the Eastern Baltic region near a number of important 
trade ports has made it an attractive and sought after destination for European powers over the 
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ages. From the initial settlers in the Estonian lands until the fall of communism, Estonia has been 
an independent country for only 22 years. Its national consciousness is thus heavily influenced 
by the idea of independence and the historical legacy of foreign occupation. Estonia‟s small size 
and population have contributed to its vulnerability to invaders, but at the same time have 
enabled its population to cohesively struggle to preserve Estonian identity and culture.  
 The earliest settlers in Estonian lands lived on the southeastern shores of the Baltic Sea. 
They lived in agricultural societies composed by self-sufficient clans with little difference in 
wealth and power. Before German conquest, Estonian lands lacked a centralized hierarchical 
structure. Political and administrative units began to emerge at the local level only. Thus, despite 
not being foreign-dominated during the prehistoric period, Estonian lands lacked a major 
unifying political or social structure that is the basis of statehood (Raun, 2002).  
In the 12
th
 century, Estonia remained the only region in medieval Europe that wasn‟t 
Christianized. German and Northern European crusaders eventually made their way to Estonian 
lands, and despite encountering strong resistance, colonized and divided Estonian territories. By 
the winter of 1220 almost the entire continental Estonia was under German or Danish control 
(Taagepera, 1993). Tired of the frequent uprisings, Denmark eventually sold its Estonian lands to 
the Livonian order. Many wars for the control of the Estonian lands followed. Northern 
Europeans, Germans, Russians and other Baltic states all had chunks of Estonia at various times. 
In the 16
th
 century, the Estonian lands were still controlled by Denmark, Sweden, Russia and 
Poland-Lithuania (Frucht, 2004).  In 1645, however, a strong and militant Sweden conquered the 
entire territory of Estonia. Swedish rule came to be known as the “good old Swedish days” as it 
resulted in a slight improvement in the plight of the peasant population and social progress 
(Frucht, 2004).  
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In the early 18
th
 century the Estonians lands experienced war and disaster. Nearly 80% of 
Tallinn‟s population died in the course of war, starvation and diseases. A stronger Russia 
defeated the Swedish empire and conquered the Estonian lands. During Russia‟s rule, serfdom 
was abolished and education was improved. However, harsh conditions in the countryside 
persisted and rebellions were not uncommon. Furthermore, formal emancipation from serfdom 
did not abolish the de facto subjugation of the peasantry to the, mostly German, nobility (Raun, 
2002). Estonia remained under Russian imperial domination for two centuries, albeit retaining a 
level of local self-governance.  
In the mid centuries Estonia was affected by the wave of national awakening that swept 
across Europe. The ideas of the Enlightenment and the news of the French Revolution had a 
powerful impact on the Estonian population. A movement demanding the use of Estonian for 
school instruction gained momentum, and the beginnings of a national literature in Estonian 
emerged. To counteract this trend, the Russian empire launched a campaign of Russification in 
the hopes of quenching the rising Estonian nationalism (Taagepera, 1993). After the Russian 
Revolution of 1905, an internally weakened Russia gave Estonians the chance to pose even 
greater demands for self-governance. Their attempts came to fruition after the second Russian 
Revolution unraveled in 1917. The Provisional Government of Russia granted national autonomy 
to Estonia and in February 1918, despite being occupied by German troops, Estonia issued its 
Declaration of Independence. After the withdrawal of German forces, Estonians fought 
Bolshevik troops until a peace treaty was finally signed between Russia and Estonia (Frucht, 
2004).  The first period of full independence in Estonian history had begun.  
Unlike other states that were to become part of the Soviet Union later on, the Baltics not 
only regained independent statehood in the interwar years, but they managed to consolidate it 
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(Brubaker, 1992). Consolidated statehood, however, was not equivalent to democratic 
governance. While the initial period of post-war democracy was characterized by a very liberal 
constitution specifically designed to avoid the rise of a strong one-man rule, the 1930s saw the 
emergence of an authoritarian regime (Frucht, 2004). During the so-called “Era of Silence” 
(1934-1939) political parties were banned and the country was largely ruled by decree.  
Regardless of form of government, however, the interwar period saw the development of 
a genuine national culture. Advances in literature, education and arts moved at a fast pace, 
despite slower economic progress. Moreover, Estonia‟s rediscovered nationhood did not take a 
reactive turn against other nationalities living in the country. The Constitution of 1920 had 
provisions for education in children‟s mother tongue irrespective of nationality and a 1925 law 
gave minorities of more than 3,000 people the right to create state-supported councils to handle 
their cultural affairs (Raun, 2002). 
The greatest concern of Estonian politics of the time remained external security. After 
having endured centuries of foreign domination, Estonians feared being embroiled in the next 
Great Power game. The threat of Bolshevik Russia loomed particularly large in the government‟s 
considerations. These concerns proved justified after the Hitler-Stalin pact as the Soviet Union 
invaded and occupied Estonia in 1940 on the eve of World War II. The war had a crippling effect 
on Estonian society. Occupied by either Soviet or Nazi forces at various points in the war, 
Estonia is estimated to have lost 18% of its population between 1939-1944 due to executions, 
deportations and refugee flight (Smith, 2002).  
At the end of WWII Estonia remained within the Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin 
embarked on a campaign of destroying Estonian national identity. More mass deportations to 
Siberia, accompanied by mass Russian colonization of the Baltics, occurred in the early days of 
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Estonia‟s communist period. The total share of ethnic Estonians in the population decreased from 
90% in 1941 to 48% in 1952. Despite the heavy human and economic toll, Estonia maintained a 
strikingly persistent anti-Soviet guerilla movement that survived until the early 1950s (Raun, 
2003).  
Communist control over Estonia brought forth some of the traditional Soviet policies 
observed all around East Europe – a push towards industrial development, the collectivization of 
agriculture, complete state control over private life and the persecution of suspected dissidents. 
The post-Stalinist years resulted in a certain relaxation of the most oppressive aspects of Soviet 
rule. A rare advantage of Estonia‟s communist experience was the possibility of contacts with 
the outside world, Finland in particular. Finnish television became accessible in Estonia and 
foreign tourists were allowed to visit the country. Estonians were also permitted, though in 
smaller numbers, to travel outside the Iron Curtain (Raun, 2003). In addition, the post-Stalinist 
era saw a re-emergence of Estonian intelligentsia and standards of living increased substantially 
from the war-torn 1940s.  
In the 1970s, however, the Brezhnev era in the USSR caused a severe stagnation of the 
Estonian economy. Shortages were common, and the rate of economic growth drastically 
decreased. The limits of the planned economy began to be seen. During this period Estonians 
also grew increasingly concerned about the Russification of their language and the loss of their 
national identity. Estonia‟s historical legacy of foreign domination, its small size and short 
period of independence, had made its population strikingly sensitive to perceived threats to their 
culture and language. Thus, once Gorbachev‟s glasnost provided the possibility for more open 
debate, the issue of nationality immediately became the dominant basis for interest articulation in 
Estonia (Smith, 2002).  
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Estonia‟s regime change from communism to democracy started with the first mass 
demonstrations in 1987. A peaceful anti-Soviet movement took form in the country and was 
dubbed “the Singing Revolution” since it involved spontaneous mass demonstrations where 
citizens would sing patriotic Estonian songs. After the first organized anti-communist political 
group – Estonian Popular Front – formed, the next few years saw pro-democratic parties and 
organizations appearing almost daily. In 1991 Estonia declared its independence and received 
formal recognition from the West. A hardliner coup in Moscow threatened the viability of 
Estonian statehood in 1991, but the Yeltsin-backed coalition prevailed and with the final collapse 
of the Soviet Union, Estonia was granted its dream of independence.  
Estonia‟s first post-independence elections occurred in 1992 and, while neither party won 
a majority of votes, the 3 frontrunners – Fatherland Alliance, Safe Home and People‟s Front 
(dominated by the Estonian Centre Party) – formed a centre-right government. The faction of the 
former communist party that had participated in the election as a reformed left party won only 
1.61% of the vote. The hardliners had previously formed a Communist Party of Estonia but the 
formation was outlawed by the Estonian government in 1991, shortly after the country declared 
independence.  
Estonian distrust and resentment of the Soviet Union thus translated into fast 
marginalization of the former communist party, unlike in Bulgaria or the Czech Republic. The 
party system that emerged in Estonia throughout the 1990s also differs from both Bulgaria and 
the Czech Republic in terms of its level of party fragmentation and electoral volatility. For the 
period of 1992-1999 Estonia records an average volatility of 25.9 as compared to 12.8 in the 
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Czech Republic (1990-1998) and 18.0 in Bulgaria (1990-1997) (Bielasiak, 2002)
10
. Similarly, in 
terms of effective number of parties Estonia scored 7.2 while Bulgaria and the Czech Republic 
have scores of 3.4 and 5.2 respectively. These characteristics would put Estonia into a category 
of “extreme pluralism” (Sartori, 1976) during the initial post-communist decade. Estonian 
elections from the early 90s until present day do not produce an absolute majority for either party 
and the country is governed by a two or three party coalition. 
Despite the high fragmentation, the Estonian party system was, and still is, dominated by 
right or centre parties. A likely legacy of the Soviet era, the unwillingness of parties to become 
associated with the defunct ideology of communism is manifested in political actors who 
“shudder at being labeled „left‟” and media outlets “dominated by centre-right views” (Huang, 
2000). This differs from the Czech Republic where a standard left-right dimension soon emerged 
in the political spectrum and Bulgaria where the mildly reformed former communist party 
became a top competitor.  
The post-communist Estonian political system, however, struggled to accommodate the 
existence of a large Russian minority comprising 25.6% of the population. Issues related to 
ethnicity gained salience in the political realm. The Estonian “singing revolution” had its roots in 
the national awakening of the nation and the fear of “Russification” of Estonian national identity 
(Hernad, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy Case Study). In Bulgaria, despite stumbling blocks and 
tension-provoking situations early in the transition, the Turkish minority had at least achieved 
representation in parliament by means of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms which became 
a regular coalition partner in successive governments.  In Estonia, however, due to a restrictive 
                                                 
10
 The study utilizes the Pedersen index of electoral volatility which measures net changes in popular vote across consecutive 
elections. The formula for electoral volatility is V = '/2 X vp,t - vp,t-l I where vp,t stands for the percentage of the vote obtained 
by a party at election t, and vp,t-l1f or the percentage in the previous election. Mogens N. Pedersen, "The Dynamics of European 
Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility," European Journal of Political Research, 7 (March 1979), 4-5. 
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citizenship law passed earlier in the transition, the Russian population was effectively excluded 
from participation in the shaping of the new political system (Van Elsuvege, 2004). Russians 
were not able to vote in the first elections and in the constitutional referendum. They were not 
able to shape the nature of initial linguistic and minority rights laws that came into effect. While 
throughout the years, Russian speakers were provided with more rights and legal protections, 
issues related to citizenship, language laws and national identity remained interwoven in the 
political reform process.  
In summary, Estonia‟s history has been largely defined by Estonia‟s small size and 
vulnerable geographic location. Prior to the current period, the country was only able to sustain 
independent statehood for 22 years between the two world wars. This has made Estonians 
particularly sensitive to cultural threats, and suspicious of Russian influence in particular. Partly 
in response to this legacy, the Estonian post-communist state developed a party system 
dominated by right-leaning parties and struggled with issues of minority rights.  
5.3 PROTEST POLITICS IN THE POST-COMMUNIST CONTEXT 
The previous sections of this chapter aimed to familiarize the reader with the past and current 
context in which politics played out in the countries under investigation. In this section, I focus 
specifically on country level features and developments that relate to the emergence and electoral 
performance of Eurosceptic and populist parties. The section on each country begins by 
examining the extent of Europeanization pressure on the country‟s party system, followed by the 
timing and strength of the corruption problem, and the extent to which these correspond to the 
nature of protest-based parties and voter preferences.  
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5.3.1 The Czech Republic 
The Czech Republic had a relatively smooth accession road to EU membership and was often 
considered a frontrunner in various stages of the process. In fact, during the early and mid 
nineties the Czech Republic was considered “the most successful transition economy in Central 
and East Europe” (World Development Report, 1999) by the international community. The 
Czech Republic often topped rankings of the post-communist successor states in terms of GDP 
growth, fiscal stability and curbing inflation, occasionally outperformed only by tiny Slovenia. 
Its mass privatization program was launched at a faster rate than many of its CEE neighbors and 
resulted in an observable improvement of market conditions. These developments led 
international and domestic spectators and analysts to refer to a “Czech miracle” – a 
transformation from planned to market economy with minimum unemployment and no shocks of 
hyperinflation. 
Non-economic indicators also placed the Czech Republic at the front of the line as far as 
post-communist countries were concerned. The Nations in Transit (NIT) database developed by 
the Freedom House ranked the candidate states throughout the accession process in a 
democratization index comprised of items such as judicial and media independence, corruption, 
electoral transparency. The Czech Republic, along with Hungary and Poland started its post-
communist transition with the best comparative scores, although each of these countries suffered 
a downgrade at various times during the negotiation process. While it is, of course, possible that 
the high initial scores were the result of analysts overestimating the democratic performance at 
the start (Mungiu, 2007), the fact remains that during most of the 90s the Czech Republic was 
treated as a forerunner in the long road towards EU membership. In 1997 this was confirmed by 
the European Commission‟s Agenda 2000. The document was an action programme which 
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identified six candidate states as frontrunners and stipulated they should be able to join the EU in 
2002.
11
 The Czech Republic was among these countries, as were Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, 
Estonia and Cyprus.  
The slightly more favorable position of the Czech Republic earlier in the accession 
process can help explain why the country experienced only a moderate degree of mainstream 
party convergence and why this fact may not even have been an electoral factor until corruption 
problems became more salient. As a frontrunner, the Czech Republic was exposed to a lower 
degree of political pressure to comply with EU conditionality. In the early 90s the European 
Union formulated a set of conditions known as the Copenhagen criteria which each candidate 
state had to fulfill. These were broad overarching conditions while the acquis communautaire – 
the body of EU rules and regulations – translated the general criteria into specific measurable 
benchmarks. The European Commission would then assess in detail each candidate state‟s 
progress in annual reports and make recommendations for future action.
12
  
While the Copenhagen criteria covered a wide span of issue areas from democratization 
to market reforms to administrative, judicial and legal reforms, they were also not applied 
objectively and uniformly at all times. Grabbe (2003) compares them to the standard 
conditionality employed by international financial institutions and concludes that the accession 
process is “highly politicized, especially on the EU side. The linkage between fulfilling 
particular tasks and receiving particular benefits is much less clear than in IFI conditionality 
because the tasks are complex, and many of them are not amenable to quantitative targets that 
show explicitly when they have been fulfilled”. This widely-accepted view of the conditionality 
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 "Agenda 2000 : For a stronger and wider Union" [COM(97) 2000] 
For more information on Agenda 2000, see: http://ec.europa.eu/agenda2000/index_en.htm 
12
 For more information on the enlargement process see: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-
work/index_en.htm 
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process points to the likelihood of different countries experiencing different degrees of political 
pressure from the EU to comply with the requirements. The more pressure the Commission 
exerts, the less leeway left for national governments to debate and decide these policies 
domestically.  
Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) estimate the degree of this pressure and the salience 
of the conditions from year to year. Their results demonstrate that the “intensity of 
conditionality” varies from country to country and “some countries have been pressed more than 
others and on a wider range of issues”. The Czech Republic scores a 0.19 on the intensity of 
conditionality index (averaged 1997-2003) placing it in the lower middle range. Slovenia and 
Estonia achieve an even lower score, while Bulgaria, Romania and Poland have experienced the 
most intense conditionality in the given time period.  
Of course, the less pressure exerted by the EU is partly due to the fact that countries like 
the Czech Republic already had more favorable political and economic conditions in place. 
Vachudova (2005) analyzes the domestic costs of compliance with EU conditions and asserts 
that for the “ruling elites in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the costs were minimal 
because the thrust of the anticipated requirements overlapped with their political and economic 
agendas”. While this may well hold true in terms of democratization and market reforms, the 
presence of the Eurosceptic ODS party as either the first or second largest power in parliament 
provides evidence for a less-than-universal consensus among political parties on EU-demanded 
reforms. Intensity of conditionality, therefore, is not merely the result of automatic domestic 
consensus or lack thereof. This chapter does not seek to examine why the EU pressured some 
countries more than others, but simply to establish the existence of this variation and how it 
relates to Euroscepticism.  
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Additionally, the chapter does not aim to suggest that the European Commission never 
criticized or monitored the Czech Republic. In fact, while the 1999 assessment placed the Czech 
Republic among the five forerunners to be offered membership within a “first wave”, the 
individual progress report had little praise and much more criticism than, for example, the 
equivalent report on another “first-wave” candidate – Estonia. The report concluded that the 
“pace of alignment needs to pick up substantially across the board” and the country‟s 
performance in meeting the short-term Accession Partnership goals was “not satisfactory” 
(European Commission Progress Report, 1999). The critiques, however, were supplemented by 
an offer for first wave membership, thus sending a mixed message politically. Elite interviews 
similarly suggest that, while Czech politicians paid close attention to Commission reports and 
felt pressure to satisfy the membership criteria, there was never much doubt in their minds that 
the country would be among the first ones to be accepted. Their concern was more with 
negotiating favorable terms for Czech accession while Bulgarian elites, in comparison, struggled 
to obtain accession to begin with.  
 In line with the moderate Europeanization pressure, mainstream party convergence 
occurred in the Czech Republic, but at a lower rate than countries that had been pressed harder to 
comply with EU conditionality. The party similarity index used in chapter 4 places the Czech 
Republic in the midranges at 4.8/10 (averaged 1996-2006) while Estonia scores 3.5 and Bulgaria 
7.2. The intensity of conditionality, therefore, seems to roughly correspond to the degree of 
mainstream party convergence observed in CEE member states.  
Similarly to the scope of Europeanization pressures, corruption in the Czech Republic is 
at a mid-range level compared to the rest of the Central and East European countries. Figure 5.1 
illustrates this by averaging the Transparency International corruption perception scores between 
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1995 and 2009. Slovenia and Estonia do the best in this regard, as high scores equal less 
corruption in this indicator. Romania and Bulgaria are at the bottom, while the Czech Republic is 
among the countries with moderate corruption. The control of corruption indicator developed by 
the World Bank paints a similar picture with the Czech Republic ranked most frequently in the 
64
th
 percentile of countries with greatest control of corruption, Estonia at approximately the 80
th
, 
and Bulgaria at the 50
th
.  Higher percentiles in the case of the WB indicator indicate a greater 
control of corruption.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Corruption Perceptions Index, 1995-2009
13
 
 
Unlike the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, corruption did not figure prominently in EU‟s 
demands on the first wave candidates. Corruption levels were, of course, the highest in Bulgaria 
and Romania which explains the importance placed on that issue but political considerations also 
mattered. Since corruption was a problem in some EU member states as well, they were reluctant 
to bring it higher on the agenda. This resulted in recommendations to combat “even high-level 
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 The figure has been created using the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) scores.  
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corruption” often being “watered down for political reasons in the annual Regular Reports” 
(Vachudova, 2009). In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, however, the EU was often perceived 
as having toughened its entry requirements and their enforcement. This could be due to 
“enlargement fatigue”, the negative public opinion on Bulgaria and Romania, or a strategy of the 
EU to use Bulgaria and Romania as a signal to future applicants, Turkey in particular (Linden, 
2007; Phinnemore, 2006).  
While the EU did not place much salience on corruption problems in the Czech Republic 
and its fellow first-wave candidates, common citizens did as the evidence presented in chapter 4 
indicates. The first major corruption scandal that is likely to have placed the issue on the media‟s 
radar and citizens‟ minds came in 1997 when after years of impressive economic and political 
performance, the Czech Republic plunged into a recession after a corruption scandal involving 
then Prime Minister Klaus caused a crisis of legitimacy and forced him to resign. The 
unexpected political and economic crisis lead spectators to alarmingly declare the coming of a 
“new phase in Czech politics” and the fight against corruption started to exist prominently in 
party strategies.   
The government that came to power following the crisis won its majority largely on an 
anti-corruption platform and a promise for the implementation of a “Clean Hands” campaign. Its 
eventual efforts at curbing corruption were not assessed as sufficiently effective, however, and 
“if anything, corruption under the Social Democrats, the CPI for the Czech Republic suggests, 
increased” (Tupy, 2006). Czech citizens were of the same opinion, as a 2001 poll demonstrates – 
52% of respondents claimed they consider the Czech Republic to be a corrupt nation.
14
 Jordan 
(2002) draws another parallel to illustrate the newly emerged significance of the problem by 
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 “Poll shows majority of population consider Czech Republic „corrupt nation‟”, Czech News Agency CTK, July 
11, 2001 
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showing that, according to international corruption indices, “in 1997, the Czechs were tied with 
the Belgians, now they are tied with the Bulgarians”.15 The worsening of the corruption problem, 
or at least the perception thereof due to its increased saliency, thus can be traced to the late 90s 
much like in the majority of CEE member states.  
Problems with corruption resurfaced throughout the 2000s in various sectors, but it was 
the high profile cases that provoked the most media attention and citizens‟ outrage. For example, 
Stanislav Gross – prime minister 2004-2005 – resigned and left politics after a corruption 
scandal. Similarly, in 2008 a corruption scandal broke out in the Defense Ministry regarding 
suspect activity during former defense minister Karel Kuhnl‟s term of office. The spokesman of 
the Defense Ministry admitted that “according to many surveys and many concrete cases we can 
confirm that the Ministry of Defense is highly vulnerable to corruption and defense contracts 
suffer from corruption”.16  These cases are illustrative that the Czech Republic experienced 
corruption even at the highest levels of government and the media saliency of these cases can 
prime voters to place corruption perceptions high on their agenda when evaluating politicians.  
Nonetheless, as seen in prior sections, the Czech Republic is not among the worst cases 
when it comes to corruption perceptions. Its relative rankings within Central and East Europe 
place it in the mid-ranges of both the corruption problem and party convergence. When it comes 
to Euroscepticism as a share of the party system, however, the country is at the high end of the 
spectrum. The theory of protest-based Euroscepticism developed here would expect a rough 
overlap between the intensity of mainstream party convergence and corruption perceptions on 
one hand, and electoral Euroscepticism on the other. What explains the misfit is an important 
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 For more information on 2001 rankings, see Transparency International, “New index highlights worldwide 
corruption crisis,” press release, June 27, 2001 
(http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2001/cpi2001).  
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 Andrej Čírtek, Spokesman for the Defense Ministry on Radio Praha, 04-01-2008 (www.radio.cz/en/article/99269) 
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contextual characteristic of the Czech Republic – the presence of a genuinely Eurosceptic 
political party which does not fall under the populist category and is an established actors in the 
party system.  
The Civic Democratic Party (ODS) has been an important player in Czech politics since 
the start of the democratization process. Formed around a neo-liberal, anti-communist ideology, 
the party has well-defined positions on economic and political issues unlike the empty platforms 
of populist parties. It can easily be placed on a standard left-right scale of ideology commonly 
used in the West. In addition, the Civic Democratic Party, however, began developing a distinct 
Eurosceptic element in its ideology as early as its 1992-1996 tenure in government. The main 
proponent and promoter of ODS‟s Euroscepticism was, and remains, the party‟s leader Vaclav 
Klaus. The gradual shift to “greater reliance on the charismatic leadership of Klaus and on his 
personal agenda” arguably became “the crucial causal mechanism enabling a radicalization in the 
party‟s Euroscepticism” (Hanley, 2002).  
During its first term in office, the ODS government pursued market oriented and 
institutional reforms which were largely in line with EU recommendations for the region. At the 
same time, its leader Klaus expressed continued criticism of Western Europe and delayed the 
Czech EU application until 1996. This created a paradoxical situation where the Czech Republic 
was among the membership frontrunners economically and politically while the Klaus 
government had brought Czech-EU relations to a temporary standstill (Bugge, 2000). Klaus‟s 
Euroscepticism coupled with the corruption scandal of 1997 even caused a split in the party and 
a faction broke away to form the Freedom Union. The newly formed party joined the pro-EU 
mainstream and frequently criticized the negative effect Klaus‟ behavior allegedly had on 
accession prospects.   
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Although the ODS never went as far as rejecting Czech membership in the EU, its brand 
of Euroscepticism intensified somewhat in the early 2000s, possibly due to the increased salience 
of the EU issue at the time. In its 2002 programme, the party included a separate chapter related 
to EU matters for the first time in its history. In addition, it referred to the EU often in another 
chapter intended to cover foreign policy. Within this programme, about two-thirds of all 
references made to the EU were negative (Hlousek and Pseja, 2009).  Around that time, another 
programmatic document made its appearance – the Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism which 
warned the government against making a “strategic mistake” (ODS, 2001) by prioritizing speedy 
entry over negotiating more favorable terms for Czech national interests. Klaus has been known 
to consistently portray the EU as a “dangerous socialist experiment, and a threat to national 
identity and sovereignty” (Vachudova, 2008). Given ODS and Klaus‟s relentless Euroscepticism, 
it is of no surprise that the Czech Republic was the last member state to ratify the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009 after a reluctant Klaus agreed to accept the decision of the Czech constitutional 
court.  
Moreover, the party is unapologetic about its Eurosceptic ideology even when it realizes 
that there is not much electoral advantage to be gained. The majority of the right-wing ODS 
electorate has positive views on the EU (Hanley, 2002) and the party‟s public speeches reveal an 
acknowledgment that engaging in a more persistent battle against the Lisbon treaty would have 
been futile. “The polls clearly show that the treaty would be endorsed by the public vote and this 
would grant it far more legitimacy than the parliamentary vote. And I don‟t want this,” said 
President Vaclav Klaus.
17
 The timing of ODS‟s terms in power also offer a curious coincidence – 
the ODS lost power in 1997 when negotiations with the EU started and did not regain it until 
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after EU entry. “Since a majority of Czech voters did support EU membership, the ODS‟s anti-
EU stance likely strengthened the hand of the relatively moderate Social Democratic Party 
(CSSD) which governed in various forms from 1998 until 2006” (Vachudova,2008). If anything, 
therefore, a genuinely Eurosceptic stance can do more harm than good for electoral gains which 
suggests citizens do indeed distinguish between genuine and protest-based Euroscepticism.  
While being the largest Eurosceptic formation in the Czech Republic, the ODS is by no 
means the only one. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) embraces a brand 
of Euroscepticism which used to be more extreme than that of the ODS but has gradually 
evolved into a strategic protest-based Euroscepticism. Understanding its nature requires 
understanding the somewhat peculiar nature of the party. The KSCM is often cited as the only 
unreformed Communist party in Central and East Europe (Agh 1998, Nagle and Mahr, 1999). 
While the rest of the communist successor parties renamed themselves and reoriented their 
ideology towards politically acceptable brands, the Czech communists did neither. Of course, 
there have been gradual steps at moderating the party‟s programme. Hanley (2002) concludes 
that the KSCM “in fact contains innovative and democratic elements that have been hitherto 
overlooked by observers”. Similarly, Strmiska (2002) demonstrates that despite having “neo-
communist leanings”, the party cannot be regarded as the equivalent of an orthodox communist 
formation.  
The party‟s expressed views on the European Union have similarly undergone a 
progression from a decidedly anti-membership position to a more moderate type of protest-based 
Euroscepticism where its criticism of the EU stems mostly from a desire to counteract the 
mainstream consensus (Linden and Pohlman, 2003; Kopecky and Mudde, 2002). The party acted 
in a deeply suspicious manner towards the European Union in the early period of its post-1989 
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development and announced it opposition to Czech membership on the grounds of avoiding 
putting the Czech Republic “into a colonial situation, perceived by more powerful countries 
simply as a market open to their surpluses and a source of cheap labor” (KSCM Election 
Manifesto, 1996). By 2006, however, the party‟s positions on European integration and Czech 
EU membership transformed into much more general and vague critiques and the European 
dimension of party programmes was somewhat reduced (Havlik and Vykoupilova, 2008). The 
party still expressed “critical reservations” towards the EU (KSCM Election program, 2006) but 
its focus had shifted on utilizing the EU issue as a hook for generally disenchanted voters.  
This shift to a more vague, protest-based Euroscepticism seemed to carry favorable 
electoral consequences. The Communist party won 18.5% of the 2002 parliamentary vote and 
became the third largest party in parliament. In 2004, the party fared even better in the European 
Parliament elections on the eve of Czech accession, coming in second. In 2006 the KSCM again 
became the third largest parliamentary-represented party in the national elections. In the most 
recent election of 2010, the communists came in fourth, after being defeated for the third place 
by another protest-based party campaigning heavily on an anti-corruption platform. While this 
fairly consistent electoral performance of the Communist party should be partially attributed to 
nostalgia for the past among the remaining loyal communist electorate, analysts agree that this is 
not the entire story. “In the Czech Republic, there is a new generation of young people with 
iPhones who don‟t remember Communism and will vote for them as a protest vote”18. The 
KSCM has thus transformed itself from a largely unreformed communist successor party that 
was harshly Eurosceptic to a more moderate formation trying to appeal to protest voters in 
addition to the traditional (and shrinking) communist base.  
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The KSCM is, however, not alone in figuring out that protest-voting may be a useful 
phenomenon. The 2010 election witnessed the appearance and good electoral performance of 
newly a formed populist party under the name of Tradition Responsibility Prosperity 09 (TOP 
09). The party was formed only a year before the election and its priorities include the fight 
against corruption, a “genuine” rule of law and the country‟s “moral revival”19. It was formed 
after a split of the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party and it quickly 
became the country‟s second most popular right-wing formation.  
Around the same time that TOP 09 came into being, two other protest-based political 
groups appeared on the Czech political landscape. The Party of Free Citizens was formed after a 
split from the ODS and, instead of making corruption and morality the centerpiece of its 
program, subscribed to a vividly Eurosceptic, anti-Lisbon rhetoric coupled with the standard 
populist vagueness on other substantive issues. Czech analysts have noted that “almost nothing is 
known about them in regard to other issues”20. Similarly, the Sovereignty – Jana Bobošíková 
Bloc formation, which takes its name after its Eurosceptic leader and former MEP, ran for the 
first time in the 2009 election after being formed by merging two smaller populist groups (The 
Party of Common Sense and Politika 21). TOP 09, the Party of Free Citizens and Sovereignty are 
thus examples of protest parties with each of them choosing a particular issue to emphasize such 
as the fight against corruption, the deficiencies of the EU/Lisbon Treaty or both.  
The populist pattern in CEE points to the uncertainty surrounding the future of these 
groupings. While the ODS and the KSCM have established a permanent role for themselves in 
the current Czech political system, newly formed parties may often cease to exist from one 
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election to another or, if existing, fall into irrelevance. This is for example what happened to 
another populist and Eurosceptic Czech formation - Association for the Republic – Republican 
Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC). The party took a harsh anti-EU line while at the same time 
vocally criticizing Klaus‟s privatization program for its purported massive corruption. While 
initially this strategy proved to be its ticket to parliamentary representation, the party was unable 
to keep this momentum and declined dramatically in popularity before eventually disbanding. 
Examples from other CEE countries such as Bulgaria and Poland also point to the dangers posed 
in front of the new protest-based formations. While riding on a wave of popularity, or at least 
gaining a respectable percentage of the vote share at one time, they stand a real chance of being 
reduced to obscurity by the time the next election rolls around.  
The Czech Republic exemplifies in some ways a typical CEE political landscape – it has 
moderate degrees of corruption and mainstream party convergence and its fair share of populist 
and Eurosceptic parties. However, protest-voting did not reach quite the electoral heights it did in 
places such as Bulgaria and Poland. The case largely fits the theory developed here linking 
corruption perceptions, party similarity and vote choice. In addition, contextual factors inevitably 
affect country-level developments. Probably the most important one in the case of the Czech 
Republic was the presence of an established ideologically-Eurosceptic party and its outspoken 
leader Vaclav Klaus. By challenging the pro-EU elite consensus consistently over the years, the 
ODS and Klaus left less leeway for protest-based formations to use the Eurosceptic tactic as a 
means of distinguishing themselves. While some still did it, they were not as successful as to win 
the majority of the vote in any election. The next section of the chapter presents the case of 
another EU applicant where protest parties fared even better.  
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5.3.2 Bulgaria 
Unlike the Czech Republic, economic and political conditions in Bulgaria at the start of its post-
communist transition and for most of the 1990s were far from exemplary. Bulgaria‟s dependency 
on economic ties with the Soviet Union and the lack of comprehensive structural reform early in 
the transition process were the most likely factors responsible for this state of affairs (Nenovsky 
and Koleva, 2002). By most indicators, the country ranked last or second to last among CEE 
countries. GDP growth between 1990 and 2000 was marginal at best, unemployment and 
inflation reached unprecedented levels compared to the “frontrunner” CEE states. In 1997 about 
36% of the population was living below the poverty line (World Bank, 1999). Privatization, 
unlike the Czech “shock therapy”, was slow and patchy. Between 1990 and 1997, only about 
20% of state assets had been privatized (OECD, 1999).  
Politically, Bulgaria was again among the problematic group of CEE countries. Along 
with Slovakia and Romania, Bulgaria was regarded as an “illiberal” democracy until the late 
1990s (Vachudova, 2005). The treatment of ethnic minorities was, for example, below 
democratic standards and the Nations in Transit‟s score of 4 on democratization placed the three 
countries on an equal footing with Russia and nearly twice lower than the frontrunners Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic.  
Bulgaria reached its worst moment in the post-communist transition in 1997 when a 
major economic crisis disrupted the already fragile economy and progressed into a political crisis 
of legitimacy as people took to the streets and demanded the government to step down from 
power. Hyperinflation caused the prices to increase by 240% in February of that year. 
Immediately after the crisis, a currency board was introduced in an attempt to stabilize the 
economy and help prevent similar occurrences.  
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Following economic reforms and a change of government, the Bulgarian economic 
situation improved over the course of the next years. Aggregate economic indicators demonstrate 
that Bulgaria‟s performance improved within the past decade. Between 2000 and 2008, GDP 
more than tripled, foreign investment increased and the country began running a budget surplus. 
Due to its low starting point, of course, the country‟s relative wealth and standard of living still 
remain below the majority of CEE states and at less than half of EU‟s average GDP.  
Parallel to the stabilization of the economic situation came advances in democratization 
as well and the gap between the country and the frontrunners for EU accession decreased. 
However, as the economy and the plight of minorities improved, Bulgaria became increasingly 
plagued by problems of corruption, organized crime and inefficient judiciary. For example, 
between 1990 and 2006, 100 contract killings had occurred in Bulgaria, but only 3 of those 
resulted in court proceedings
21
. The problem of enforcement was of particular importance and 
international observers often concluded that “Killings, frauds and corruption all seem to go 
unprosecuted and unpunished.” (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 2008).  
In the previously discussed case of the Czech Republic the generally favorable political 
and economic conditions resulted in a moderate degree of pressure on the part of the EU. In 
Bulgaria, however, the opposite effect can be observed. The continuous domestic problems 
experienced by the country provoked an equivalently stronger response on the part of the EU, 
particularly after 1997. Prior to the crisis of 1997 and the subsequent changes, Bulgaria‟s illiberal 
government hindered EU‟s efforts at affecting domestic politics in the desired course. “EU 
leverage was confined to working slowly and indirectly by censuring governments and 
buttressing domestic opposition” (Vachudova, 2008). The European Commission was still 
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learning how to play its new role of de facto democracy promotion in countries like Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia.   
After the crisis of 1997 and the coming into power of reformers, EU‟s pressure 
intensified and remained strong for the entire period thereafter. According to the intensity of 
conditionality scale developed by Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007), Bulgaria tops the rankings 
along with Romania. Both countries receive an average score of 0.34 for the period 1997-2003 
while the Czech Republic had a medium score of 0.19. The rush to membership became 
particularly pronounced in that time period and successive governments “would rapidly respond 
by presenting revised reform strategies and making pledges for additional measures” (Noutcheva 
and Bechev, 2008) whenever they were criticized or penalized by the EU.  
Moreover, since Bulgaria was not deemed prepared enough to be offered membership in 
2004, it experienced 3 additional years of pre-accession conditionality. The EU‟s leverage was 
considered stronger in the case of second-wave candidates as they had credible reasons to fear 
additional delays (Brusis, 2005). Bulgarian governments faced progressively toughening EU 
conditions as the projected accession date neared but they also faced significant public pressure 
at home (Nikolova, 2006). Support for EU membership in Bulgaria was running strong, 
consistently 10% or more above the CEE average.  “Consequently, Bulgaria was more eager than 
the first-wavers to make itself „appealing‟ to the EU in areas where formal criteria were not 
specified” (Nikolova, 2007). The grand consensus on EU membership as the ultimate political 
goal in Bulgaria and Romania even led some scholars to warn that government officials had 
developed a tendency to “follow EU instructions despite their sometimes acute negative impact 
on the structure of domestic political and social relations (Bojkov, 2004; Bruszt and Stark, 2003).  
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Europeanization thus had stronger effects in Bulgaria comparatively speaking and 
resulted in greater mainstream party convergence. The European Commission imposed a de facto 
“political review board” (Smilov, 2008) on successive Bulgarian governments. By virtue of its 
uncertain timing, EU membership became a more salient issue in campaigns and political 
platforms of political parties. Ilonszki (2009) finds that the EU cleavage in party systems is most 
pronounced in Bulgaria and Poland but the “success of anti-EU parties does not inhibit general 
and above average support for European integration”. Almost every political decision by the 
governing coalition had to be justified as a necessary step towards achieving EU membership 
while the opposition‟s common critiques also revolved around the (in)competency of the 
government to carry out the EU-desired reforms.
22
 “Overall, we see that negotiated conditions 
related to the eventual EU membership of the country resurface as issues of domestic 
contestation, redefining fault lines between political actors, as well as traditional approaches to 
policy-making” (Spendzharova, 2003). The issue of compliance with EU conditionality thus 
dominated domestic agendas for the majority of the post-1997 period.  
What‟s more, even once Bulgaria and Romania were formally granted EU membership, 
monitoring from the EU still continued. Their membership was granted under an “unprecedented 
condition: an ongoing „co-operation and verification mechanism‟ that the Commission would use 
to monitor whether they lived up to their outstanding commitments in satisfying the requirements 
of EU membership” (Vachudova, 2009). Progress was assessed according to „benchmarks‟ 
created by the European Commission and progress reports were published every 6 months. In the 
case of Bulgaria, the CVM was triggered because of problems in the areas of judicial reform, 
corruption and organized crime.  
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The arrangement was not merely an exercise in rhetoric on the part of the Commission as 
there were tangible punishment provisions such as invoking a “safeguard” clause where 
decisions made by Bulgarian courts would not be valid in the rest of Europe or putting a halt to 
some of the financial transfers the country was receiving as a new member. Punishment did 
indeed materialize as irregularities concerning the use of EU funds surfaced and the Commission 
temporarily “froze” $800 billion aid to Bulgaria in 2008. As a result, the government that took 
power in the aftermath declared that “we're going to do everything Brussels asks of us. For a 
country as poor as Bulgaria, it's vital to get the money from Brussels flowing again."
23
 These 
developments indicate that unlike the first-wave candidates, Bulgaria and Romania experienced 
stronger EU conditionality that continued after accession and had a greater impact on domestic 
politics.  
The salience of the corruption issue followed a similar trajectory over time. Prior to the 
late 1990, while corruption was by no means low, its salience in the public realm was less 
pronounced. Due to the continued presence of the communist successor party in power, the main 
cleavage in Bulgarian politics still revolved around the communist/anti-communist divide. Major 
economic troubles in the privatization process, hyperinflation and widespread poverty 
additionally focused the attention of the majority of citizens. In the late 90s, however, while 
standards of living remained, and still generally are, the biggest concern of voters, the ability of 
politicians to deliver the desired results came to be viewed less through the prism of their former 
affiliation with the communist party and more in terms of how corrupt and dishonest certain 
individuals and/or political groups may be. The troubled privatization process had been met with 
a strong public sentiment of unfairness (Miller et. al, 2001) and resulted in a perception that the 
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new-found wealth of the post-communist political elites had been accumulated at the expense of 
the population. These sentiments contributed to the salience of the corruption issue (Krastev, 
2004 ; Grigoresku, 2006) in the country.  
At the same time that EU conditionality had intensified, the first series of high profile 
corruption scandals occurred under the UDF (Union of democratic Forces) government at the 
time. The lack of immediate and tangible improvements in standards of living did not serve the 
government‟s popularity but what affected it “more profoundly than the stalled reforms” came in 
the form of a “series of corruption scandals directly implicating UDF politicians that made it 
appear that the UDF was little better than the BSP” (Vachudova, 2005).24 The Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha government, which came to power in 2001, “fared only slightly better” and was plagued 
by major scandals surrounding infrastructure and land ownership (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008).  
As shown in a previous chapter, the ongoing political scandals increased the salience of 
the corruption issue among voters.
25
 EU monitoring, both before and after accession, devoted 
considerable space to the corruption issue. On the eve of Bulgaria‟s entry in 2007, for example, 
the progress report pointed to the persistence of “deeply rooted problems, notably organized 
crime and corruption” (European Commission Progress Report, 2007). The report also stresses 
that it was not a problem of compliance as the Bulgarian government had exhibited “good will 
and determination” in producing action plans and setting up the needed structures in all 
problematic areas. However, it was the implementation and ultimately enforcement of these 
well-intended measures that was consistently lacking.  
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 Evidence to this statement is provided in section 3.3 of the dissertation. 
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The bi-annual reports by the European Commission were highly publicized and analyzed 
in Bulgaria and the frequent critiques in the areas of corruption and organized crime had a double 
effect. Firstly, of course, the assessments of the European Commission strengthened the 
vigilance of society in terms of keeping politicians accountable but these assessments also can 
reinforce one‟s already pre-existing disillusionment with the domestic political class. Bulgarians 
entered the European Union with one of the lowest levels of trust in their own domestic 
institutions. A striking majority of 65% believed in 2006 that winners of Bulgaria‟s transition 
would be either the “parties, their leaders and their close circles” or the “criminal forces and 
economic groups” while the biggest losers were either the “ordinary honest people” or the 
“retired and elderly people”26 Smilov‟s (2008) study of Bulgarian populism also finds that 
citizens are „generally distrustful, even hateful toward politicians (62%) – an attitude which leads 
to the criminalization of the political class in the eyes of the public”. In a toxic environment like 
that, when people read that a leaked EU report “slams Bulgaria for failing to deal with 
corruption”27, they are likely to see their worst fears about the untrustworthiness of Bulgarian 
elite confirmed. Noutcheva and Bechev (2008) similarly note that while the regular monitoring 
has produced more concentrated action on the part of governments, the “anticorruption talk has 
had less savory effects, too, in that it has prompted a popular disengagement from politics and 
elections and even played into the hands of populist xenophobes opposed to pro-EU reforms”.   
Given the strong Europeanization pressures on political parties and the salience of the 
corruption issue, it is no surprise that Bulgaria experienced high levels of populism of various 
kinds. While protest-based Euroscepticism appeared later than in many other CEE countries, it 
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obtained good electoral results as well. Unlike in the Czech Republic, however, Bulgaria does 
not have a purely Eurosceptic party in its party system. The only party to ever come close to 
ideological Euroscepticism was the pre-1997 Socialist Party, largely unreformed from its 
communist days, and professing a lukewarm attitude towards the EU. It soon thereafter 
embraced the pro-EU consensus in favor of membership in order to market itself as a mainstream 
socialist party.  
Populism, on the other hand, seems to thrive well in Bulgarian society. While the major 
shift to populist politics occurred around 2001, signs of the appeal of this trend to Bulgarian 
citizens appeared much earlier. In the 1994 and 1997 parliamentary elections, a populist 
formation under the name Bulgarian Business Block (BBB) managed to gather around 5% of the 
vote which is sufficient to grant it representation in parliament (albeit finishing last among the 
parliamentary represented parties).  
George Ganchev – the party‟s flamboyant and unorthodox leader who would address the 
electorate in his televised speeches with “Bulgarian brothers” and would not shy away from 
singing and dancing at campaign events – managed to come third in the 1992 and 1996 
presidential election. Both times, however, there was a significant gap of around 60% between 
him and his opponent in the decisive second round of the election. His party lacked substantive 
positions on the majority of issues and relied mostly on Ganchev‟s “personal charisma and 
unconventional political behavior” (Krasteva, 1998). The party had a tangible nationalist bent 
and mild Eurosceptic leanings. Overall, however, the party was a relatively marginal political 
phenomenon – barely collecting enough votes to enter parliament, let alone break the dominance 
of the two major political parties; and the majority of the population viewed Ganchev as 
somewhat of a comic relief during otherwise dry and serious campaigns.  
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The brief political stint of the BBB suggests that, while Bulgarian society had not placed 
populists at the center stage yet, there may have been a predisposition towards a more 
personalistic political style based on charisma and a strong leader. By 2001, the explosion of 
corruption scandals in the UDF government and the intensified EU pressure leading to 
mainstream party convergence had created the necessary pre-conditions for the emergence of 
protest-based parties. Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) distinguishes 5 symptoms of the “political malaise” 
affecting the region: populist electoral gains; political radicalization; weak majorities; factional 
behavior; and misbehavior of political parties (defined as “occasional acts that violate democratic 
standards” and “are generally limited in time and impact and end in public scandal”). Bulgaria 
scores high on this index by possessing 4 of the 5 symptoms.  Lewis (2007) similarly observes 
that in countries like Bulgaria “there seems to be more fluidity and fragmentation now than 
during the 1990s, and even the role of personalities in these countries seems to have increased 
recently to the detriment of programmatic parties”.  
The first one to break the dominance of mainstream parties was the National Movement 
Simeon II (NMSS) which was created by the former king Simeon II after his return from decade 
long exile in Spain. NMSS‟s electoral success was unprecedented given the time constraints and 
the unknown status of the movement. “Within just weeks, the National Movement for Simeon II 
emerged as the largest political force in the country and came within just a few percentage points 
of winning the 2001 parliamentary elections outright” (Jones, 2007). Analysts widely believe 
that NMSS would have won an absolute majority in that election if it hadn‟t been for a few small 
parties which used Simeon II‟s name on their ballots without authorization – a situation ripe for 
potential voter confusion.  
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The NMSS‟s campaign was not based on a coherent programme but rather on a diffuse 
populist message exemplified by the now infamous campaign promise that there would be a 
tangible improvement in people‟s lives in 800 days. Smilov (2008) dubs the NMSS phenomenon 
the “first populist wave” and asserts that the main sources of mobilization for the NMSS were 
the personal charisma of the former king coupled with his historical legacy and the fact that he 
“portrayed the then-existing political elite as largely politically corrupt. Against this background, 
he presented his candidacy as the triumph of personal integrity in politics”. Ucen (2007) 
classifies the NMSS as a new type of “centrist” populists which are “non-radical challengers 
mobilizing disappointed electorates against under-performing and morally failing established 
parties”. The central themes of the campaigns of centrist populists consist of “curbing corruption, 
improving responsiveness, and promoting economic development”. Parties of this type have 
indeed become quite common in the region and while their attitude towards the EU varies, the 
NMSS in Bulgaria is a typical case of markedly pro-EU populist party. This indicates the issue 
of corruption had a sufficient appeal in Bulgarian society to be able to generate a mass wave of 
protest-voting.  
NMSS much like its fellow populists did not ultimately succeed in establishing itself as a 
consistent force in the Bulgarian party system. In the next election of 2005, the socialists were 
back in power, but they needed coalitional partners to govern which resulted in another stint in 
government for the king‟s party. This was as far as their once stellar popularity could carry them, 
however, as the party eventually split into factions and did not succeed in passing the electoral 
threshold for parliamentary representation in the most recent 2009 election. Neither did its 
offspring, the smaller party Leader despite the attempts of its young leader to re-create some of 
the charismatic appeal that once won Simeon the elections.   
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The second major surge of populism was much more radical than the “centrist” 
undertones of the NMSS. In 2005, two years before EU accession, the newly formed political 
party Ataka won around 9% of the vote after a vocal anti-establishment campaign. While NMSS 
focused on a more moderate populist message focusing exclusively on anti-corruption and 
presenting an alternative to the allegedly incompetent mainstream elite, Ataka‟s message 
spanned the whole range of protest politics. It is most accurately described as an “anti-
establishment something-for-everyone party in a political milieu where most of the other parties 
have crowded into a pro-Western, pro-market center” (Ghodsee, 2008). Much like the NMSS, 
Ataka is personified almost exclusively by its charismatic leader Volen Siderov  rather than its 
party structure or programmatic elements. However, Ataka‟s campaigns are much more 
controversial and have caused concern among EU observers at various points. “Under the banner 
of anti-corruption and „Bulgaria back to Bulgarians!‟ the party seeks to reverse post-Communist 
privatization, withdraw from NATO, expel foreign troops based in the country and impose 
„severe sanctions‟ on anyone „defaming Bulgaria‟ (Blaszczynski and Doran, 2009). 
Ataka‟s populist and Eurosceptic message thus spans both extremes of the political 
spectrum. It can be viewed as a far right nationalist party and it prides itself on having 
incorporated nationalist rhetoric into the public discourse. It is the first party to openly and 
vocally question the legitimacy of the ethnic Turkish party Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
(MRF) which had been a coalition partner in all cabinets prior to the latest election. Siderov‟s 
verbal attacks on the Turkish and Roma minority are a trademark of the party‟s speeches and he 
has consistently called for stopping the “advancing Islamization” of Bulgaria.28 At the same 
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time, his call for reversal of market-oriented policies and his strident anti-Western rhetoric have 
been recognized as elements of a radical left agenda (Ghodsee, 2009; Ragaru, 2006).  
While ultra-nationalism is a significant part of the party‟s appeal, so is its fervent anti-
corruption and anti-elite rhetoric. Ataka was the first party to openly challenge the pre-existing 
pro-EU, pro-NATO consensus and thus offered a clear signal to voters who wanted to punish the 
political establishment. Ataka‟s popularity peaked in 2006 when Siderov came in second in the 
presidential election, despite the backing of the third candidate by almost all mainstream 
formations. However, in the second round of the election, Siderov lost, receiving 24.1% to 
75.9% for the mainstream socialist candidate. This suggests that despite the wide popular appeal 
of the party, voters were not willing to risk putting an anti-establishment president in office on 
the eve of the long-awaited EU accession. Since then, the party‟s support has been relatively 
stable at 6-10 percent of the vote but its future, much like other populist formations, is uncertain. 
During the election of 2009, for example, Ataka had a harsh competitor – another new protest-
based party which attempted to “steal” Ataka‟s anti-corruption anti-EU nationalist message.  
The Order Law and Justice (OLJ) party dared to cross the political niche previously 
reserved for Ataka in 2009 by building its whole campaign around a flashy anti-corruption and 
nationalist message. This led even to the two parties attempting to outdo each other in terms of 
who was more earnest and more competent in bringing forth the desired changes. Ultimately, 
Ataka survived the challenge by gaining its usual share of votes, but OLJ also passed the 
electoral threshold necessary for gaining access to parliament and has become a vocal opposition 
group since then, albeit one prone to splits and factionalization much like Ataka. The emergence 
of the OLJ party while Ataka was still holding strong suggests that there is more untapped 
protest-votes than one may have originally expected or that Ataka has indeed succeeded in 
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radicalizing the Bulgarian political discourse to some extent, as its leader Volen Siderov likes to 
claim.
29
 
During the 2009 election, another populist party of the more moderate NMSS kind made 
a breakthrough in Bulgarian politics. Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (known 
as GERB) won both the national and EP elections. In the European election, GERB finished first 
by winning 24.36% of the vote. A month later – in the national elections - the party fared even 
better by securing 39.75% of the vote share. This figure was more than twice higher than that of 
the runner-up Coalition for Bulgaria (lead by the Socialists) which won 17.70% of the vote. 
GERB‟s decisive victory gave Borisov enough confidence to announce he would not seek 
coalition partners to form the cabinet despite falling a few seats short of absolute majority.
30
 
The party was built around a charismatic and popular figure as well. A former wrestler, 
bodyguard and head of the police, Boyko Borisov became known in the media as “Batman” for 
his alleged abilities to tackle crime and corruption. Borisov‟s campaign also relied heavily on 
symbolic, rather than programmatic issues and he soon became a media favorite. Despite its self-
proclaimed status of a center right party, GERB developed as a quintessential populist party of 
the NMSS kind while avoiding the anti-EU undertones of the more extreme Ataka and OLJ. 
Smilov (2008) summarizes Borisov‟s image as being “spicier than the ex-tsar, but does not scare 
the people as much as Siderov does”. It is too early to say how long GERB‟s popularity will last, 
but one year after the elections, they were holding on to most of their electorate.  
GERB and NMSS are thus two examples of populist parties which did not have an anti-
EU message but had a strong anti-corruption one and went on to win elections and govern the 
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country. Ataka and OLJ are examples of parties with mixed message which did not go quite as 
far as to be part of the cabinet, but they succeeded in becoming the first extremist parties in 
Bulgaria to have parliamentary representation. For a country which for many years boasted to be 
the only one in the region without a Eurosceptic party, the electoral performance of these new 
political groups is not to be neglected.  
Overall, the case of Bulgaria presents strong support for the theory developed in this 
study. Bulgaria was among the “laggards” of the EU accession process, troubled first by 
economic and democratization problems, later to be supplanted by corruption and organized 
crime. It was heavily monitored and pressured by the EU even after its accession. Domestic 
politics was tangibly affected by Europeanization pressures and mainstream parties rushed to 
compete as to who can better and faster fulfill the EU requirements. Populism gained grounds in 
the country after the first few major corruption scandals in the late 90s and has almost become 
the norm since then. Protest-based voting is widespread and does not show signs of subsiding as 
some of the formerly dominant mainstream formations have become weak and fragmented. The 
next section of the chapter presents the mostly opposite case of Estonia where Europeanization 
pressures and corruption perceptions were lowest in the region, and hence Euroscepticism and 
populism in its party system fared worse despite an otherwise notably Eurosceptic public.  
5.3.3 Estonia 
For most of the EU accession process, which also coincided with post-communist transitions in 
Central and East Europe, Estonia was treated as a definite frontrunner. Much like the Czech 
Republic, its economic development and speedy transition to a functioning market economy 
provoked praise in the West. Its institution building and democratization also progressed 
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relatively painlessly. A major exception that will be further explored below concerns the 
treatment of the large ethnic minority of Russian origin. Estonians did not quite comply with EU 
conditionality on that matter but were nonetheless not significantly pressured to do so. While the 
reasons for this are beyond the scope of this study, the lack of decisive pressure on this issue is 
consequential for establishing the lower degree of Europeanization of the country‟s party system.  
In terms of its economic progress, Estonia enjoyed until recently “a reputation as an 
emerging high growth „tiger economy‟ and reform pioneer” (Lauristin and Vihalemm, 2009). It 
reached this point by engaging in fast liberalization in the early 1990s after the fall of the 
communist regime. After an initial adjustment of the economy to the newly implemented pro-
market measures, the Estonian economy began experiencing consistent economic growth since 
1995. In fact, its GDP grew by 96% in the next decade (World Development Indicators, World 
Bank) placing it in a better place than even the Central European frontrunners Czech Republic 
and Hungary. Its trade with the rest of Europe grew exponentially and by 2002 the EU was the 
destination of 68% of Estonia‟s exports (Mikkel and Pridham, 2004). In addition, Estonia‟s free-
market policies far surpassed the more moderate approach of other CEE countries and in 2006 it 
was ranked the 12
th
 economically freest country in the world (Economic Freedom of the World: 
2006 Annual Report).  
Politically, as well, Estonia fared relatively well, though it did not duplicate its economic 
successes. Religious pluralism and media freedom took grounds in the country by the mid 90s 
and “there were signs that stable and relatively large parties were beginning to emerge” 
(Dawisha and Parrott, 1997). Organized crime presented somewhat more of a problem much like 
in the rest of region. The gravest concern from the standpoint of democratization, however, was 
the treatment of Russian minorities – an issue Estonia has in common with Latvia.  
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Russians represent the largest minority in Estonia – about 25% of the population (CIA 
World Factbook). The historical legacies of Soviet rule caused somewhat tense relations between 
the two ethnic groups especially whenever native Estonians perceived Russia‟s attempts to lobby 
for the rights of its minorities as a breach of the country‟s sovereignty. Since Estonia was among 
the best performing EU candidate states on all other criteria, the treatment of minorities was one 
issue area where the extent of EU‟s impact on domestic politics can be observed. Economic 
policies initiated by Estonian governments from the very beginning of the transition were fully in 
line with the EU-promoted model since the policy preferences of domestic actors in power were 
aligned with EU preferences unlike the case of Bulgaria where a reluctant government stalled the 
economic reform process. In the case of rights of minorities, however, EU-norms were met with 
resistance by Estonian political actors.   
 The Copenhagen criteria have an explicit clause related to minority rights and the EU 
consistently engaged the issue in negotiations with all post-communist candidates. Countries like 
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria significantly improved their national legislation and provisions 
for minorities, although of course the change was partially due to reformist domestic 
governments coming in power (Vachudova, 2005). These governments would prefer to satisfy all 
EU requirements in exchange for membership unlike their predecessors in the early and mid 
1990s.  
In Estonia, governments were by no means “illiberal” as was initially the case in 
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia.  Nonetheless, the historical legacies and the large size of the 
Russian minority made even strongly pro-EU governments reluctant to make significant 
compromises (Hughes, 2005). Harsh citizenship laws and linguistic policies resulted in the 
exclusion of many ethnic Russians from the political process or from equal access to 
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employment and educational opportunities (Arnswald, 2000; Amnesty International Report, 
2006). In 2001, the number of non-citizen Russians in Estonia was still much higher than that of 
naturalized Russians (Open Society Institute: EU accession Monitoring Program, 2001) but that 
did not prevent the European Union from opening accession negotiations with the country in 
February 2000.  
Nonetheless, this is not to say the European Commission failed in bringing forth any 
changes in that issue area. Legislation favoring minorities‟ rights was passed after “sustained 
pressure from the European organizations, notably the OSCE, and then the EU” and the presence 
of EU conditionality is often found by scholars to have been the “decisive factor” (Muiznieks 
and Kehris, 2003; Mikkel and Pridham, 2004). For example, after sustained criticism from the 
European Commission, a new language law was adopted in 2000 and the electoral law was 
slightly modified to accommodate minorities. Russians in Estonia, despite being disadvantaged 
compared to the titular population, also have a higher living standard and better economic 
prospects than their counterparts is most other post-Soviet economies (Minorities at Risk: 
Assessment for Russians in Estonia, 2006).  
The situation of the Russian minority thus improved over the years, with definite 
assistance from the European Union. However, general legislation remained patchy and not fully 
compliant with the Copenhagen criteria throughout the accession period which did not prevent 
the EU from fast-tracking the Estonian membership application. As early as 1997, the EU placed 
Estonia in the so-called “first wave” candidates to be offered entry in 2004, while its fellow 
Baltic states Latvia and Lithuania were left out. So was Slovakia, another country that had been 
criticized heavily on its treatment of ethnic minorities while otherwise exhibiting improvements 
in economic growth. Only a year later, the 1998 annual progress report on Estonia included 
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heavy criticism on the country‟s Citizenship Law (European Commission Progress Report, 
1998). Once EU accession came to be considered a certainty in 2002, domestic governments 
almost entirely abandoned the citizenship issue as it was domestically controversial and it had 
become clear that it would not be a hurdle towards membership. The reasons for EU‟s softer 
approach towards enforcing conditionality in Estonia are not the subject of this dissertation but 
other studies have argued that the EU adopted a security-oriented approach towards the Baltics 
largely because of concerns over Russian ambitions and the possible spillover of such tension 
into the rest of Europe.
31
 
Given the favorable economic and political landscape in the country, and the 
unwillingness of the EU to press the minorities issue to greater length, the Estonian party system 
experienced less Europeanization pressures than the rest of the Central and East European states. 
The intensity of conditionality index developed by Steunenberg and Dimitrova (2007) places 
Estonia at the lowest spot among the rest of the candidate states from the region. Of course, a 
pro-EU consensus did develop in Estonia at the elite level much like in the rest of the region. The 
EU issue was not particularly salient in electoral campaigns, at least not to the extent that it was 
absorbed in domestic party platforms in countries like Bulgaria and Romania. “No mainstream 
party has seriously questioned EU membership; and even those parliamentary parties that flirted 
with Euroscepticism, especially when public opposition to EU membership was growing, soon 
returned to their pro-EU stances” (Mikkel and Pridham, 2004).  
Despite the pro-EU consensus, the reluctance of successive governments to comply with 
every single condition set forth by the EU in the area of minority rights had domestic electoral 
benefits. Russians remained distrusted despite the fall of communism. Estonian political actors 
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did not shy away from engaging the anti-Russian sentiment in political debates and mainstream 
media discourse would go as far as freely using ethnic slurs during politically charged moments 
(Subrenat et. al, 2004; European Network Against Racism Shadow Report, 2008). The domestic 
political benefits stemming from defying EU minority rights requirements thus included electoral 
gains from playing the nationalist card against a distrusted segment of the population.  
Estonia had the lowest intensity of conditionality which translates into the highest 
freedom for domestic maneuvering. Parties took advantage of this in the area of minority rights 
and the debate over ethnicity exemplifies the greater leeway Estonian politicians had in 
formulating domestic policy. While the Bulgarian population, for example, held largely negative 
views of the Roma minority and, to a lesser extent, the Turkish one – pre-accession governments 
refrained from engaging in a minority rights debate and attempted to fulfill EU legal reform 
requirements in these areas even if enforcement and monitoring were still inadequate. It was only 
after acquiring EU membership that major political parties became less restrained in engaging 
the ethnic issue during their campaigns and tenure in office. The consensus on EU membership 
that developed in the Estonian party system, however, did not prevent political actors from 
challenging the EU for domestic electoral gains.  
The Estonian case demonstrates that convergence does not equal compliance. Major 
political parties in Estonia were slow and reluctant to implement minority protections, thus they 
were fairly convergent in their anti-Russian stance (which defies EU norms) and they were fairly 
convergent in their pro-market, pro-Western consensus on any other issue (which is consistent 
with EU norms). Mainstream party similarity was, therefore, still high in Estonia but it did not 
produce the same levels of protest voting as it did in other countries. The country‟s corruption 
rankings can help explain this phenomenon. As the findings in chapter 4 indicate, perceptions of 
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party similarity become particularly consequential whenever they are coupled with perceptions 
of high corruption.  
In the Estonian case, the corruption issue was much less of an electoral factor. The 
country‟s average score on Transparency International‟s CPI index places it as the country with 
the lowest corruption in the post-communist world for the period 1995-2009. Along with 
Slovenia, Estonia‟s average rankings “are on par with Western European countries such as Italy 
and Portugal” (Moller and Skaaning, 2009). While of course, Italy and Portugal are in the higher 
end of corruption in Western Europe, for a CEE country this accomplishment is much more 
noteworthy. The second common international indicator measuring “control of corruption” 
similarly places Estonia at the top spot with more than 30% greater control than Bulgaria (World 
Bank Governance Indicators, 2008).  
The country‟s distinction with regard to its corruption performance has provoked 
sustained praise from the international community, including the EU. A corruption study by the 
EU suggested that “a possible corruption-free culture” may be behind this development and 
provoked the Estonian Vice-President of the Commission Siim Kallas to ambitiously declare that 
the country could reach the top of the corruption perception index, currently inhabited by nations 
such as Sweden and Norway.
32
 Estonian politicians have expressed consistent, and justified, 
satisfaction with the state of affairs in their country as far as corruption is concerned and the 
beneficial results have been acknowledged by the EU.  
The low relative corruption is, in part, responsible for the less negative perceptions of 
domestic political structures held by the public. Estonia exhibits a smaller degree of political 
dissatisfaction with parties and the mainstream elite than is evident in the rest of the region. For 
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example, only about 12% strongly disagreed with the way democracy is going in their country 
and only 8.8 strongly disagreed that “those who make decisions in my country are competent 
people” while in Bulgaria the numbers were respectively 41.8% and 25.1% (Intune Mass Survey 
as cited in Ilonszki, 2009).  
Estonians, therefore, exhibit less systemic dissatisfaction with the political process. While 
respective governments can provoke substantial criticism on the part of the public, the all-
encompassing alienation from the political elite is not pronounced in the country. Interestingly, 
though, while Estonians have low scores on domestic dissatisfaction, they have frequently been 
among the most Eurosceptic populations in the European Union (Vetik 2003, 2006; Lust, 2006). 
Results from the accession referendum confirmed that one-third of the electorate voted against 
EU membership which, along with Latvia, placed Estonia at the bottom of membership support 
among CEE countries. Moreover, negative attitudes towards the EU were not a fleeting 
phenomenon. As early as 1997, when the majority of candidates still enjoyed artificially high 
levels of support for the EU, only 29% of Estonians viewed membership in a positive light 
(Central and Eastern Europe Eurobarometer, 1997).  
The causes of Estonian Euroscepticism among the public vary and range from basic 
economic calculations (Lust, 2006) to reasons related to national identity (Vetik, Nimmerfelft 
and Taru, 2006) and the particular historical legacy of being under foreign dominance for the 
majority of their recent history. The particular balance of public and  party Euroscepticism is 
somewhat opposite to the situation in the Czech Republic where a large ideologically 
Eurosceptic party like the ODS co-existed with mostly pro-EU population and its ousting from 
power for the years prior to accession was partially explained with public concern over its anti-
EU positions. In Estonia, on the other hand, the Eurosceptic population co-exists with mostly 
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pro-EU parties and the occasional soft Euroscepticism exhibited by a major party is an attempted 
adjustment to popular moods whenever electorally rewarding rather than a manifestation of the 
protest-voting phenomenon.  
The constellation of the factors discussed above – low Europeanization pressure and low 
corruption resulted in relatively few examples of populism and Euroscepticism in the party 
system of Estonia. This fits the theory developed here about the relationship between these 
factors. However, the Estonian case also demonstrates that when mainstream party convergence 
occurs, but in an environment of lower corruption and lower systemic dissatisfaction, we see less 
of Euroscepticism and populism in the political system. Much like survey evidence did at the 
individual level, the country comparisons indicate that mainstream party similarity becomes 
more consequential for activating protest voting as corruption perceptions increase.  
In addition, the theory developed here would have also expected a purely Eurosceptic 
formation to have emerged in Estonia as there was a real EU cleavage evident among the public 
throughout most of the accession process. A possible explanation for the high public 
Euroscepticism compared to low party-based one concerns the ethnic composition of the 
country. Given the marginalization of the Russian minority from parts of the political process 
and the somewhat questionable Estonian record at integrating its minorities, it is possible that 
Estonian Euroscepticism is partially a function of the attitudes of Russians in the country. 
Support for this supposition is mixed. Based on survey evidence from the Baltics, Ehin (2001) 
finds that Russians in Latvia are more likely to hold Eurosceptic attitudes but the relationship 
was not found in Estonia. Estonian Russians were not systematically different in their attitudes 
towards the EU. A 2003 TNS Emor
33
 survey, however, shows a different picture. Respondents 
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 TNS Emor is the largest market-research and consulting company in the Baltics.  
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were asked about their satisfaction with the results of the EU membership referendum. 72% of 
the Estonian respondents were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” with the positive outcome, while 
only 49% of non-Estonians were. Thus, evidence on this matter is somewhat contradictory, but 
there is the possibility that Estonian Euroscepticism is at least partially channeled through the 
views of the minority ethnic group. In this case, given that the Russian population‟s views were 
not sufficiently represented through an electorally strong pro-Russian political party (as opposed 
to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria which had representation), the non-emergence of a purely 
Eurosceptic party makes more sense.  
Moreover, survey evidence from 2008-2009 suggests that Estonia‟s position as the most 
Eurosceptic country among the new member states may become a thing of the past. Whether due 
to short term public opinion fluctuations, or a more permanent shift in attitudes towards the EU, 
Estonians have recently recorded a 78% approval level of their EU membership and only 15% of 
the population claimed that they had not benefited from membership (Eurobarometer survey: 
Autumn 2008). The shift became notable in spring 2007 when favorable views on the EU 
jumped by 10 points in the case of Estonia possibly due to perceptions of a more “robust EU 
stand vis-à-vis Russia” (Eurobarometer: Spring 2007). Moreover, Estonia‟s good economic 
performance continued as a member state and the country is due to be the first among the Baltics 
(and the third among all new members) to adopt the Euro in January 2011. While no breakdown 
by ethnicity is available, the notably improved standing of the European Union in the Estonian 
population suggests that Estonia‟s party system is even less likely to see the formation of a 
purely Eurosceptic party in the near future. 
The Estonian party system‟s two major parties the Estonian Reform Party and the 
Estonian Centre Party have been around since the formation of the multi-party system. They are 
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supplemented by agrarian, conservative and social democratic parties. There are few examples of 
populist or Eurosceptic tendencies at the elite level. The only populist formation is the Union for 
the Republic – Res Publica. It was formed in 2003 after absorbing the smaller Fatherland Union 
formation whose statements declared its ideology to be a combination of Christian democracy 
and nationalism. Both the Fatherland Union and its successor fared relatively well in elections 
gathering between 7 and 24% at respective elections between 1995 and 2007.   
The type of nationalism subscribed to by the party was, however, far from the extremes 
of the Ataka coalition in Bulgaria. The party‟s main campaign message in 2003 – its strongest 
election year so far - revolved around improving order in the country and suggesting that current 
governments were too soft on crime. It pledged to bring increased transparency and popular 
representation in the political process.
34
 While the party, much like typical populists, lacked a 
clear programmatic agenda, its message was more moderate than the anti-establishment agenda 
of fellow populists in other CEE countries. Res Publica “emerged in an effort to take advantage 
of political stagnation and the unpopularity of the conservative-led government‟s economic 
policies” while also labeling the traditional parties as “outdated” (Ucen, 2007). The party‟s 
message was particularly popular with young and urban voters who saw it as more modern and 
progressive than their competitors.  
The Centre Party won the most votes in the election but failed to secure an absolute 
majority. Res Publica, along with the Estonian Reform Party, were invited to participate in a 
triple government coalition. However, as their campaign promise was not perceived as having 
come to fruition, the appeal of the party decreased and it re-oriented itself towards liberal 
economic policies combined with social conservatism.  
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While the Res Publica party and its predecessor the Fatherland Union are a manifestation 
of moderate populism in the Estonian party system, the only electorally viable party to exhibit 
Euroscepticism at times has been the Centre Party. Its mild Euroscepticism has mostly been 
vocalized whenever the party finds itself in opposition and has subsequently been tempered or 
fully shifted to a pro-EU position once the party regains office which it did in 1999 and 2003 
(Mikkel and Pridham, 2004). During the campaign preceding the referendum on EU 
membership, the Centre Party attempted a controversial strategy by sending mixed messages in 
an attempt to appeal to more voters. At one time it recommended to its electorate to vote against 
membership, while at other points in the campaign prominent party members campaigned 
strongly for a „yes‟ vote. Edgar Savisaar, the party leader took a neutral position and advised 
citizens to vote according to their own views (Mikkel and Pridham, 2004). 
Euroscepticism is much more prevalent on the margins of the political system in Estonia. 
Small parties like the Constitution Party (formerly the Estonian United People‟s Party), the 
Independence Party, the Republican Party, the Russian Party in Estonia, the Estonian Christian 
People‟s Party and the Estonian Future Party all subscribe to anti-EU views while some also 
espouse a far-right nationalist ideology. The electoral performance of these parties up to date, 
however, has been unimpressive
35
 and they have failed to gain parliamentary representation 
(with the exception of the soft Eurosceptic Estonian United People‟s Party which gained 6 seats 
in 1999). This suggests that while “the potential for extreme-right parties exists” (Kasekamp, 
2003), it has remained confined to the periphery of the party system for the duration of the 
country‟s post-communist transition. Estonian citizens, while fairly Eurosceptic and suspicious 
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 For example, in 2003 (on the eve of EU accession) the combined vote share of the fringe Eurosceptic parties was 
3.06%. In 2007 this number decreased slightly to 3.2%. The largest combined vote share of these parties (or their 
predecessors, given the frequent name change, merging and splits in Estonian parties) was in 1999 when they 
captured 10.69%. 
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of the Russian minority, seem unwilling to resort to the more extreme manifestations of these 
sentiments by putting charismatic anti-establishment leaders in office, or even in opposition in 
the parliament.  
Overall, most aspects of Estonian Euroscepticism and populism fit the theory developed 
in this study, but add additional nuances. Estonia experienced low degree of Europeanization 
pressure from the EU and has had a less pronounced corruption problem. Parties agreed on the 
necessity of EU membership but resisted compliance with aspects of the Copenhagen criteria 
when domestic electoral interests were at stake. Given Estonia‟s otherwise frontrunner status, the 
EU did not strongly press demands in the area of minority rights thus providing the leeway used 
by political parties to engage the nationality issue.  
Mainstream party similarity was still high on salient issues like minority rights, but ran 
against the EU-promoted norm. The lower levels of protest voting in Estonia thus can be 
explained by the interactive effect of party convergence and corruption. Corruption was less 
widespread in Estonian society, thus reducing in importance an important predictor of protest 
voting. In line with expectations, the party system exhibited fewer examples of populism and 
even fewer of Euroscepticism among parliamentary represented parties. It should be noted, 
however, that even when Estonia topped public Euroscepticism scales among the candidate 
states, a genuinely Eurosceptic party did not emerge as a viable electoral contender in Estonia. 
Possible explanations for this include the Russian population‟s potentially more Eurosceptic 
views but lack of political representation; or an elite calculation that tangible benefits from 
membership would eventually reduce Euroscepticism among the public. The latter trend has 
been empirically observed in the past 3 years.  
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented three case studies from Central and East Europe. The cases were selected 
in an attempt to maximize variation in terms of the key explanatory factors – levels of 
Europeanization pressure, mainstream party convergence and corruption. They also exhibit 
variation in terms of the outcome – electoral performance of Eurosceptic and populist parties. By 
tracing the country-specific developments and contextual elements that affected political life, the 
chapter presents a more nuanced picture of how the phenomena under investigation interact with 
one another and fit or did not fit the theory. In general, the main developments within the 3 
countries support the survey findings from chapter 4 and conform to the theoretical expectations 
laid out in chapter 3. While this dissertation cannot examine in detail each of the 10 countries in 
the CEE sample, the case studies developed here are representative of the larger sample as they 
range from „frontrunners‟ to „laggards‟ in the process of EU accession, from countries with high 
to low party Euroscepticism, high to low populism, high to low corruption perceptions and high 
to low public support for the EU. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes the dissertation and draws some avenues for future research. The first 
section of the chapter summarizes the main theoretical arguments and the associated findings. 
The second section discusses some limitations of the study and their consequences for the 
findings. Next, I examine the major implications of the results of this project for broader research 
agendas in comparative politics and political behavior. I outline the key contributions of the 
study to these fields as well as its significance for real-world political developments. The final 
section of the chapter and of the dissertation presents potentially useful ways of extending the 
scope of this research and improving our understanding of the subject.  
6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This dissertation intends to answer the following question: What accounts for the emergence and 
electoral performance of Eurosceptic political parties in the domestic party systems of Central 
and East Europe? I argue that electoral Euroscepticism is closely related to the phenomenon of 
populism and often has different underlying determinants than genuine, value-based 
Euroscepticism. The dissertation relies on an individual level survey, longitudinal country-data 
and in-depth case studies for providing the necessary evidence.     
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A growing number of studies have begun to explore the nature and causes of either 
Euroscepticism or populism in CEE. They have made valuable contributions regarding the 
typology of protest parties, their distribution and strength across the region, the role that 
utilitarian versus identity-based factors play in negative attitudes towards the EU. However, few 
of those (Hooghe et. Al, 2007; Krowel and Abts, 2007) directly examine the link between 
populism and Euroscepticism, especially at the level of the individual. I argue that parties that 
mix Euroscepticism with populism draw voters in large parts due to their populist anti-elite, anti-
corruption message rather than their anti-EU views. Voting for these parties becomes a form of 
protest against the mainstream political class.  
When measuring public Euroscepticism, moreover, some studies use electoral vote 
shares, while others base their findings on survey questionnaires. My argument seeks to 
demonstrate that these two approaches are not equivalent because the factors that drive a person 
to vote for a Eurosceptic party are sometimes different from those determining his or her attitude 
towards the EU. Voters for whom the EU is not as salient as the domestic agenda can cast a 
Eurosceptic vote in order to punish mainstream parties even if these same voters have an 
otherwise positive opinion of European integration. This dissertation thus distinguishes between 
electoral and value-based Euroscepticism. The former is evident in vote choice, while the latter is 
better captured by public opinion surveys.   
Chapter 2 also gives an overview of the Europeanization literature about EU effects on 
domestic politics. Scholars are generally in agreement that little or no direct effects of the EU on 
parties and party system are present across Europe. In this study, however, I examine an 
important indirect effect of Europeanization and argue it has noteworthy electoral consequences. 
Mainstream party converge is indirectly fueled by EU pressure to comply with conditionality 
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criteria and the associated race in the CEE region as to how fast each country can secure a 
membership offer. Of course, while the criteria for membership are identical for all candidates, 
domestic contextual differences and political calculations on the part of the EU, would result in 
varying degrees of pressure in different cases.  Europeanization‟s effects on party competition in 
CEE thus vary in scope.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on the theory in more detail. I single out two observable factors – 
mainstream party convergence and political corruption - that stand out as drivers of the protest 
vote. When mainstream political parties - united in the single goal of EU membership and rush to 
comply with membership conditionality – grow closer in the political space over time, voters are 
likely to be left with little substantive choice. Citizens across the region may feel forced to pick 
between competing political groups that are often viewed as “all the same”. The effects of 
mainstream party convergence are likely to be reinforced by the second factor – perceptions of 
political corruption – in affecting voting preferences. Corruption is a common by-product of 
democratization in post-communist societies, but its saliency in the media and public realm has 
notably increased since the late 1990s. Individuals who view the political elite as engaged in 
frequent corrupt activity are much more likely to engage in a protest vote and pick a Eurosceptic 
or populist party.  
Chapter 4 conducts a series of empirical tests of the observable implications developed 
from the theory. The first part of the chapter is an individual-level study of voter preferences. I 
use an original random, representative survey conducted in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 
the summer of 2009. Results indicate that there are indeed different underlying motivations 
driving electoral and value-based Euroscepticism. Citizens who perceive a higher degree of 
corruption among public officials in their countries are much more likely to vote for mixed 
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(Eurosceptic/populist) and purely populist parties. Citizens who see a higher degree of 
mainstream party convergence are also more likely to pick these parties, though the effect 
appears much stronger when corruption and party similarity views act together as an interaction 
term. People‟s attitudes towards the European Union and European integration, on the other 
hand, were not found to be systematically related to vote choice when it comes to these political 
parties. The findings indicate that protest voting is indeed taking place in the region and electoral 
Euroscepticism is, to a large extent, driven by domestic considerations.  
When I treat value-based Euroscepticism as the dependent variable in the analysis, a 
different picture of citizens‟ considerations emerges. We see that socio-economic characteristics, 
knowledge of the EU, media exposure and national identity are key determinants of how one 
views the EU. Corruption perception still played a role, albeit a smaller one and of the opposite 
direction. More perceived corruption domestically makes people slightly more favorable towards 
the EU, probably as an alternative to deficient national governments. The findings clearly 
confirm that value-based Euroscepticism tends to be a factor of the classic determinants 
examined in the literature but when it comes to voting behavior, pro-EU citizens often choose to 
vote for Eurosceptic parties under certain conditions. This project pinpoints what these 
conditions are and when it is that they become consequential for electoral outcomes.  
The second part of the chapter presents an analysis of the country-level findings. I 
conduct a longitudinal study of aggregate Euroscepticism and populism across the CEE region.  
Findings largely confirm the story from the level of the individual. We see that mainstream party 
convergence has a more pronounced conditional effect on the vote share of protest-based parties. 
This effect increases when overall corruption perceptions are at a high level. At low levels of 
corruption, however, there is no systematic relationship between party similarity and size of the 
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protest vote. This finding gives us greater confidence that the survey results in the two countries 
are not driven by the temporal context. While the public opinion survey is set at a particular point 
in time, after corruption had already become a salient issue, the cross-national analysis covers a 
range of years when corruption was not quite that salient in the region. Thus, we see that the 
main relationships found at the individual level are generalizable across the region rather than 
being a function of idiosyncratic developments from Bulgaria and the Czech Republic at a given 
point in time.  
Chapter 5 sheds more light on the country-level context in which the developments 
described in this dissertation take place. I choose three case studies offering variation on each of 
the dependent variables studied – electoral Euroscepticism and value-based Euroscepticism and 
trace the emergence and nature of protest parties. The chapter gives an overview of the political, 
social and economic context of these countries by recounting their histories and stressing the 
particular cultural legacies that have remained consequential for their modern societies. Populist 
and Eurosceptic movements are a common trend in the region but they come in different degrees 
and shapes. Identifying important historical legacies that have affected the post-communist 
societies of the selected cases allows a glimpse into some of the cultural pre-conditions enabling 
protest politics as well as the conditions under which mainstream party similarity and corruption 
perceptions have the strongest effect.  
Estonia‟s brief historical period of independence, for example, coupled with a troubled 
relationship with Russia throughout the ages has exacerbated Estonian sensitivities to perceived 
threats to their national identity. As a result, post-communist Estonian society and government 
resisted the acceptance and full integration of a large Russian minority. Mainstream Estonian 
parties thus largely converged around an anti-EU norm of limiting minorities protection, while at 
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the same time embracing the rest of the EU membership criteria to the extent of gaining a 
frontrunner status. While mainstream party convergence did occur, it did not provoke the rise of 
notable Eurosceptic and populist parties due to Estonia‟s highly publicized low levels of 
corruption and the associated smaller discontent with political elites on the part of the 
population. The Estonian case illustrates an important point mentioned in the introduction of this 
dissertation. Mainstream party convergence does not need to automatically result in public 
dissatisfaction unless parties are also seen as dishonest or incompetent when it comes to 
performing their duties.  
Bulgaria‟s much warmer relationship with Russia on the other hand and the more positive 
public orientation towards socialism, resulted in a belated start of real pro-market reforms since 
the former communist party remained in power. Once real reforms began in the late 90s, 
Bulgaria had a lot of catching up to do and successive governments were put under substantial 
pressure by the EU to fulfill the accession requirements. Since all mainstream parties embraced 
the goal of EU accession, they had little leeway left for political maneuvering and mainstream 
party similarity was particularly tangible in the country‟s party system. At the same time, 
Bulgaria was among the countries most heavily affected by corruption problems and the salience 
of the issue in the media and in public attitudes became a useful campaign tool for protest parties 
aimed at capturing disaffected voters. Thus, Bulgarian voters, while having high rates of 
approval of the EU, were willing to put populists or Eurosceptics in parliament in successive 
elections. This case illustrates that, as expected, mainstream party similarity and corruption 
perceptions have the strongest effect when acting together.  
Finally, the Czech Republic‟s history of relative autonomy, identification with the West 
and strong anti-communist sentiment led to a quick extrication from communist era policies. 
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Ever since the suppressed Prague Spring of 1968, Czech society had distanced itself from the 
communist regime and political formations that came to power after 1989 were quick to 
implement pro-Western reforms in a largely supportive population. Mainstream party 
convergence as a rest of the consensus on EU accession did occur in the Czech Republic but it 
was mitigated by the presence of a key Eurosceptic party from the early periods of Czech post-
communist history. Corruption did present a problem in the country following a series of 
scandals and eventually enabled populist formations to take advantage of it. Comparatively 
speaking, the country‟s corruption performance places it ahead of Bulgaria but behind Estonia 
while its mainstream party similarity is lower than both of these countries. Accordingly, the 
country takes a middle place when it comes to the electoral gains made by Eurosceptic and 
populist parties in its most recent history.  
By tracing the degree of EU pressure applied on each of the three countries, chapter 5 
also clarifies the mechanism and degree to which mainstream party convergence occurred in the 
region. While membership criteria are identical, strength of enforcement depends additionally on 
the domestic context and strategic considerations on the part of the EU. Thus, while chapter 4 
provides a country-level longitudinal examination of protest voting, chapter 5 illustrates the role 
of Europeanization in bringing about these developments. As evident by the language of progress 
reports and measures of intensity of conditionality, the EU put the most pressure on Bulgaria to 
comply with membership criteria while Estonia experienced the least. Consequently, we see the 
highest mainstream party similarity in Bulgaria while in Estonia mainstream party similarity 
does occur but in some cases contrary to EU-promoted norms and policies. Ironically, it is when 
domestic politicians stick most closely to the EU-promoted policies that protest voting seems to 
take the strongest hold if society grows distrustful of the political elite.  
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6.2 LIMITATIONS 
This study uses a carefully planned research design but certain limitations do remain. As with 
any survey, both the dependent and independent variables were measured at the same time, thus 
external influences and endogeneity cannot be fully controlled. Longitudinal survey data, on the 
other hand, allows for examining more precisely the direction of the relationships.  
In addition, the timing of the survey may have introduced some bias into the responses 
since the summer of 2009 followed the global financial crisis and economic considerations were 
likely to be particularly high on people‟s minds. People may be more likely to express negative 
views on economic conditions in their country and in their household. Similarly, more people 
may be likely to place the economic situation as the number one issue of concern among 
problems facing the country. However, previous survey evidence has demonstrated that 
economic considerations tend to have high resonance with voters in Eastern Europe to begin 
with, so while the timing of the survey could have intensified this effect, its presence is not an 
idiosyncratic finding. Moreover, even if economic considerations are overrepresented, they have 
been accounted for in the models and the key relationships of interest remain significant.  
Populism is, however, also known to flourish in response to crisis and in that sense the 
aftermath of the financial crisis may have exacerbated popular sentiments of disenchantment 
with mainstream political elites. The expectation, if not their  implementation yet, of austerity 
measures and a reduction in living standards coupled with general uncertainty about the future, 
creates fertile ground for people growing resentful to the political establishment as a whole. 
Thus, the appeal of populists would be particularly widespread. Regardless of the survey timing, 
however, previous elections indicate that neither populism nor Euroscepticism is a phenomenon 
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that appeared in 2009. The global anti-establishment wave of discontent cannot be credited with 
driving the results.  
At the country level, a limitation of the study lies in the inability to include the same vast 
range of control variables available in the survey. I designed the survey questions for the specific 
purposes of this project, but longitudinal data on these indicators could not be included. 
However, at the country level it is at least possible to account for some sources of endogeneity 
bias. If a third unobserved factor is affecting, for example, both corruption levels and the portion 
of the vote won by protest parties, the country fixed effects method of estimation aims to correct 
for that. Findings from the two sections thus complement each other and at least partially 
compensate for each other‟s limitations. The individual level analysis is able to include much 
more nuanced and detailed information on citizens‟ beliefs and views and the relationships 
between those. The country level analysis offers a more basic picture of the key relationships of 
interest but it assuages concerns about generalizability of the results.  
6.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS 
This dissertation examines the determinants of Euroscepticism, and protest politics in general, in 
the political systems of Central and East European countries. My analysis contributes to the 
growing literature on parties and voting behavior and, more specifically, to the study of 
Euroscepticism and populism in Europe. With respect to Euroscepticism, the findings here 
clearly indicate that scholars need to distinguish between its electoral and value-based 
manifestations. When Eurosceptic parties employ heavy populist messages, it is often their 
populist message that draws disenchanted voters rather than the anti-EU sentiment. A 
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Eurosceptic vote becomes, in this case, merely a signal of protest punishing mainstream elites on 
the most visible issue of consensus among them.  
This finding has implications for both the general literature on voting behavior and for 
the study and practice of European politics. In terms of electoral behavior, the East European 
protest voters can be conceived as „insincere‟ voters sending a message to their political elites. 
Insincere voting has been found to occur in three cases – when citizens want to avoid wasting 
their vote on small parties (Cox, 1997; Duch and Palmer, 2002), when they want to moderate 
policy outputs through split ticket voting (Fiorina, 1992; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995) and when 
they want to send a message to candidates by voting insincerely in low-profile elections 
(Meirowitz and Tucker, 2007). The type of insincere Eurosceptic voters presented here, however, 
do not fall neatly into these categories. In fact, they are more likely to vote for initially small 
parties with fringe agendas and their votes are likely to polarize rather than simply moderate 
policy. This behavior is exhibited in high profile as well as low profile elections and serves as 
punishment aimed at the whole class of mainstream parties rather than simply a message to the 
current office-holders.  
Insincere Eurosceptics represent both good and bad news for European integration. The 
Lisbon Treaty referendums, the French and Dutch vote on the Constitution in 2005, the 
prospective referendums on the next enlargements demonstrate that public opinion has become a 
major consideration in European Union politics and policy-making. If European integration is to 
proceed, analysts and politicians need to constantly update their knowledge on what does and 
what does not indicate a negative view of the EU.  
The type of Eurosceptic voters examined here are not actively seeking to undermine the 
European project and often have favorable views of European integration. They pick protest 
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parties because of their populist anti-mainstream appeal rather than the European dimension. As 
reported in Chapter 4, CEE citizens who do not trust domestic institutions in their countries are 
actually more likely to approve of the EU, possibly as an alternative to perceived domestic 
inefficiencies. On the other hand, by placing a lower priority on their views towards the EU, 
voters are exhibiting signs of the same detachment that often plagues European Parliament 
elections. Willingness to put Eurosceptic parties in office thus indicates that voters are still not 
aware of the scope of impact that EU level decisions have on their lives and may regard their 
Eurosceptic voting choice as a necessary evil given the greater salience of domestic issues.  
By looking at the causes of mainstream party convergence, this study adds to our 
understanding of international influences on domestic politics. Examining the indirect effects of 
Europeanization on party politics supplements current Europeanization studies by revealing an 
important electoral consequence of the convergence phenomenon. With new candidate states 
now aspiring for EU membership and a line of potential candidates waiting their turn, 
Europeanization effects during the accession process will remain of interest to scholars and 
policy-makers. This dissertation is the first to provide empirical evidence for the proposition that 
mainstream party similarity is consequential for voting behavior. Previous studies have also 
observed that the rush to European integration has constrained the nature of political competition 
but no survey evidence to date has explored the consequences of this development for citizens‟ 
voting behavior. 
The findings raise some concerns about the effects of Europeanization. While the 
mainstream elite consensus on the issue of EU membership undoubtedly facilitated economic 
and political reforms in post-communist Europe, the lack of debate unintentionally created the 
pre-conditions for fringe parties to utilize the European issue to their advantage. While 
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referendums on membership itself were held in some countries, individual policies or sets of 
policies were rarely debated – instead they were presented as the next set of conditions to be 
satisfied. The findings of this study suggest that future enlargements would benefit from a more 
politicized approach to accession as moderate Euroscepticism among mainstream formations 
would diminish public perceptions that parties have grown too similar in their race to 
membership. Ironically, the more EU policies are contested in their nascence, the less likely a 
future backlash of protest-based Euroscepticism becomes. Contestation brings legitimacy in the 
political system regardless of the policy eventually enacted and decreases the options of fringe 
actors for capturing dissatisfied voters. Contestation, of course, comes at a price, as it makes 
policies more difficult to implement but the appeal of EU membership is still large enough for 
publics in most (potential) candidate states to be permanently swayed by a hard Eurosceptic 
stance. The “insincere” Eurosceptics want to be part of European integration but they also want 
political parties that give them the option to say no to a given policy.  
This study sheds light on the determinants of populism as well. While the particular 
findings refer to Central and East Europe, populist parties have also been known to fare well in 
various other places such as Western Europe and Latin America. The populist right has attracted 
attention of scholars in all European countries and in recent years. Parties of this kind use the 
catch-all philosophy explored here, in which they combine various forms of protest, including 
anti-elite, anti-EU, anti-immigration messages. By disaggregating these factors and placing them 
against each other in a model of vote choice, this dissertation is able to provide important new 
evidence on the relative importance of each of these strands of non-mainstream political slogans 
in the campaigns of the populist right. The populist vote is seen here as a largely protest vote 
against mainstream parties being all the same and being perceived as corrupt and unresponsive.  
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     In some cases, such protest-based parties are said to act as correctives to inefficient or 
unresponsive mainstream political parties and the surge of Euroscepticism and populism is 
followed by a regrouping of the mainstream actors in order to regain electoral ground (Casullo, 
2009). However, while this certainly seems to be happening in some European political systems, 
it comes at a price. Incorporating populists into political life has resulted in tentative adoption of 
populist or Eurosceptic rhetoric by mainstream parties in the hope of capturing some of the 
cherished protest votes. Thus, otherwise mainstream parties can subscribe to a more nationalistic, 
Eurosceptic or exclusionary agenda even if only for strategic vote-seeking purposes.  
    Citizens, however, are the ones affected the most by these developments. The populist 
resurgence creates a vicious cycle in which initial disenchantment with the political process 
causes voters to put protest parties in parliament. If mainstream parties adapt to the new strategic 
situation and “borrow” some of the populist or Eurosceptic language, citizens are exposed to a 
political discourse that moves even farther away from the liberal democratic ideal type. Populism 
did not disappear in Central and East Europe after accession – instead, it is now growing in the 
party systems of West European countries as well. The traditional left-right ideological division 
is being challenged by more extreme populist parties which often have Eurosceptic and anti-
immigrant positions. This pushes the party system towards a new dynamic where one large 
mainstream party is forced to compete with another equally strong protest based party for 
people‟s votes. Such re-configuration can be seen in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Norway. As observers have already noted, one effect of this development is that 
the political mainstream is beginning to move closer to their populist opponents – what 
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constitutes “reasonable” immigration policy, for example, becomes reasonable through 
comparison with the right-wing populists.
36
  
This study presents some important clues as to who the populist voters are in Central and 
East Europe and why they vote the way they do. Perceptions of mainstream political elites are 
the foremost motivation. Therefore, mainstream parties can take one of two roads in responding 
to the populist wave. The first is what recent developments seem to show – party platforms are 
increasingly becoming less „mainstream‟ and less programmatic – moving closer to the populists 
and trying to express similar messages as the more realistic and reasonable alternative. The 
second road would involve a more long term process of rebuilding citizens‟ trust in the ability of 
traditional parties to govern. As the threat of being excluded from the European Union is no 
longer valid, mainstream parties cannot count on external incentives to affect voting behavior to 
the same extent as before accession. Thus, the reshaping of the political scene and its future 
dynamic depend largely on domestic strategies enacted by the political parties themselves.  
6.4 FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are a number of ways in which this dissertation can be expanded upon. First, while I focus 
on the new member states, there are reasons to expect that mainstream party convergence has to 
some degree occurred across the EU since both old and new members need to comply with EU 
laws and regulations. Political parties with populist and Eurosceptic messages are also not a 
phenomenon confined to the CEE region as electoral advances made by populists in Belgium, 
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Netherlands, and Sweden demonstrate. An expansion of the current findings to include both new 
and old member states could tell us more about whether and how the two groups are similar, 
different, or converging over time.  
Populists can be successful because of their anti-establishment rhetoric and their ability to 
capture citizens‟ dissatisfaction with the mainstream political elites. As noted, populist 
mobilization is often the result of perceived deficiencies of the political system and failure of 
traditional parties to govern successfully or relate their political message to the people. Populists, 
however, can also be successful when they engage in “symbolic politics” pertaining to issues of 
identity, nationhood and otherness. They often try to invoke people‟s fears of or hostility toward 
immigrants, ethnic or religious minorities, or other groups perceived as foreign to the national 
culture. In this case populist mobilization is the result of deep rooted personal attitudes and 
beliefs activated by populist rhetoric. The two related manifestations of populist mobilization 
have different implications for society and politics and it is, therefore, worth asking under what 
conditions we see more of one or the other. 
In addition, the study‟s findings on a number of control variables pose some interesting 
new questions. While they are not the subject of the dissertation, they can provide new avenues 
for understanding citizen‟s attitudes. Social trust and media effects are the clearest examples. 
Understanding whether and why people who have higher interpersonal trust tend to be less 
susceptible to populist and Eurosceptic messages has important social psychological implications 
for the study of the relationship between personality and mass political behavior.  
Similarly, media effects have recently become the subject of growing interest as people 
are constantly exposed to a variety of conflicting information. While traditionally viewed as a 
source of information, the media has the potential to influence citizens‟ views and political 
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participation by placing certain items on the agenda or by emphasizing the costs or benefits of a 
given policy. Given the complex legal and decision-making structure of the European Union, 
citizens are even more likely to count on media shortcuts for informing their views. This study 
suggests that media effects are present when it comes to affecting the popularity of non-
mainstream parties and this finding deserves further exploration.  
In particular, how the European Union is portrayed compared to domestic political actors 
can be a determining factor in shaping views on Europe. Attitudes towards the two levels of 
authority present in EU countries may reinforce or rival each other. People may project their 
views of domestic governments onto the European Union. Or, they may perceive the two as 
alternative sources of authority, and dissatisfaction with domestic politics would actually 
increase trust in the EU. How does the media influence these related perceptions? Does exposure 
to it reduce support for the EU or domestic governments? In my dissertation I found some 
preliminary evidence that exposure to the media increases one‟s support for European Integration 
while reducing support for national governments, at least as far as East European countries are 
concerned. Examining these questions in detail can strengthen our understanding of the link 
between citizens and the European Union.   
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APPENDIX 
Survey Questionnaire 
1) How old are you?   
2) Record gender.  
3) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
(If a student, record qualification for which currently studying) 
3b) In what field?  
4) On a scale of 1-10, how would you rate the economic situation in this country today? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very unsatisfactory       Very satisfactory 
5) And as for your own household, how would you rate its economic situation today? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very satisfactory       Very unsatisfactory 
6) What do you think the economic situation of your household will be in five years time?  
1. Much better  
2. A little better  
3. About the same  
4. A little worse  
5. A lot worse 
7) How often on average do you watch news and/or political programs on television? 
1. Daily 
2. A couple of times a week. 
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3. Once in a while 
3. Rarely 
8) How often do you read a major newspaper?  
1. Daily 
2. A couple of times a week. 
3. Once in a while. 
4. Rarely 
8b) Which one (if answered 1, 2 or 3)?  
9) How often do you visit news websites on the internet?  
1. Daily 
2. A couple of times a week.  
3. Once in a while. 
4. Rarely. 
5. Never.  
{Vote Choice}  
10a) Thinking about the last parliamentary election in this country, did you vote or did you not 
get a chance?  
1. Voted 
2. Did not get a chance.  
10b) (If voted) People we have talked to today have voted for one of the parties on this ballot. 
Please put a cross by the name of the party that you voted for in the last parliamentary election.  
11a) Thinking about the June 2009 European Parliament election, did you vote in that election or 
did you not get a chance?  
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1. Voted 
2. Did not get a chance.   
11b) (if voted) People we have spoken to today have voted for one of the following parties in the 
European Parliament election. Please put a cross by the name of the party that you voted for in 
that election.  
12a) Thinking about the 2005 (2006 – Czech Republic) parliamentary election, did you vote in 
that election or did you not get a chance?  
1. Voted 
2. Did not get a chance.  
12b) (If voted) People we have talked to today have voted for ___ different parties in that 
election. Please put a cross by the name of the party that you voted for in the 2005 (2006 – Czech 
Republic) parliamentary election.  
13a) (Czech Republic only) If an election was to be held next month, would you cast a vote or 
stay home?  
13b) People we have talked to have said they would vote for one of the following parties if an 
election was taking place next month.  Please put a cross by the name of the party that you would 
vote for if a parliamentary election were to be held next month.  
Perceptions of Parties 
14) Here are some commonly cited distinctions between political parties in this country. Please 
place each of the following political parties on a scale from 1 to 10.  {List mainstream non-
Eurosceptic, non-populist parties only} 
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1. Views on the Communist regime  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pro-communist   Moderate    Anti-communist 
2. Market versus Government-managed economy.  
Politicians from some parties argue that leaving the market alone is best for the economy 
while others claim that government intervention to guide the economy is necessary in our 
society.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pro-market    Moderate   Government-managed 
3. Urban versus Rural  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Catering to the urban electorate    Catering to the rural electorate 
 4. Pro versus Against European integration  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
In favor of integration   Moderate   Opposed to integration 
5. Ethnic lines.  
Some parties call for defending our country from the growing influence of ethnic 
minorities while others ask for encouraging diversity and improving the integration of ethnic 
minorities in society.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Defending the interests   Neutral/Moderate Defending the interests of the 
ethnic majority       of ethnic minorities 
 
6. Other distinction lines (please name) 
15) On a scale of 1-10, would you say that your country‟s membership in the EU is a:  
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bad thing         Good thing 
16) On a scale of 1-10, does the EU invoke for you a positive or negative image?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very negative    Moderate    Very positive 
-Why (open ended) 
17) On a scale of 1 to 10 how much do you feel you know about the European Union? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Nothing at all         A great deal 
18) How widespread do you think bribe-taking and corruption is in this country? 
1. Almost no public officials are engaged in it.  
2. A few public officials are engaged in it.  
3. Most public officials are engaged in it.  
4. Almost all public officials are engaged in it. 
 
19) In thinking about political corruption in this country, please place each of the following 
political parties on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 equal the least corrupt and 10 equal the most 
corrupt. (list all parties) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
20) Consider the following political parties (list mainstream non-Eurosceptic, non-populist 
parties in respective country). To what extent do you agree with the following statement: These 
political parties are all the same.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree       Strongly Agree 
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21) What should a person who needs a government permit do if an official says: just be patient, 
wait.  
       1 Wait; it will come  
       2. Offer a "tip" to the official to get a prompt reply.  
       3. Use connections  
       4. Write a letter to the head office  
       5. Do what you want without a permit.  
       6. Give up the project as the permit will never come. 
22) Under our present system of government how much influence do you think people like 
yourself can have on government?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No influence         A lot of influence 
23) On a scale of 1-10, how interested would you say you are in politics? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not interested at all       Very interested 
24) Here are some commonly cited distinctions between political parties in this country. Please 
place each of the following political parties on a scale from 1 to 10. {List mainstream 
Eurosceptic and populist parties only} 
1. Views on the Communist regime  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pro-communist   Moderate    Anti-communist 
2. Market versus Government-managed economy.  
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Politicians from some parties argue that leaving the market alone is best for the economy 
while others claim that government intervention to guide the economy is necessary in our 
society.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pro-market    Moderate   Government-managed 
3. Urban versus Rural  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Catering to the urban electorate     Catering to the rural electorate  
4. Pro versus Against European integration  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
In favor of integration   Moderate   Opposed to integration 
5. Ethnic lines.  
Some parties call for defending our country from the growing influence of ethnic 
minorities while others ask for encouraging diversity and improving the integration of ethnic 
minorities in society.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Defending the interests  Neutral/Moderate Defending the interests of the ethnic 
majority       of ethnic minorities 
 
6. Other distinction lines (please name) 
25) Some people say that we would be better off if we get rid of Parliament and elections and 
have a strong leader who can decide everything. What do you think?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree 
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26) How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Very unsatisfied        Very satisfied  
27) To what extent do you trust each of the following institutions to look after your interests? 
Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 for no trust at all and 10 great trust.  
1. Courts 2. Political Parties 3. Army 4. Parliament 4. Police 5. President 6. Trade Unions 7. 
Church 8. Media 9. Most people in this country 10. Most people you know. 11. European Union  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
No trust         Great trust 
28) Consider the following political parties (list mainstream plus Eurosceptic and populist parties 
in respective country). To what extent do you agree with the following statement: These political 
parties are all the same.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Strongly disagree       Strongly agree 
29) Some people say that the personality of the party leader is the most important characteristic 
of a party. To what extent would you say the personalities of the following leaders are the 
defining feature of their party? [list party leaders + their party] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Personality very important      Personality unimportant 
30) Which broad political outlook are you most inclined to favor? (record two choices if 
respondent names two)  
1. Pro-market 
2. Social democratic 
 211 
3. Communist 
4. National traditions 
5. Environmentalist, green 
6. Other 
31) With which of the following statements do you agree the most?  
1. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.  
2. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a 
democratic one.  
3. For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-
democratic regime 
32) With which of the following do you most closely identify yourself?  
32b. And which do you identify with secondly?  
a. My ethnic group 
b. Local community or city in which I live  
c. Region  
d. Country:  
e. Europe  
f. Other 
33)  Do you think any of these pose a real threat to peace and security in this society? 
1. National minorities in our society 
2. Immigrants from other societies.  
3. Neighboring countries.  
4. Other countries (ask “which one(s)” if respondent picks this option) 
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4. Terrorist groups.  
34) On a scale of 1 to 10, please indicate your position on the following issue: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ethnic diversity      Ethnic diversity enriches life 
erodes a country‟s unity 
 
35) In your opinion, what is the most important problem facing the country at present? 
35b) And what is the second most important problem facing the country at present?  
19. The poor economic situation. 
20. The spread of corruption in society. 
21. The spread of crime in society. 
22. The loss of decision-making power and erosion of national identity after entry into the 
EU. 
23. Increasing influence of minority groups.  
24. Rise of radical religious movements.  
25. The poor condition of the environment.  
26. Decay of moral values in society.  
27. Other (please name).  
We are almost done. Let me ask you some brief final information about your background.  
36) What religious group do you belong to? 
  
1. Roman Catholic  
2. Protestant  
3. Orthodox Church  
4. Jewish  
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5. Muslim  
6. Other  
7. Not a believer 
 
37) (If names a religion) How often do you go to church or religious services?  
 
1. At least once a week  
2. Once or twice a month  
3. A few times a year  
4. About once a year  
5. Less often  
6. Never go to church 
 
38) What is your ethnic background? 
(for Bulgaria)    (for Czech Republic) 
1. Bulgarian    1. Czech 
2. Turkish    2. Moravian 
3. Roma     3. Slovak  
4. Armenian    4. Roma 
5. Other     5. Other 
39) Looking at this card, what would you say was the total income of your family during the last 
month from all sources? 
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